RELIGION, ETHICS AND COMMUNAL INTERACTION IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA ‑ THE CASE OF THE DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

Michel Clasquin
Institute for Theological Research
University of South Africa

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ABSTRACT

Considering the immense power of religion for either good or evil, it is imperative that the followers of different religions should discuss their differences and negotiate a shared future, especially in a religiously pluralistic country such as South Africa. This article describes one attempt to engage in such a process; the South African Chapter of the World Conference on Religion and Peace's creation of the "Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities". The author was personally involved in the compilation of this text. The process that led up to this document is described, as is the intent behind some of its more contentious clauses. A prognosis for the document's future is also offered.

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INTRODUCTION: RELIGION, POLITY AND ETHICS

     For millennia, religion has stood as the basis and guarantor of ethics in society. While this function of religion has declined somewhat in the last century or so, and while it is true that the logical relation between religion and human rights is a questionable one (Prozesky 1989, 1990; Clasquin 1993) and that the entire concept of human rights is philosophically questionable (MacIntyre, quoted in Van Niekerk 1993: 27) it is still true that the hold that religion has on the minds of millions of people remains a potent weapon for good or evil.
     Just consider how many of the wars going on in the world are explicitly or implicitly religious in nature. In the case of Bosnia‑Herzegovina, for instance, there is much use of terms such as "ethnic cleansing". But the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims are genetically of the same Slavic stock; they even speak the same language, Serbo‑Croatian. No, that conflict is essentially a clash of cultures, and more specifically of cultures whose self‑identification is based largely, though not exclusively, on religion. In short, it is no exaggeration to describe the conflict there as a war between Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Muslims. Elsewhere, we can see religious conflicts between people who belong to the same large religious complexes, such as that between Protestant and Catholic Christians in Northern Ireland and between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims in Iraq. In South Africa, while there is little violent conflict explicitly based on religious grounds, the actions of some religious groupings in providing theological justification for racial discrimination during the apartheid years have left a bitter legacy (Saayman 1993, Jafta 1991: 4, Prozesky 1991: 2‑4). Without religious reconstruction, argues Villa‑Vicencio (1991, 1993), sociopolitical reconstruction of South African society is well‑nigh impossible.
     On the other side of the coin, we can see that many twentieth‑century figures who have become almost synonymous with ethical behaviour and moral persuasion were and are deeply religious people, though not necessarily in a conventional way. Here one could mention Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King junior, Alexander Solzhenitshyn and Mother Theresa. South Africa, too, has known a number of religious leaders and followers who have consistently spoken out against apartheid. The names of Bishop Tutu and Reverend Boesak most readily come to mind here.
     If, then, religion is potentially a force for either good or evil, it is the duty of all religious individuals and communities to direct this potential into ethically preferable channels. In other words, we must talk to and negotiate with those of other religious persuasions rather than fight them. There are two broad streams of such dialogue; firstly, one can speak to people within one's own religion, but of a different denomination ‑ this is called ecumenism. Secondly, one can talk to people who belong to a completely different faith‑tradition ‑ this is called interreligious dialogue. Although this distinction is at least partly an artificial one, based on a classification of "faith‑tradition" as the conventional, but highly questionable religious blocs of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and so on, it nevertheless remains a useful contrast.
     One organisation that has concerned itself with interreligious dialogue since 1970 is the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP). Although WCRP was formally founded in 1970, it grew out of a meeting in 1962 convened by Dr Dana Mclean Greeley during the Cuban missile crisis and from subsequent conferences in 1964 and 1966 (Clarke 1987: 39). Since its founding, WCRP has held international conferences every five years (Taylor & Eberhardt 1986: 463‑464). WCRP chapters now exist in many different countries, including South Africa. 
     It is a cardinal objective of WCRP‑SA to make South Africans aware of the extent to which our country is religiously pluralistic. Every world religion is represented here. Islam has been present almost as long as Christianity, and we have one of the largest concentration of Hindus outside the Indian subcontinent. Although Christianity is the single largest faith present here, it must be acknowledged that South Africa is not dominated by a single Christian denomination (see Chidester, quoted in Lubbe 1993: 154). On the contrary, the sheer variety of denominations is staggering and the interaction between them is not always marked by tolerance and dialogue.

DECLARATION PAST

     During WCRP‑SA's 1990 "National Inter‑Faith Conference on Religion‑State Relations", it was decided that "WCRP‑SA should initiate a process of developing a charter of religious rights and responsibilities within the context of a new constitutional framework" (WCRP‑SA 1991: 81). Although the initial impulse for the document was based on the thought of Albie Sachs (See Sachs 1991: 40), once the task was attempted the WCRP‑SA organisers felt it to be imperative that this be a religiousinitiative rather than a political one, and while political groupings were consulted throughout, their wishes and suggestions were not allowed to override those of religious organisations. For example, the very word "charter" was dropped at a very early stage since some participants felt that it would indicate an excessively close association with the "Charterist" movement in South African politics. Human nature being what it is, the compilers of the document still often refer to it nostalgically as "the charter", but this does not necessarily demonstrate any hidden ideological bias.
     The task of organising this document was assigned jointly to the Pretoria and Johannesburg Branches of WCRP‑SA, and when the National Charter Committee had been established, Dr J.N.J. (Klippies) Kritzinger was chosen as chairperson. Much input was also received from Dr Gerrie Lubbe, national chairperson of WCRP‑SA. Dr Lubbe was later to receive the Indicator Human Rights Award for his efforts to bring about interreligious dialogue, both in terms of the Declaration process and elsewhere. I was not present at the 1990 conference, but joined the WCRP‑SA effort soon thereafter and have been active in the organisation's "National Charter Committee" throughout its existence. My primary source for this article, therefore, is personal memory.
     The declaration was created by the following process (cf. WCRP‑SA 1991: 82‑88): first the intention to formulate such a document was announced and a request for inputs was made to as many religious, political and social organisations as could be reached. To achieve this end, inter‑faith and multi‑faith workshops were organised on a regional basis. Individual religious organisations also held their own meetings to discuss possible inclusions in and objections to such a document. While it is hardly possible to generalise on the way different religious organisations conducted such sessions, some idea of the process may be gained by looking at the way the issue was handled by one group with which I am personally involved, namely the Pretoria Buddhist Group (PBG). Observations from this group will therefore be intermingled with a description of the process in general to serve as a kind of miniature case study that will exemplify and concretise the Declaration process.
     Like a number of other religious organisations, the PBG called a special meeting of active members to discuss whether such a document was necessary and what the members felt should be included in it. Since the PBG is the only Buddhist group in Pretoria, no single‑faith Buddhist meeting was held in the region, as was the case with some other religious traditions. The PBG came up with 10 points that it felt warranted attention. In abbreviated form, they were:

