<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<title>Department of Mercantile Law</title>
<link href="https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/2977" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/2977</id>
<updated>2026-05-12T22:42:08Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-05-12T22:42:08Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Selected legal aspects of money-laundering control in trade-finance instruments</title>
<link href="https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32398" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Makuyana, Tsanangurai</name>
</author>
<id>https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32398</id>
<updated>2026-04-29T09:47:20Z</updated>
<published>2024-08-07T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Selected legal aspects of money-laundering control in trade-finance instruments
Makuyana, Tsanangurai
The traditional perception that trade-finance instruments are less susceptible to the risk of money laundering has changed due to the increasing threat of trade-based money laundering (TBML). In the process of facilitating trade-finance transactions, financial institutions may be entrapped in the dangers of TBML and be abused for criminal gains. In this regard, the institutions play a significant role in ensuring that only legitimate trade is facilitated through trade finance without being tainted by TBML. Despite that, vulnerabilities for the vice have been discovered in the trade-finance sector. This study employs a macro-comparative approach in examining how selected jurisdictions respond to the problem of TBML in trade-finance instruments. It analyses the vulnerabilities of documentary credits, documentary collections, demand guarantees and standby letters of credit to the potential risk of TBML. The thesis compares the response of the South African AML regime with that of the English, the US and Singapore AML regimes to the threat of TBML in the selected trade-finance instruments. The study reveals, inter alia, that there is not much difference between the South African AML regime and the AML regimes of the comparative jurisdictions in terms of the legislative response to the challenge of TBML in trade-finance transactions. However, the difference is apparent when it comes to the varied institutional responses to the problem within the jurisdictions considered in this thesis. While South African AML authorities have not made any official pronouncement against TBML in trade finance, those from other comparative jurisdictions have done so. The latter have also gone a step further to produce best practice reports on TBML for banks and other financial institutions involved in trade-finance transactions to enable the institutions to prepare for the challenge. However, similar to the South African position, there has not been any legislative change in the comparative jurisdictions to provide for TBML in specific terms. This means that these jurisdictions also deal with TBML using current AML legislation, which was designed originally for cash-based money-laundering operations. Therefore, the institutions and laws under the South African AML regime are relevant in the combatting of TBML. However, they may require some modifications to appropriately counter the challenge. The study makes various policy and best practice recommendations to strengthen the South African AML regime against TBML in trade-finance transactions.
</summary>
<dc:date>2024-08-07T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>A comparative legal study of the derivative action in South Africa, Ghana and  Australia</title>
<link href="https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32357" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Jennifer Owusu-Akyaw</name>
</author>
<id>https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32357</id>
<updated>2026-04-13T17:59:55Z</updated>
<published>2025-11-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">A comparative legal study of the derivative action in South Africa, Ghana and  Australia
Jennifer Owusu-Akyaw
The derivative action, as practised in many jurisdictions worldwide, is a remedy by &#13;
which a shareholder in a company (generally a minority shareholder) institutes legal &#13;
action to protect the rights and interests of the company. Under the predominantly &#13;
English law-based common law in South Africa, Ghana and Australia, the company is &#13;
deemed a separate entity independent of all its stakeholders, which can sue and be &#13;
sued in its corporate name. Decision-making within the company generally takes the &#13;
form of a majority decision by the company’s shareholders. The minority shareholders &#13;
are consequently subject to the decisions of the majority shareholders and the &#13;
company’s directors. The courts are generally reluctant to interfere in the internal &#13;
management of companies. This, therefore, offers restricted protection to the company &#13;
and minority shareholder rights where the majority shareholders decline to act against &#13;
the company’s wrongdoers on behalf of the company, or where the majority &#13;
shareholders or directors are themselves the wrongdoers. &#13;
The common-law derivative action is a remedy by which a shareholder in the company &#13;
(generally a minority shareholder(s)) may institute legal proceedings to protect the &#13;
