The hard problem of consciousness and panpsychism: investigating a foundation for artificial general intelligence

Abstract

The field of artificial intelligence has historically proceeded on computationalist accounts of the mind, which are a subset of physicalist accounts of the mind, that ignore metaphysical issues of consciousness posed by assuming physicalism. However, as the technology advances, the distinction between simulating behaviour and instantiating real understanding becomes critical. This study investigates the ontological foundations of artificial general intelligence (AGI), arguing that the prevailing physicalist and functionalist frameworks fail to give a complete account of consciousness. David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of Consciousness is analysed to demonstrate that a purely functional or structural description of the mind leaves an explanatory gap regarding subjective experience. Responding to this ontological challenge, the study proposes panpsychism as a viable alternate foundation for AGI. By grounding phenomenal properties at the fundamental level as intrinsic to matter, panpsychism resolves the problem of brute emergence that plagues physicalism. It is argued that this metaphysical reframing has profound implications for the AGI project. Ultimately, such a shift moves the goal of AGI further away, without denying it outright. The study concludes that panpsychism is a necessary ontological foundation for AGI, wherein consciousness is understood as an event of participation and not merely a physical process.

Die veld van kunsmatige intelligensie het histories die fisikalistiese aanname aanvaar dat intelligensie rekenkundig nageboots kan word, onderwyl dit die filosofiese probleem van bewussyn wat met die aanname gepaard gaan grootliks geïgnoreer het. Namate die tegnologie ontwikkel, raak die verskil tussen die nabootsing van gedrag en die werklike vestiging van begrip van kritieke belang. Hierdie studie ondersoek die ontologiese grondslag van kunsmatige algemene intelligensie (KAI/AGI) en voer aan dat die heersende fisikalistiese en funksionalistiese raamwerke nie ’n volledige verduideliking van bewussyn gee nie. David Chalmers se Moeilike Probleem van Bewussyn word ontleed om te demonstreer dat ’n suiwer funksionele of strukturele beskrywing van die verstand ’n verduidelikingsgaping ten opsigte van subjektiewe ervaring laat. In reaksie op hierdie ontologiese uitdaging stel die studie panpsigisme voor as ’n lewensvatbare alternatiewe grondslag vir AGI (KAI). Deur fenomenale eienskappe op ’n fundamentele vlak as ’n intrinsieke deel van materie te grond, los panpsigisme die probleem op van onbesielde ontstaan waardeur die fisikalisme gepla word. Daar word aangevoer dat hierdie metafisiese herformulering diepgaande implikasies het vir die AGI projek. Uiteindelik beweeg so ’n verskuiwing die doel van AGI verder weg, sonder om dit heeltemal te ontken. Die studie kom tot die slotsom dat panpsigisme ’n noodsaaklike ontologiese grondslag vir AGI is, waarin bewussyn verstaan word as ’n gebeurtenis van deelname en nie bloot as ’n fisiese proses nie.

Ngokomlando umkhakha wobuhlakani bokwenziwa i- (artificial intelligence) ubulokhu usekelwe emibonweni ye-computationalism mayelana nengqondo, okuyingxenye yemibono ye zazi zomzimba (physicalist) ephathelene nengqondo, lemibono ivame ukunganaki izindaba zephicamvelo(metaphysical) ezimayelana nokuqwashisa, ezivela ngenxa yokwamukela umbono wokuthi yonke into ingachazwa ngokomzimba kuphela. Nokho, njengoba ubuchwepheshe buqhubeka nokuthuthuka, umehluko phakathi kokulingisa ukuziphatha kanye nokokuqonda kwangempela kubonakala njengokumqoka kakhulu. Lolucwaningo luhlola izisekelo ze -ontoloji zobuhlakani bokwenziwa obujwayelekile (AGI), luveza ukuthi ukuthi imobono ebusayo ye-physicalist kanye ne- functionalist ayikwazi ukuchaza ngokugcwele isimo sokuqwashisa.Umqondo ka- David Chalmers’ i-(Hard Problem of Consciousness) uyahlaziywa ukuze kuboniswe ukuthi izincazelo zengqondo ezisekelwe kuphela emisebenzini yayo ingqondo okanye esakhiweni sayo kazikwazi ukuvala igebe lokuchaza phakathi kwezinqubo ezibonakalayo zobuchopho kanye nesipiliyoni esizizwelayo somuntu.Ukuphendula kulenselelo ye-ontoloji, lolucwaningo luphakamisa i-panpsychism njengesisekelo esingaba enye indlela efanele yokwakhiwa kobuhlakani bokwenziwa okujwayelekile (AGI). Ngokubeka izimfanelo zesipiliyoni sokuqwashisa ezingeni eliyisisekelo lobukhona njengengxenye yemvelo yento uqobo,i- panpsychism ixazulula inkinga yokuvela okungachazeki okuhlupha umbono i -physicalism. Kuvezwa ukuthi lokhu kuhlelwa kabusha kwe-metaphysical kunemithelela ebanzi nebonakalayo kumklamo wobuhlakani bokwenziwa obujwayelekile (AGI). Ekugcineni, lolushintsho lwendlela yokucabanga lwenza umgomo wokufinyelela kubuhlakani bokwenziwa obujwayelekile (AGI) ubonakale ukude kakhulu kunalokho obekucatshangwa ekuqaleni, ngaphandle kokuphika ngokuphelele ukuthi ungafezeka. Lolucwaningo luphetha ngokuthi i- panpsychism iyisisekelo se ontology esibalulekile nesidingekayo ekwakheni umqondo wobuhlakani bokwenziwa obujwayelekile (AGI), lapho ukuqwashisa kungaqondwa khona njengesenzo sokubamba iqhaza kunokubhekwa njengenqubo nje yomzimba.