(1) People have the unqualified right to make their own religious choices.
(2) Religion should cease to see itself as the co‑governor of the country.
(3) ... while religious belief should be free and unregulated, religious acts cannot be considered above the law.
(4) It is proposed that a joint religious committee be established to discuss these matters with the government on an ongoing basis.
(5) The breaking up of religious gatherings and desecration of religious objects such as shrines by persons of other religious persuasions should be outlawed.
(6) The religious institution of matrimony should be separated from the legal institution of marriage, as it is in certain western European countries. ... The PBG deplores the present situation, in which only Christian and Jewish religious officials are recognised as marriage officers.
(7) The teaching of religion in schools should be depoliticised by removing it from the hands of teachers and returning it to religious professionals.
(8) We suggest that the current unfair and discriminatory Christian monopoly over religious broadcasting be done away with.
(9) Adults should be allowed to refuse medical attention on religious grounds, but the state may legitimately insist on such attention being dispensed to children or to people not in full possession of their faculties.
(10) The PBG commits itself to reconciliation between the people of South Africa and pledges to work towards democracy, tolerance and peace, both within its own ranks and in its dealings with the outside world.

These ten points were received by the WCRP‑SA Charter Committee, along with others from a variety of religious institutions and individuals. From these inputs and suggestions, a Draft Declaration was created at a WCRP‑SA workshop in Johannesburg in June 1992. This Draft Declaration was then returned to the organisations previously contacted, including those who had not responded to the earlier call for suggestions, and their comments were invited. Press releases were also made at this time.
     Like other religious organisations, the PBG received a copy of the Draft Declaration and convened another special meeting to discuss it. It was noted that none of its suggestions had been incorporated verbatim, but that the general tenor of the Draft Declaration was highly compatible with its suggestions. It was therefore decided to accept the Draft Declaration in principle, but to suggest certain amendments.
     Many such suggestions were received from a variety of sources, some of them critical of specific passages, others looking suspiciously like a concerted letter‑writing campaign by religiously conservative groupings advising us, in the words of one correspondent to "... forget all about it!". From the more constructive among these comments a second Draft Declaration was compiled at a workshop near Hartebeespoort Dam in October 1992. It ended up about half the size of the original. This second draft was then disseminated again and was further amended by a national conference organised jointly by WCRP‑SA and the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) in November 1992. The conference was attended by representatives from most of the major denominations and religious organisations in the country. They were divided as follows:

60 Christians
20 Muslims
20 Hindus
20 Jews
30 others (academics, WCRP‑SA Charter Committee members, Buddhists and members of the Baha'i faith)

     These persons then jointly created the Declaration as we have it today (WCRP‑SA 1992a). It was then forwarded to religious organisations and individuals for possible ratification or suggestions for further amendment. The PBG once again distributed the Declaration and decided at one of its regular meetings to endorse the document. The reply slip enclosed with the Declaration was accordingly completed and signed and was forwarded to WCRP‑SA headquarters. The process that led to the creation of the Declaration is also described by Lubbe (1993: 145‑146).
     Naturally, the capsule description above does little justice to the long hours put in by the members of the Charter Committee, nor does it describe the fascinating patterns of interaction that occurred in the two workshops and the conference. Members of religious traditions that had long lived together amicably suddenly found each other on opposing sides over one particular issue, then joining forces with a completely different faith over another. In other cases, representatives of religions that have long histories of mutual enmity found themselves in unexpected agreement over specific issues. At times, the participants at the workshops displayed a sensitivity and goodwill towards the religious sentiments of others that was quite touching; once, for example, a Christian participant vetoed an excessively one‑sided theistic definition of religion on the grounds that it would exclude the Buddhists, before the Buddhist participant (the author) himself had a chance to object!
     Needless to say, at the final conference many of the delegates were present in a more "official" capacity, and tended to fight more specifically for the interests of their particular organisation.

DECLARATION PRESENT

     Let us now look at the main sections of the Declaration and explain each one's intentions and evolution, giving special attention to two of the more problematic areas, namely the issue of religious freedom in general and that of religious education in schools:

WE WHO SUBSCRIBE TO THIS DECLARATION

a. understand, for the purpose of this declaration, a religious community to mean a group of people who follow a particular system of belief, morality and worship, either in recognition of a divine being, in the pursuit of spiritual development, or in the expression of a sense of belonging through social custom and ritual;
b. recognise that the people of our continent, Africa, belong to diverse religious communities;
c. regret that in South Africa religion has sometimes been used to justify injustice, sow conflict and contribute to the oppression, exploitation and suffering of people;
d. acknowledge the courageous role played by many members of religious communities in upholding human dignity, justice and peace in the face of repression and division;
e. are convinced that our religious communities can play a role in redressing past injustices and the construction of a just society;

THEREFORE

f. affirm the rightful and lawful existence of diverse religious communities and call upon the state to recognise them and guarantee their autonomy;
g. call upon religious communities to promote spiritual and moral values, reconciliation and reconstruction, in accordance with their own teachings;

AND AFFIRM THAT...

