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<title>Phronimon (2003) Vol. 4 No. 2</title>
<link>https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/5413</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 05:10:55 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-06-18T05:10:55Z</dc:date>
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<title>Hermeneutical paradoxes in the trial of Socrates</title>
<link>https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/5466</link>
<description>Hermeneutical paradoxes in the trial of Socrates
Ladikos, A.
The logical role of the paradox is not to state a truth whose&#13;
paradoxical nature lies in the difficulty we feel in maintaining it as&#13;
true, but rather to state somefhing thaf will cause fo feel as fa/se&#13;
something else we previously believed to be true. The Socrafic&#13;
paradox, somefimes called the "moral paradox, " is convincing and&#13;
true because if implicitly raises the question about the true good.&#13;
The drama of Socrates' trial and death indeed iIIustrates a&#13;
dilemma, in which on the one hand the philosopher cannot accept&#13;
the way of I ife prescribed by his tradition but 0 n the other hand&#13;
cannot offer an unquestionable alternative to it. The best&#13;
approach to the Socratic problem is an ec/ectic one, using all the&#13;
ancient sourees instead of championing a single author at the&#13;
expense of the rest.
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<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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