rights and interests of the company. The common-law derivative action has several &#13;
flaws. It has been plagued by uncertainty, procedural weaknesses, and the high cost &#13;
of litigation. As a result, a number of leading jurisdictions, including South Africa, Ghana &#13;
and Australia have revised their legal rules relating to the derivative action. &#13;
Section 165 of the Companies Act 2008 is frequently referred to as South Africa’s &#13;
statutory derivative action and has completely replaced the common-law derivative &#13;
action and the derivative action under section 266 of the Companies Act 1973.  &#13;
Although there have been important court judgments clarifying the key features of &#13;
section 165 of the Companies Act 2008, certain weaknesses can still be identified &#13;
under the section.  &#13;
Ghana for a long time depended on the common-law derivative action with its attendant &#13;
flaws, vagueness, procedural irregularities, and uncertainties. However, on 2 August &#13;
2019, the Companies Act 2019 was passed which specifically provides for a statutory derivative action in terms of sections 201 to 204. The Ghanaian statutory derivative &#13;
action is relatively new in comparison with that of South Africa and Australia.  &#13;
Before 2000, the Australian derivative action had traditionally been enforced in terms &#13;
of the common law. The Corporations Act 2001 in Part 2F.1A under sections 236 to &#13;
242 finally provided for a statutory derivative action in Australia. It came into force on &#13;
13 March 2000 through the promulgation of the Corporate Law Economic Reform &#13;
Program Act 1999 (CLERP Act 1999).  &#13;
This thesis examines the statutory derivative action under South African, Ghanaian &#13;
and Australian company law. The thesis will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of &#13;
the South African statutory derivation action in section 165 of the Companies Act 2008 &#13;
in comparison with the strengths and weaknesses of section 201 of the Companies Act &#13;
2019 and sections 236 to 242 of the Corporations Act 2001.  &#13;
The purpose is to identify important lessons that South Africa, Ghana and Australia can &#13;
learn from each other to resolve their weaknesses. The thesis provides &#13;
recommendations for each of the three jurisdictions. The recommendations will be &#13;
based on the important lessons that can be learned from the key features of the laws &#13;
of each jurisdiction.; Die afgeleide aksie, soos dit in baie jurisdiksies wêreldwyd beoefen word, is 'n remedie &#13;
waardeur 'n aandeelhouer in 'n maatskappy (gewoonlik 'n minderheidsaandeelhouer) &#13;
regstappe instel om die regte en belange van die maatskappy te beskerm. Ingevolge &#13;
die oorwegend Engelse regsgebaseerde gemenereg in Suid-Afrika, Ghana en &#13;
Australië, word die maatskappy as 'n afsonderlike entiteit onafhanklik van al sy &#13;
belanghebbendes beskou, wat in sy korporatiewe naam kan dagvaar en gedagvaar &#13;
word. Besluitneming binne die maatskappy neem gewoonlik die vorm aan van 'n &#13;
meerderheidsbesluit &#13;
deur &#13;
die &#13;
maatskappy &#13;
se &#13;
aandeelhouers. &#13;
Die &#13;
minderheidsaandeelhouers is gevolglik onderhewig aan die besluite van die &#13;
meerderheidsaandeelhouers en die maatskappy se direkteure. Die howe is oor die &#13;
algemeen huiwerig om in te meng in die interne bestuur van maatskappye. Dit bied &#13;
dus beperkte beskerming aan die maatskappy en minderheidsaandeelhouerregte waar &#13;
die meerderheidsaandeelhouers weier om namens die maatskappy teen die &#13;
maatskappy se oortreders op te tree, of waar die meerderheidsaandeelhouers of &#13;
direkteure self die oortreders is. &#13;
Die gemeenregtelike afgeleide aksie is 'n remedie waardeur 'n aandeelhouer in die &#13;
maatskappy (gewoonlik 'n minderheidsaandeelhouer(s)) regstappe kan instel om die &#13;
regte en belange van die maatskappy te beskerm. Die gemeenregtelike afgeleide aksie &#13;
het verskeie gebreke. Dit word geteister deur onsekerheid, prosedurele swakhede en &#13;
die hoë koste van litigasie. Gevolglik het 'n aantal toonaangewende jurisdiksies, &#13;
insluitend Suid-Afrika, Ghana en Australië, hul regsreëls met betrekking tot die &#13;
afgeleide aksie hersien. &#13;
Artikel 165 van die Maatskappywet 2008 word gereeld na verwys as Suid-Afrika se &#13;
statutêre afgeleide aksie en het die gemeenregtelike afgeleide aksie en die afgeleide &#13;
aksie kragtens artikel 266 van die Maatskappywet 1973 heeltemal vervang. Alhoewel &#13;
daar belangrike hofuitsprake was wat die belangrikste kenmerke van artikel 165 van &#13;
die Maatskappywet 2008 verduidelik het, kan sekere swakhede steeds onder die artikel &#13;
geïdentifiseer word. Ghana was lank afhanklik van die gemeenregtelike afgeleide aksie met sy &#13;
gepaardgaande gebreke, vaagheid, prosedurele onreëlmatighede en onsekerhede. &#13;
Maar, op 2 Augustus 2019 is die Maatskappywet 2019 aangeneem, wat spesifiek &#13;
voorsiening maak vir 'n statutêre afgeleide aksie ingevolge artikels 201 tot 204. Die &#13;
Ghanese statutêre afgeleide aksie is relatief nuut in vergelyking met dié van Suid-Afrika &#13;
en Australië.  &#13;
Voor 2000 is die Australiese afgeleide aksie tradisioneel afgedwing ingevolge die &#13;
gemenereg. Die Korporasiewet 2001 in Deel 2F.1A onder artikels 236 tot 242 het &#13;
uiteindelik voorsiening gemaak vir 'n statutêre afgeleide aksie in Australië. Dit het op &#13;