     The preamble to the Declaration defines religion and religious communities, acknowledges the situation that has led to the creation of the document and makes certain demands on both the state and on religious communities themselves.
     The definition is in the form of a series of conjunctions and disjunctions: this shows the difficulty of defining something that will encompass all the phenomena that common sense tells us are "religious", a difficulty all too familiar to scholars active in Religious Studies. First it is stated that religious communities practise "a particular system of belief, morality and worship" and then that this is done for one of three reasons, namely "either in recognition of a divine being, in the pursuit of spiritual development, or in the expression of a sense of belonging through social custom and ritual". It is clear that the first of these three is intended to cover theistic religion, the second nontheistic religions such as Buddhism and the third is specifically aimed at the inclusion of African Traditional Religion. This definition, although somewhat cumbersome and inelegant, was approved unanimously by the conference. At the time, delegates were so relieved at having created this definition and at its being acceptable to all participants that there was much jocular talk about obtaining a patent or copyright on it.
     The definition is followed by a historical description of the religious plurality of South Africa, the fact that religion has been used both to oppress and to fight oppression, and the hope that religion may yet contribute to the rebuilding of the country.

1. PEOPLE SHALL ENJOY FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

1.1. All persons shall be free to have and give expression to a system of values or religious beliefs and practices of their choice, and no‑one shall be coerced into accepting or changing his/her religious affiliation.
1.2. Everyone should respect and practise tolerance towards other people whatever their religious beliefs, provided that the expression of religion shall not violate the legal rights of others.

     Naturally, a document such as a Declaration of Religious Rights and Responsibilities, particularly in the current South African situation, can do no other than to start out by stating what its creators regard to be the ideal situation regarding the role of religion and religious freedom in society. Religious freedom is a complicated issue, as can be seen in the variety of comments made by participants at a 1993 conference on this very topic held at Unisa under the auspices of the Institute for Theological Research (Kilian 1993).
     According to Sachs (1991: 39), there are basically five "constitutional options for governing the relations between religious organisations and the state." They are:

* Theocracy, that is, the acknowledgement of religious organisations as the holders of public power and of religious laws as the laws of the state.

* A partly, secular, partly religious state, with legal power‑sharing between the state and religious institutions ‑ each exercising constitutionally recognised power in its own sphere, usually with religious bodies controlling family law and, possibly, criminal law, and the state controlling all other aspects.

* A secular state with active interaction between the state and religious organisations, which not only have a constitutionally recognised sphere of autonomy, but collaborate with the state in tasks of mutual concern

* A secular state in which religious organisations have a tolerated, private sphere of action, but there is no overlapping or joint activity with the state.

* A secular state in which religious organisations are repressed."

     Sachs (1991: 39) goes on to state that "in the light of South Africa's history and culture, something along the lines of the third option mentioned above would achieve the greatest support, namely, a secular state with active interaction between the state and religious organisations." However, the situation remains problematical. Prozesky (1991: 7), for instance, sees a fundamental contradiction between religious belief and the secular democratic state, which he states as follows:

... if God is the only sovereign, or Christ the only Saviour, or the Qu'ran the last and greatest testament, then how can true believers accept a political system which effectively restricts God, Christ or the Qu'ran to only part of society, by confining them to private life, or to voluntary associations, or by removing the influence of religion from the organs of the state, as many democrats are hoping will happen in the new South Africa. Can believers really accept that cornerstone of modern democratic political structures, the distinction between secular and sacred? Can people who believe in their hearts that there is one true faith really accept that all faiths are on a par, and that the state should treat them equally?

     While Prozesky's comment is particularly apt in the case of the fourth of Sachs's constitutional options, it cannot be entirely discounted in the case of any but the first of the five options. Religions have a tendency to make absolutist claims to truth, and in the absence of restraining conditions, some traditions in particular seem to feel an overwhelming urge to establish a theocratic state. This is the problem that the first clause of the Declaration attempts to forestall.
     The first clause of the Declaration sets the scene for all that is to follow: the rest of the document can be said to emanate from this first statement of intent. It will be noted that besides asserting a conventional freedom of religious preference, the first clause also explicitly protects people's right to profess "a system of values" which is not necessarily part of a recognised religious system. This was a particularly thorny issue at the workshops and conference: the consensus that emerged was that we could not merely insist on the right to be religious, but that in all fairness the right not to be religious had to be equally guaranteed. However, the feeling was that while a person might denounce conventional religion, no‑one could survive as a human being without some value system, however vague and undefined. Accordingly, this is how clause 1.1 was phrased.
     While sub‑clause 1.1 states the religions' demand on state structures, sub‑clause 1.2 is more concerned with the actions of religious people and organisations themselves. This is a cardinal feature of the Declaration, for the compilers were concerned from the outset that it should not be a mere set of demands, but that it should also show the contributions that religious people, jointly, were willing and able to make to the reconstruction of South African society. Hence the title: Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities.
     This does not imply that the Declaration or its compilers had in mind the creation of a syncretistic, all‑encompassing super‑religion that would negate each tradition's claims to exclusivity, as is claimed by Stegen (1993:127). This is in fact strongly denied by Lubbe (1993: 148‑149). The point of acknowledging South African religious pluralism in a document such as this, as it was seen by the participants at the various workshops and conferences, is precisely to create a framework in which each tradition has a legal right to make robust claims to uniqueness and indispensability, but without taking actions that would encroach on another tradition's matching and equally valid right to do the same.
     In terms of the Liberal/Ecumenical/Differential trends in freedom of faith identified by Van Niekerk (1993: 30‑33), it is clear that the Declaration falls squarely into the liberal camp:

For the purposes of the liberal position, organisations of faith are regarded as private personae. Freedom of faith means that people of different religious value systems may enact this private matter in different ways, so long as their actions do not harm others (Van Niekerk 1993: 31, cf. Van Niekerk 1993: 28‑29).

