DISPLACEMENT AND PLACEMAKING AMID CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE'S CABO DELGADO: AN ETHNOHISTORY STUDY OF THE AFFINITIES BETWEEN ETHNICITY AND BELONGING AMONG THE MAKONDE AND MAKHUWA FAMILIES.

by

NELSON TIVANE

submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the subject

ANTHROPOLOGY

At the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUPERVISOR: DR. GLORIA SAUTI

Pretoria, April 2026



Figure 1: Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, Geographic scope and study area.

Figure 5: Model of IDP & Household house in an involuntary resettlement camp: Ngalane 1, Pemba-Metuge District.

Figure 4: Ngalane 1: IDP- involuntary resettlement neighbourhood: Ngalane 1, Pemba-Metuge District

Figure 2: Model of House in a Government-induced voluntary resettlement Camp: Marocane, Ancuabe District.

Figure 3: Road and Hospital in a Government-induced voluntary resettlement Camp: Marocane, Ancuabe District.

DECLARATION

Student number: 20131011

I declare that *"Displacement and placemaking amid conflict in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado: an ethnohistory study of the affinities between ethnicity and belonging among the Makonde and Makhuwa people"* is my own work, and that all sources used or quoted have been properly indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

I further declare that I submitted the dissertation to originality, plagiarism detection, and checking software. I further declare that I have not previously submitted this work, or part of it, for examination at the University of South Africa (UNISA) for another qualification, or at any other higher education institution.

NELSON TIVANE

DEDICATION

To my son, Kheisson, my daughter Khailissa, and my mother, Isabel for their [in]-visible light and the rootedness that sustains my persistent pursuit of excellence and ‘personhood’; and for the blessing of being a father.

In memory of my father.

To my brothers, the light of brotherhood and remembrance of where I came from.
To my children’s mother, Idalissa H. Balane, for the precious gift of fatherhood and parenthood, and for the years of learning and adapting through challenging circumstances.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Place and belonging - I remember it vividly, under a tree, at my lowest psychological and spiritual breaking point, I decided to call A. Roland Brouwer. I shared with him where my mind was. He suggested that I seek a new challenge. One that would nourish a long-term ambition – a personal project, to put in my words. I decided to go for my academic training and pursue a second master's degree, as I was not satisfied with the first. I embarked on the mission of formulating this research project. In this journey, I learned a great deal from my calls and meetings with S. Gaye Thompson – who, it can be said, has long been an inspirational anthropologist. There would be no Nelson Tivane without A. Roland Brouwer and S. Gaye Thompson, and the late José Mota-Lopes.

Alongside them, my utmost gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr Gloria Sauti, who has supported and assisted me countless times. This is extended to Dr Stephan Van Wyk. I am profoundly grateful.

I would like to thank the twelve families who were my main participants, and the institutions I interviewed. I immensely appreciate the families' willingness to participate in the study and to reencounter their traumas while narrating their memories.

To my colleagues at the Norwegian Refugee Council, especially Ulrika Bloom (Country Director) and Nina Birkeland, I cannot thank both enough for their support right to the end. I thank the *Instituto Nacional de Gestão e Redução do Risco de Desastres – **INGD***, and the Municipality of Pemba, for permitting this study.

Special thanks go to the following dearest friends: Felizarda Machel Manjate, Felisberto Afonso, Aly Juma Sahal and Elquina Armindo Maduela. I am so grateful for your time and insightful support during these tumultuous times. I found no words to fully express the value of your support in my life.

Finally, to God. For my existence.

ABSTRACT

Since 2017, conflict has erupted in Mozambique, spreading terror, violence and displacing millions of people from areas largely inhabited by two ethnic groups: Makonde and Makhuwa. For centuries, these groups have been distorted as 'traditional enemies', posing as key conflicting element of the current war. What prompted my questioning was the observation that thy are now entangled in a sort of 'appeasement' and 'rapprochement' within and around displacement and resettlement camps.

