Evaluating the social perceptions of bullshit versus lying: the insidious bullshit hypothesis

Abstract

The present research reports three experimental studies that tested the insidious bullshit hypothesis and the effects of the bullshitters’ social status and group membership on bullshit receptivity. More specifically, applying a single factor between-subjects design, Study 1 (N = 216) and Study 2 (N = 190) tested the hypothesis that the act of bullshit is evaluated less negatively than the act of lying (Hypothesis 1), while Study 3 (N = 180), which applied a 2 (social status: low versus high) x 2 (group membership: ingroup versus outgroup) between-subjects factorial design, explored how the bullshitter’s social status and group membership affects participants’ receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit information (Hypotheses 2-4). The results of Study 1 supported the insidious bullshit hypothesis that bullshit is evaluated less negatively than the act of lying. These results could not be replicated in Study 2. The direct effects of the bullshitter’s social status and group membership (and their interaction) on participants’ receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit information were also not supported by the results of Study 3. Possible explanations for and implications of the results are outlined and discussed.