     Incidentally, the Declaration in its first draft stage was initially titled the "(Draft) Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of Religious People" (WCRP‑SA 1992b), showing a typically "liberal" concern for the individual rather than the group. At the heart of the Declaration's stance on religious freedom it is therefore vulnerable to Van Niekerk's comment that:

When it comes to the question of freedom of faith, the bane of humanity is the distinction between sacred and profane, theocratic and secular, church and world, private and civil. What we should have is not just a separation between church and state ... (but) genuine differentiation between all societal structures ... plus interstructural integration in the sense of mutual responsibility and accountability (Van Niekerk 1993: 34, cf. 29‑30).

     Although the Declaration does here and there make attempts to address societal structures other than the state, the basic formula stated in its first clause show it to be based on a classic dualistic religion/nonreligion or state/nonstate paradigm. The way in which it attempts to solve this dichotomy is firmly based in what Van Niekerk (1993: 30) calls the "liberal trend" in religious freedom. While one imagines that this would be regretted by Van Niekerk, who seems to champion the differential trend, it can be said in favour of the compilers' liberal approach that it is consonant with the approaches taken by many successful democratic countries and that, in the absence of a single highly dominant faith that is itself unfractured, it does seem to work.

2. RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES SHALL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW

2.1. The state shall uphold the equality of all religious communities before the law, not identifying with or favouring any, but shall consult and cooperate with religious communities in matters of mutual concern.
2.2. Religious communities, singly, jointly or collectively, shall have the right to address the state and enter into dialogue on matters important to them.
2.3. The state shall uphold the professional confidentiality of people who exercise a leadership function in religious communities concerning any information acquired in the course of their religious duties.
2.4. There shall be no discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation in employment practices, except where religious affiliation is an essential job qualification.

     Clause 2 goes into state‑religion relationships in greater detail. Here it can be seen that the compilers of the Declaration ended up supporting the third of Sachs's five constitutional options; that is, no attempt is made to absolutise the state/religion relationship; instead, an attempt is made to create a situation where religious institutions are guaranteed a sphere of relative autonomy, but one in which an important aspect of that autonomy is the freedom to address the state on issues on which some or all of them feel that it is necessary to take a stand. Clause 2.1 is concerned with the equal treatment of religious communities, in other words with the avoidance of an established or state church, whether explicitly, as Islam is established in Iran and Buddhism in Cambodia (Kampuchea), where it was thus established in 1989 (Religion in Communist Lands 1989: 337) after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, or implicitly, as the Dutch Reformed "Susterkerke" have been in South Africa for the last half‑century. Clearly the compilers of the Declaration did not desire a "secular" state in the sense of a state that actively oppresses religion, nor even in the sense of such a strict division between church and state that school prayers become a politicised issue. What they did strive for was a situation in which the state and religious communities recognise each other's legitimate existence and consult each other whenever necessary. Some of the corollaries of such a relationship are spelt out in 2.2 and 2.3.
     The somewhat ambiguous qualification at the end of 2.4 refers directly to the fears of some of the participants that a straightforward ban on religious discrimination in employment practices could lead to, say, a Jewish or Islamic school being unable to insist on hiring only teachers of their own faith. Thus, the "essential job qualification" should be demonstrable and clearly defined in each case.
     In one sense, the position of this sub‑clause is anomalous, since it does not deal directly with the relation between the state and religious communities as do the other sub‑clauses of clause 2. Instead, it is concerned with the relation between employers and employees. The reason for this lies in the evolution of this sub‑clause: in an earlier version it was restricted to employees of the state, and the change to the present phrasing was only made at a very late stage of the process. On reflection, it might have been better to set it apart as a clause in its own right.

3. RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES HAVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO SOCIETY

Religious communities should, within their respective teachings,

3.1. educate their communities in spiritual and moral values and promote these in society;
3.2. direct energies, talents and resources towards the service of their fellow human beings;
3.3 direct their land resources to the benefit of the landless;
3.4. remain self‑critical at all times and strive to eliminate discrimination based on gender, race, language or social status in their own structures and among their members;
3.5. critically evaluate all social, economic and political structures and their activities;
3.6 ensure that people who exercise a leadership function in religious communities follow the dictates of their consciences to avoid conspiring or colluding to violate the public good or the legal rights of others.

     Clause 3 is the main expression within the Declaration of the religious communities' responsibility towards society. Some of the sub‑clauses remain problematic: 3.4, for instance, calls for the elimination of gender discrimination within religious communities; does this imply that women could make a legal demand to be ordained as priests or ministers in those religious insitutions which now restrict such ordination to males? Certainly, some representatives stated that their organisations felt so strongly about this issue that they would rather disband or go underground than submit to such a regulation. In the end, the consensus was that common sense would have to prevail: nowhere in the world has gender equality been pressed this far in any legal system. Hence the proviso "within their respective teachings": this qualification applies not only to the issue of gender equality but also to other concerns: some religions are deliberately "other‑worldly" and it would be unfair to force a "critical evaluation of all social, economic and political structures" upon them. Sub‑clause 3.6 is a direct counterweight to 2.3 ‑ if religious leaders have the right to professional confidentiality, then they also have the corresponding duty to use this confidentiality only for the common good.

4. PEOPLE HAVE THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
4.1. Parents, guardians and religious communities have the primary responsibility for the faith development of their children, and parental consent is required in all matters pertaining to their religious instruction and worship in schools.
4.2. The decision about whether or not to offer religious education in state schools shall be made by each local school community.
4.3 Schools that offer religious education may choose single‑faith instruction in each of the religions represented in the school, or the study of world religions, or both.
4.4. In the case of a single‑faith curriculum, school communities should invite suitably qualified persons from religious communities to give religious instruction to their own adherents.
4.5. Religious communities shall be entitled to establish and maintain their own educational institutions at all levels.
4.6. Such institutions shall have the right to financial support by the state, provided that they comply with the academic norms laid down by the educational authorities.
4.7. Public tertiary educational institutions should provide facilities for worship to all religious communities with significant representation at the institution.