13 Maart 2000 in werking getree deur die promulgering van die Korporatiewe Reg &#13;
Ekonomiese Hervormingsprogramwet 1999 (CLERP-wet 1999). Hierdie tesis &#13;
ondersoek die statutêre afgeleide aksie onder Suid-Afrikaanse, Ghanese en &#13;
Australiese maatskappyreg.  &#13;
Die tesis sal die sterk- en swakpunte van die Suid-Afrikaanse statutêre afleidingsaksie &#13;
in artikel 165 van die Maatskappywet 2008 uitlig in vergelyking met die sterk- en &#13;
swakpunte van artikel 201 van die Maatskappywet 2019 en artikels 236 tot 242 van die &#13;
Korporasiewet 2001. Die doel is om belangrike lesse te identifiseer wat Suid-Afrika, &#13;
Ghana en Australië by mekaar kan leer om hul swakpunte op te los. Die tesis verskaf &#13;
aanbevelings vir elk van die drie jurisdiksies. Die aanbevelings sal gebaseer wees op &#13;
die belangrike lesse wat geleer kan word uit die sleutelkenmerke van die wette van &#13;
elke jurisdiksie.
Summary in English and Afrikaans
</summary>
<dc:date>2025-11-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Confusion in the Judicial Review of Board Decisions to Remove Directors under Section 71 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008</title>
<link href="https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32167" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Cassim, Rehana</name>
</author>
<id>https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32167</id>
<updated>2026-02-19T08:09:04Z</updated>
<published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Confusion in the Judicial Review of Board Decisions to Remove Directors under Section 71 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008
Cassim, Rehana
A significant innovation of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, contained in section 71(3), is that the board of directors of companies is empowered to remove directors from office. Within twenty business days directors so removed may apply to court under section 71(5) of the Companies Act to have the board's decision reviewed. Section 71(5) is an essential remedy for directors. More than ten years after the promulgation of the Companies Act South African courts are beginning to develop the jurisprudence on the interpretation of section 71(5). This article examines recent cases in which courts had to interpret section 71(5) of the Companies Act. It discusses the following issues that these cases canvassed: (i) whether the board's power to remove a director under section 71(3) of the Companies Act constitutes administrative action and whether the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 applies to the review of these decisions under section 71(5) of the Companies Act; (ii) the ambit of a section 71(5) review and whether courts may review both the procedural aspects and the merits of the board's decision; (iii) the trigger for the twenty-business-day period to run; (iv) whether a court may condone a section 71(5) review application brought after the twenty business days expire; and (v) the awarding of costs in a successful section 71(5) review. As this article shows, courts have disagreed with and contradicted one another on the correct interpretation of section 71(5). This disagreement has led to confusion in South African law regarding the judicial review of board decisions to remove directors.
</summary>
<dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Regulation on the Use of Remuneration Consultants in South Africa: Proposals for Legislative Reform</title>
<link href="https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32166" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Cassim, Rehana</name>
</author>
<id>https://ir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/32166</id>
<updated>2026-02-19T08:04:12Z</updated>
<published>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Regulation on the Use of Remuneration Consultants in South Africa: Proposals for Legislative Reform
Cassim, Rehana
Over the years, companies have turned to remuneration consultants for guidance on remuneration matters. Their assistance is often sought when companies’ remuneration committees lack sufficient time, knowledge or data to decide effectively on executive remuneration. The assistance extends to accounting, tax and legal issues pertaining to executive remuneration. However, problems like potential conflicts of interest for remuneration consultants stem from factors such as the selection process, the duration of their contracts, and the services they provide to the company. A further challenge is benchmarking. Using remuneration consultants may contribute to excessive remuneration of executive directors, which in turn contributes to South Africa’s substantial socio-economic problems. Accordingly, the use of remuneration consultants must be strictly regulated in South Africa. This article examines how remuneration consultants are regulated by the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the JSE Limited Listings Requirements, and the King IV Report on Governance for South Africa, 2016. It compares the ways in which remuneration consultants are regulated in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States of America. This article argues that the use of remuneration consultants is not sufficiently regulated in South Africa, and it makes recommendations to help enhance this regulation.
</summary>
<dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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