This dissertation deploys Franz Boas's historical particularism and employs an ethnographical approach to examine the experiences and narratives of displacement, and the role of ethnicity and ethnic boundaries in processes of re-encountering of place to dwell and belong, amid conflict. Altogether, ethnicity, social boundaries and *home* are a void in Mozambican's contemporary conflict studies. This study changes the current state of art. It centres *home* [in conflict settings] as an often-contested profound concept and repository of identity, security and social memory. Home becomes an element that either fosters social cohesion or fuel of conflict, by establishing social boundaries, exclusionary and antagonistic identities. By this, the essay builds footprint of factors serving as powerful identity from where conflicts may arise or be intensified.

The essay argues that, to survive displacement, lower-class Makonde and Amakhuwa peoples have produced two [ethnos] social phenomena. The first is a parallel process of dilation and stretching of ethnic boundaries. This phenomenon encompassed [re]creation and expansion of social networks through appropriation of space and new neighbouring practices, characterised by a sort of appeasement and rapprochement, in [what I call] *ethno-mingled communities*. This did not entail changes in concept and practice of *home*, as it continued to be a multilayered material concept. However, it entailed changes for its spatial manifestation (in place) and some elements of *home*. The second phenomenon is the emergence of [what I call] the 'revolving door' status of Others – encompassing displacement experience amounted leading to *de facto* 'refoulement'.

The study was conducted in three districts of Cabo Delgado (see figure #1).

Keywords: *conflict, displacement, ethnicity, home and belonging*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADIN	Agência de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte (*Northern Integrated Development Agency*)
DUAT	Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra (*Right of use and benefit of land*)
ENDE	National Development Strategy
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (*Mozambique Liberation Front*)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INGD	Instituto Nacional de Gestão e Redução do Risco de Desastres (*National Institute for Disaster Risk Management*)
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PEGDI	Política e Estratégia de Gestão de Deslocados Internos (Policy/Strategy on the Management of Internally Displaced People)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
UNISA	University of South Africa
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, Geographic scope and study area. I
Figure 2: Model of House in a Government-induced voluntary resettlement Camp: Marocane, Ancuabe District. II
Figure 3: Road and Hospital in a Government-induced voluntary resettlement Camp: Marocane, Ancuabe District. II
Figure 4: Ngalane 1: IDP- involuntary resettlement neighbourhood: Ngalane 1, Pemba-Metuge District II
Figure 5: Model of IDP & Household house in an involuntary resettlement camp: Ngalane 1, Pemba-Metuge District.............................. II
Figure 6: Map of Cabo Delgado Province Language 54

CONTENTS

DECLARATION III
DEDICATION IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT V
ABSTRACT VI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS VII
LIST OF FIGURES VIII
1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. My interest in the intersections between ethnicity, place, and belonging. 1
1.2. Rationale for the Research 4
1.3. Problem Statement 5
1.4. Aim 6
1.5. Objectives 6
1.6. Research methodology 6
1.6.1. The research setting and methodology 6
1.6.2. Population and Sampling 8
1.6.3. Household interviews 9
1.6.4. Observation and participant observation 10
1.7. Data analysis. 10
1.8. Ethical considerations 11
1.9. Structure of the Dissertation 12
1.10. Struggling with the orthography of Cabo Delgado's languages. 13
1.11. Conclusion 14
2. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 16
2.1. Introduction 16
2.2. Ethnicity 16
2.3. Belonging and Dwelling-place 21
2.4. Conclusion 24
3. CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL SETTING, SOCIOCULTURAL CHANGES, AND HUMAN MOBILITY AMONG THE MAKONDE AND MAKHUWA 25
3.1. Introduction 25
3.2. The Makonde people, ... 25
3.2.1. Nature, origin, and political organization 25
3.2.2. The Economy 29

3.2.3. Social practices and Identity 32
3.3. The Makhuwa people 36
3.3.1. Nature, origin, and political organization.. 36
3.3.2. The economy 40
3.3.3. Social Practices and Identity 43
3.4. Conclusion 47
4. CHAPTER FOUR: CONFLICT, DISPLACEMENT, AND PLACEMAKING AMONG THE MAKONDE AND MAKHUWA 48
4.1. Introduction 48
4.2. The narratives of Conflict and Displacement between the Makonde and Makhuwa 48
4.3. Where and when is home: the concept of home and its intersections among the Makonde and Makhuwa.. 54
4.4. Living together: ignoring roots, negotiating home to belong or '*revolving door'*? 72
4.5. Conclusion 80
5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 81
5.1. Future Studies or PhD Research 86
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY.. 88

1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. My interest in the intersections between ethnicity, place, and belonging.