     The issue of religious education and instruction in schools is one of the thorniest issues facing South Africa today. As I write this (November 1993) it is widely accepted that our country will soon have a single educational system, even if this is divided into regional structures for administrative purposes. Religion is an important aspect of South African society and it would appear vital that it be included in the curriculum somehow. But is it justifiable to offer instruction in just one religion, or one interpretation of that religion, as was done in the past? Even some Christian theologians are now referring to the teaching of religion in the South African educational system as a failed experiment: "In 1987 many Afrikaner students look on Christian Higher Education and Christian National Education as antiquated ideals to be left to the eccentrically religious or the far right wing groups" (Lederle 1988: 44). And Kerr (1991 :1) states that "We meet at a time (1991) when the school subject which, for the sake of convenience we will call Religious Education, continues to be quietly allowed to slip from the timetables of state schools." Moreover, with the demise of the Group Areas Act formerly white schools have already seen an influx, if a modest one, of nonChristian families into their feeder areas. How is this situation to be accommodated?
     Mitchell (1993) summarises the educational options regarding religious education in schools. In abbreviated form, they are as follows:

* The freedom to evangelise ‑ a situation in which one or a small number of officially approved religious traditions are entitled to evangelise pupils at state schools; the status quo in South Africa at the time of writing.

* The freedom to withdraw ‑ while excepting the above option in broad outlines, individual teachers and children are allowed to withdraw from religious education by taking recourse to a "conscience clause".

* The freedom to be separate ‑ in this option, representatives of the various faiths take over the teaching of religion to the children of their respective adherents. Religious education is thus taken out of the hands of professional educators.

* The freedom for a local option ‑ In this option, the parent community decides which religion is to be taught in a given school.

* The freedom from coercion ‑ This system would either follow the American pattern by removing religious education from the school syllabus entirely or replace the present confessional form of religious education with one that is based on firmly educational grounds and that would probably include the teaching of the basic tenets of the major religious traditions. While he accepts that each of these options has its own problems, Mitchell comes out in support for the implementation of this option in South African schools.

     Kerr (1991: 14) states that the most relevant models for the South African situations are those of the ex‑colonial African countries and that of England, "on which our system was originally modelled", and puts forward a similar, though not identical, list of possibilities:

* No religious education in schools

* Full cooperation between church and state

* Self‑determination by provincial authorities

* Ex‑colonial countries which have retained religious education after independence

* Ex‑colonial countries which have excluded religious education

* Countries where the religious and cultural diversity of the population is acknowledged and catered for in the religious education curriculum in state schools (Kerr 1991: 12‑14)

     This, then, is the basic problematical situation regarding the teaching of religion to schoolgoing children. The answer at which the Declaration's compilers eventually arrived is to promote the idea of a "local option" as much as possible, although the mention of "parental consent" in 4.2 also shows evidence of Mitchell's "right to withdraw". In the first place, the Declaration maintains that the religious instruction of children is primarily the responsibility of the family and the local religious community; the school can only play a supplementary role. Every parent‑teacher‑student association at every state school will then have the opportunity to choose between the following options:

1) No religious instruction at all.
2) The academic study of world religions.
3) Religious instruction in each of the faiths represented in the school.
4) Both (2) and (3).

     In other words, if a school community decides on option (3) and it has children from three different religious communities in its ranks, then those communities would be approached and asked to organise religious instruction for their own adherents' children. However, it should be noted that clause 4.4 does not expressly prevent teachers from being active in religious education alongside the religious functionaries. This arrangement differs from Mitchell's "local option" in that a simple majoritarian decision by the parent body would not be able to impose a single religion on an entire school ‑ the role of the parent‑teacher‑student association is simply to decide whether or not to teach religion at all; if the answer is in the affirmative, the only choice left is to decide whether to teach all the religions represented in the school in a confessional manner or to teach the academic, nonconfessional study of religions. Besides giving full and accurate expression to the entire range of religious belief present in the school, this would also reduce the workload of teachers, who would no longer necessarily have to offer religious instruction. This variation on Mitchell's "local option" would not be subject to his criticism that "such a system would only work if geographical and religious apartheid remained intact" (Mitchell 1993: 118). As families of a hitherto‑unrepresented religious faith moved into a new neighbourhood and enrolled their children into a local school that had opted to give religious instruction in all the faiths represented in the student body, the teachers would contact the family's religious leaders and arrange for the children's religious instruction accordingly. No doubt, there would be some administrative difficulties involved in this, but the end result would be that no‑one could claim that he or she was being discriminated against or dominated because of his or her religious affiliation, or at least not in the educational system.
     The alternative option, "the academic study of world religions", would be a new option in South African education, but one that has been offered successfully in other parts of the world, notably the United Kingdom. It could be presented instead of or in conjunction with single‑faith instruction.
     In addition to the above, religious groups would also be entitled to start their own private sectarian schools, much as is the case today. In such schools, people would have the "freedom to evangelise", as Mitchell puts it.
     It can be seen, therefore, that the Declaration's statements on religious education tries to accommodate as many people as possible by combining aspects of some of the options as delineated by Mitchell. The most important aspect of the Declaration's educational policy, however, remains the local option. In this, the document recognises that a school in Sea Point, Hillbrow or Sunnyside is likely to have a different schoolgoing population with a different religious profile than one in Malmesbury or Bronkhorstspruit. To impose a single religious policy for all of these would amount to exactly the kind of religious imperialism that the document tries to get away from.

5. PEOPLE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS SHALL ENJOY RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

5.1. Members of the security forces, prisoners, as well as patients and residents in public institutions, shall have the right to observe the requirements of their religions.
5.2. Such persons shall have access to spiritual care from their own religious communities.

     Clause 5 of the Declaration deals with the religious rights of people who for some reason or another are not able to enjoy regular communication with their religious communities. It is stated that not only should such persons be entitled to observe the requirements of their faith, but that they should also be allowed to receive visits from religious ministers of their particular organisation. This was a relatively uncontroversial clause; only the precise phrasing was debated at the final conference.

6. RELIGIONS HAVE THE RIGHT TO PROPAGATE THEIR TEACHINGS

6.1. The propagation of religious teachings should be done with respect for people of other religious communities, without denigrating them or violating their legal rights.
6.2. Such propagation should not take unfair advantage of anyone on the basis of age, physical and mental weakness, economic need or any other vulnerability.

     Religious propagation, another thorny issue, is tackled by clause 6 of the Declaration. If I believe that my religion is true and others are false, and that it is my spiritual duty to convert other people to my religion, does this imply that I am allowed to make denigrating and inflammatory statements about others? Can I call another person's most deeply‑held beliefs a false religion? Can I go into hospitals and attempt to convert people who are bedridden and unable to shut the door in my face? Can I make a conscious effort to proselytise impressionable school children against the wishes of their parents? If not, how does this affect the freedoms of expression and association which we all hope will be entrenched in a future legal system? Here the Declaration can make only general remarks: many of the practical issues remain to be worked out. The Draft Declaration was much more specific in issuing guidelines, but conceptual and practical difficulties kept cropping up that reduced the final statement to this somewhat vague statement of intent.

7. RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES SHALL HAVE ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC MEDIA

7.1. Every religious community shall have reasonable access to the publicly‑owned communications media and the right to establish its own.
7.2. To ensure such reasonable access and to avoid misunderstandings and intolerance, the broad religious spectrum of society should be represented on all boards responsible for religious media.

As in the case of religious education in schools, the Declaration's standpoint on religion and the media is an attempt to move away from the status quo, in which one religion virtually has a monopoly on religious broadcasting, to a more balanced position in which any religious community would have a fair chance of gaining air time on the publicly‑owned radio and television networks. An alternative proposal, first put forward by representatives of the Hindu community, was that all religions should have "equal" access. But this has problems of its own: does a religion with a hundred thousand followers get the same amount of air time as one with five million? And what are the groups that should be equalised in this respect: Christian‑Jewish‑Muslim‑Hindu perhaps, in which case one offends members of minority religions by their omission and the majority religion by its unjust allocation of only one quarter of the available air time when it lays claim to three quarters of the population. Or should the Christians be divided into Protestant and Catholics (and Orthodox?), the Muslims into their schools of jurisprudence and so on? Or perhaps each Christian denomination and every analogue of the denomination in other religions, even if it has no more than a dozen followers, should be seen as a separate religion with a valid claim to "equal" media exposure? Similar problems plague the idea, as stated in the Draft Declaration, that all religious communities should have "proportional" access. In the end, it was decided to leave the specifics to be negotiated, but to lay down the principle of "reasonable access". The advantage of this phrasing, as was pointed out by a participant who belonged to the legal profession, is that the term "reasonable" is a justiciable one, that is, it is a term that has a definite and specific meaning in legal terminology and that can therefore be enforced by a court of law.

8. THE STATE SHALL RECOGNISE SYSTEMS OF FAMILY AND CUSTOMARY LAW

8.1. The state shall grant legal status to systems of family and customary law of religious communities with regard to marriage and its dissolution,the support of dependents and succession.
8.2. The state shall recognise persons from all religious communities as marriage officers.
8.3. Marriages and dissolutions contracted under family or customary law should be registered with the appropriate civil authorities.
8.4. People whose family or customary law has been granted legal status may also have legal recourse to the civil authorities on issues of family law.
8.5. In the case of the dissolution of a marriage, recourse may be sought in civil law after the avenues of family or customary law have been applied.

     If any one issue ever threatened to shipwreck the entire Declaration process, the question of family and customary law surely was it. In practical terms, there are three religious complexes in contemporary South Africa that maintain extensive systems of family and customary law besides the civil legal system: Judaism, Islam and African Traditional Religion, with a number of variations within each of these. Other religious traditions also have certain codes of conduct and procedures for censuring or even expelling their members, of course; the vital distinction is that the abovementioned three traditions have certain religio‑legal requirements that coincide and sometimes conflict with areas of life in which the modern state claims predominance. These areas include issues such as marriage and divorce. In many respects, female participants argued, retention of these customary systems of law would disadvantage women. Some traditional (generally male) participants, on the contrary, were quite open about their intention to abandon the Declaration process if the issue was not addressed in a way that would include retention of customary law.
     The requirements of these traditions in respect of marriage, divorce and the support of dependents were often in direct opposition to one another. Other religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, had no specific, extensive religio‑legal systems of their own but were affronted by the practice, until very recently, of the state appointing only Christian ministers and Jewish rabbis as marriage officers; this was also true of Islamic marriages (cf. Saayman 1993: 42; Sooka 1993: 83; Omar 1993: 76, 80).
     In compiling the compromise that is clause 8, one principle was kept in mind: the simple realpolitik of the situation is that the South African civil legal system is not about to relinquish its position as the law of the land, nor would it be advisable to attempt to establish a country with parallel and equal legal systems. Thus, if systems of family and customary law are to be given some kind of recognition, they will have to be in such a position that, while they may enjoy considerable autonomy in practice, they will ultimately remain subordinate to civil law. Hence the requirement that all marriages and dissolutions of marriages also be registered with the civil authorities, and the stipulation that final recourse may be had to the civil courts. "The intention of this clause was to give women who are trapped in religious marriages the right of civil recourse where their religious leaders did not see fit to allow them a divorce" (Sooka 1993: 90).
     One should not underestimate the depth of feeling that is engendered by this clause: one Muslim spokesperson was heard to say that the Muslim community would go along with the Declaration, despite some remaining misgivings, just to ensure the recognition of their system of family law.

9. THE HOLY DAYS OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES SHALL BE RESPECTED

9.1. Authorities and employers shall make reasonable allowances for people from all religious communities to observe their religious holidays and days or times of worship.

     The majority of workshop and conference attendants recognised the de facto situation of South Africa having a Christian majority and made no radical proposals to de‑establish Sundays and other Christian holidays. However, the Draft Declaration's recognition of Sunday as the generally accepted day of rest was also felt to be too partisan. Thus, clause 9 of the Declaration contains a quite moderate proposal that "reasonable allowances" should be negotiated between the state and religious communities and between employers and employees.

10. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS MAY OWN PROPERTY AND BE EXEMPT FROM TAXES

10.1. Local authorities shall set aside adequate land for religious purposes, such as worship, burial and cremation, and shall respect the religious integrity of these sites.
10.2 Such land shall be allocated to religious communities in terms of the needs of the local population.
10.3. Assets, religious objects and symbols imported and funds received by religious communities for worship, education and works of mercy shall be exempt from taxation, and donations or bequests for the above purposes shall be tax‑deductible.

     The final clause of the Declaration was debated hotly at the workshops and the conference: some delegates felt that such a straightforward demand for the right to "own property and be exempt from taxes" was self‑serving and might damage the credibility of the entire document. It was also pointed out that to a large extent this position was already reflected in the status quo. The counter‑arguments were that inequities do in fact existand that the status quo was a mere happenstance which might be repealed by a future government. Eventually, it was decided that the principle needed to be established, and the right of a religious community to own assets and be tax‑exempt was incorporated in the Declaration.

AFFIRMATION

We, the signatories to this declaration,

convinced that there is an urgent need for all religious communities and the state to accept and implement the principles in this declaration;

trusting that this will contribute to better relations between the state and religious communities and between religious communities themselves;

recognising that these principles will function within the framework of a Bill of Rights;

appeal to all religious communities to promote these principles everywhere.

     The Declaration ends with an affirmation that states the importance the signatories believe it to have, their recognition that it will function within a Bill of Rights and an appeal to religious organisations to promote the principles it contains.
     The conference also approved a condensed version of the Declaration to be forwarded to the Constitution‑making body as a candidate for inclusion in a future Bill of Rights:

1. All persons are entitled to freedom of conscience, to profess, practise, and propagate any religion or no religion and to change their religious allegiance;

2. Every religious community and/or member thereof shall enjoy the right ‑		2.1 to establish, maintain and manage religious institutions and to have its particular system of family law recognised by the state;
2.2 to criticise and challenge all social and political structures and policies in terms of the teachings of that religion.

     It may be instructive to compare this proposed clause to some other proposals by major political forces on the same topic. The following were the most recent that could be obtained at the time of writing, and were kindly provided by Mr. P. A. Van Wyk of the South African Law Commission. In alphabetical order, they are:

African National Congress:

There shall be freedom of worship and tolerance of all religions, and no State or official religion shall be established.

The institutions of religion shall be separate from the State, but nothing in this Constitution shall prevent them from co‑operating with the State with a view to furthering the objectives of this Constitution, nor from bearing witness and commenting on the actions of the State.

Places associated with religious observance shall be respected, and no‑one shall be barred from entering them on grounds of race.

(African National Congress 1993: 7)

Democratic Party:

Every person shall have the right to ... freedom of conscience and religion and, consequently, the State shall not favour one religion over another.

(Democratic Party 1993: 3)

KwaZulu Legislative Assembly:

Religious freedoms are recognized and shall be guaranteed. Everyone shall have the right to profess and promote his or her religion or belief, and to establish institutions and organize activities for this purpose. The State of KwaZulu/Natal shall not take any action supporting or endorsing any particular religious belief or confession or conditioning the exercise of religious freedom to any requirement, and shall promote conditions for the equal and free exercise of all religions and beliefs in the State.

(KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 1992: 10)

South African Government:

Every person shall have the right to profess and practise the religion of his choosing.

(This) shall not preclude ministration to the forces, the public service and other state institutions, religious instruction or exercise in schools, and religious broadcasts instituted by or under any law.

(South African Government 1993: 8)

     It is ironic that, of these proposals, only the WCRP‑SA Declaration in its condensed form, the one created by religious people, specifically guarantees the right of persons to have and propagate "no religion" and to "change their religious allegiance"! A minor point is the drafting committee's decision, contrary to most of the other proposals, not to capitalise the term "state". As one delegate stated, "Why capitalise `state'? It is not sacred!" By and large, however, the proposed clauses of political parties and government structures contain much that is similar to the Declaration in both its full and condensed forms. However, the ANC's proposal contains a specific reference to racial discrimination which does not appear in quite such a prominent form in the Declaration, and the SA Government's proposal contains references to religious education and broadcasting that seem to support the status quo and to be incompatible with the concepts contained in the Declaration.
     The Declaration as it stands now still has shortcomings: despite WCRP's best efforts, we are still encountering religious organisations that have never heard of the Declaration or the process that brought it into being, this despite the attention paid to it in the press and on television. This lack of "grassroots" involvement is now being rectified by WCRP‑SA with a series of meetings and lectures, of which this article is a modest part. Another shortcoming is that most of the members of the Charter committee and the attendants at the two workshops could be said to belong to the "left wing" of their various religions ‑ they were committed to the interfaith process and to the creation of a document that would be representative of the interests of allreligious South Africans, or at least as many as possible. Naturally, those that chose not to participate had no opportunity to have their views included. Also, at no stage did the process involve a bona fide representative of African Traditional Religion, though this was contrary to our wishes and was due largely to the non‑hierarchical, non‑organisational nature of this religious tradition.
     The original Draft Declaration also contained a clause pertaining to conscientious objection to military service. This was dropped because some of the workshop attendants felt that this issue was sufficiently important to be dealt with separately in the Bill of Rights, and that the issue of conscientious objection should in any case not be restricted to purely religiousobjections. When this was put to the 1992 conference, though, the motion to forward such a proposal to the constitution‑makers was defeated, as delegates from religious communities which had not in the past been much affected by military call‑ups felt that their constituencies had not had sufficient opportunity to consider the issue. It can be expected though, that the issue will arise once more in the future; in the recent past "Buddhism was not considered sufficiently `religious' to ensure that Buddhists qualified for the right to conscientious objection until a Supreme Court case in Bloemfontein ruled otherwise ..." (Saayman 1993: 42). Religious discrimination comes in many guises.

DECLARATION FUTURE

     Quo vadis, Declaration? The document was disseminated to religious communities throughout the country for endorsement. These have flooded in from individuals, but official endorsements from religious communities have been more slow in appearing. This is to be expected: a given church might conduct a general synod only once every four years, and even then such a matter might be referred to a committee with instructions to report back at the next general synod. Smaller religious communities (such as the PBG) and those with more hierarchical decision‑making structures have been quicker to respond.
     By no means is this Declaration to be thought of as having been carved in metaphysical granite: if it turns out to be totally unacceptable to most of the major religious organisations in the country, then we may have to start from scratch. If, however, only some sections turn out to be unacceptable or serious omissions are pointed out, then a series of separately worded amendments and/or addenda may be the best way to make the document more widely acceptable.
     At first, the intention was that the Declaration, once it was finished, would somehow be "appended" to the Bill of Rights in a future Constitution, along with other, similar documents. While this hope has not entirely faded, the emphasis has since shifted to the creation of a conscientising document, a text that would describe what it is that religious people and organisations expect from their government and what they would be willing to do in return, a set of conditions for which they would jointly strive, be it in the field of constitutional law or anywhere else. In short, it should describe what we, as religious South Africans, want: how to get it will be a matter of long‑term tactics and religion‑state negotiation.
     A Declaration by itself is little more than a piece of paper which will not decrease the level of violence in the country or lead to a negotiated constitutional settlement or to interreligious tolerance by its mere existence. Only if religious and nonreligious institutions alike acknowledge the spirit of cooperation and tolerance in which it was conceived and act to implement its suggestions can it make a difference to the ethical and religious climate of the country.
     Thus, this is what the assembled religious communities of South Africa want and are able to contribute to the ethical and constitutional debate: whether it is sufficient will have to be left to posterity to judge.

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Clasquin, M. 1993. Buddhism and human rights. Journal for the study of religion. Vol. 6:2. (September 1993). pp. 91‑101.

Democratic Party, 1993. Freedom under the rule of law: advancing liberty in the new South Africa. Democratic Party draft bill of rights. May 1993. [sl].

Jafta, L. D. 1991. Response to Dr Langan's paper. Unpublished article read at a conference on "The contribution of South African Religions in the coming South Africa", University of Natal (Pmb), 15‑17 September 1991.

Kerr, S. E. 1991. Religious education in the new South Africa. Unpublished article read at a conference on "The contribution of South African Religions in the coming South Africa", University of Natal (Pmb), 15‑17 September 1991.

Kilian, J. (ed). 1993. Religious freedom in South Africa. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

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Lederle, H. I. 1988. Christian Higher Education in South Africa: the enterprise that miscarried. Theologia Evangelica. 21:1. March 1988. pp. 34‑49.

Lubbe, G. J. A. 1993. A Christian perspective on religious freedom in the South African context. in Kilian, J. (ed). 1993. Religious freedom in South Africa. Pretoria: University of South Africa. pp. 144‑159.

Mitchell, G. 1993. Education and religious freedom. in Kilian, J. (ed). 1993. Religious freedom in South Africa. Pretoria: University of South Africa. pp. 113‑124.
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Prozesky, M. 1991. Religion in the old South Africa and the new: the broad picture. Unpublished article read at a conference on "The contribution of South African Religions in the coming South Africa", University of Natal (Pmb), 15‑17 September 1991.

Prozesky, M. 1989. Is the concept of Human rights logically permissible in theistic religion? Journal for the study of religion. 2:2 September 1989. pp 17‑26.

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Saayman, W. A. 1993. Religious freedom in apartheid South Africa. in Kilian, J. (ed). 1993. Religious freedom in South Africa. Pretoria: University of South Africa. pp. 37‑47.

Sachs, A. To believe or not to believe. in WCRP‑SA. (1991). Believers in the future. Proceedings of the national inter‑faith conference on religion‑state relations. Cape Town: World Conference on Religion and peace (South African chapter). pap. 37‑42. (Reprinted from Sachs, A. 1990. Protecting human rights in a new South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. pp. 43‑49.)

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Van Niekerk, E. 1993. What is religious freedom? in Kilian, J. (ed). 1993. Religious freedom in South Africa. Pretoria: University of South Africa. pp. 14‑36.

Villa‑Vicencio, C. 1991. Catharsis, religion and culture: Keeping the revolution human. Unpublished article read at a conference on "The contribution of South African Religions in the coming South Africa", University of Natal (Pmb), 15‑17 September 1991.

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WCRP‑SA. 1991. Believers in the future. Proceedings of the national inter‑faith conference on religion‑state relations. Cape Town: World Conference on Religion and peace (South African chapter). Edited by J. N. J. Kritzinger.

WCRP‑SA. 1992a. Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities. Krugersdorp: World Conference on Religion and Peace (South African chapter).

WCRP‑SA. 1992b. Draft Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of Religious People. Krugersdorp: World Conference on Religion and Peace (South African chapter).

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Michel Clasquin is a Research Assistant at the Institute for Theological Research, University of South Africa, Pretoria.