The population and cultural variation in Mozambique entail processes of enormous complexity, such as migration and deterritorialization of social networks from several diverse ethno-linguistic groups, who inhabit a territory defined by artificially created colonial boundaries. The colonial Portuguese took advantage of this by implementing a conscious policy of divide and rule. Under this policy, major ethnic groups were set against each other to the advantage of the colonial power, setting the tone for a distorted and rationalised idea that they were 'traditionally' enemies (Alpers E. A., 1974, p. 40). According to Darch and Hedges (2021, pp. 612-613), ethnic differences are well known to have counted for deepening social and political tension (within FRELIMO) in the past, including amid wars in Cabo Delgado. These assertions coincide with an extensive colonial and post-colonial documented beliefs over an existing ethnical cleavage, most prominently manifested in that province, and countrywide, as recounted in the following statements.

> *"The Makonde despises the Makua people as people whom they never feared and who served as victims for their slave raids. The desire to have many women ... compelled them to undertake incursions into Makua territory... The Makua never ventured into the highlands because they feared the savage attacks of the Makonde." [* (Rita-Ferreira, 1973, p. 72)*]*

> *"In Mozambique, there are no Makonde, Makua, Nhengue, Ajawa, Ronga. What is there, in Mozambique are Mozambicans. [Samora M. Machel, first President of Mozambique]*

> *"Why Inhambane does not stay with RENAMO [i.e., why FRELIMO does not lose election to RENAMO]? Ask yourselves. Why Inhambane, Manica, Chimoio does not stay with RENAMO. Why Tete, Pemba does not stay with RENAMO. The answer I want to give you is that of 'the Makhuwa people are untrustworthy. That is the answer. The Makhuwa are not to be trusted. They have no direction [Frelimo's political purpose?]. I have no way of hiding that. When I say that 'I am ashamed', it*

> *is because I am from the Makhuwa ethnic group" [Army Reserve Command, and Senior member of Frelimo, Eduardo Nihia – Speech September 2022]*
>
> *"My wife and I belong to the same ethnic group: Makonde, but we came from different lineages and clans. Our parents and families originated from the same neighbourhood in the Mueda district, yet the area where they lived was separated by a small rural tertiary road. That road served as a boundary marking differences in our intra-culture, habits, social ties, and modus vivendi. Our parents and ancestors could not and still cannot even marry together or build a friendly relationship" [non-IDP informal participant]*

These citations above also situate my interest in the issues of Mozambique's contemporary processes and intersections of conflict and displacement (resettlement) *versus* ethnicity and place-making. These expressions were chosen to illustrate the seemingly long history of ethnic cleavages in Mozambique, particularly in the north. The last citation comes from a friend of mine, (Cesar Carlos Vamos Ver[1]), shared while our families were celebrating New Year's Eve in 2022. Out of choice, his parents moved from Cabo Delgado to Zambezia province, later in their lives. Neither he nor his wife were born in the localities where I conducted my fieldwork, and ultimately, they have no preceding personal connections to the localities in terms of memory of displacement.

Altogether, the expressions above emphasise my urge for a closer examination of the role of inter-ethnic distinctions and affinities to displacement and conflict, and its impact on social construction of [dis]articulation or erosion of cultural values, impoverishment, dispossession, social conflict or cohesion; and the global view on rural urbanization *versus* (rural) development, principled humanitarian response *versus* lasting solutions to displaced persons, etc.

---

[1] Cesar Vamos Ver is now a well-known lawyer | several countries in Africa. He found space in South Africa, around Pretoria – where he studied for his master's degree. But he refuses to call it his own place. While working there, he has managed to build a dwelling place in Maputo, but not in Zambezia, where he and his wife were born, nor in Mueda, Cabo Delgado, where their parents come from. His story is intriguing, from the perspective of ethnicity, finding place and belonging.

I focus on how different displaced groups and persons I met in urban and semi-rural Cabo Delgado perceive displacement, and act upon it in creating their own sense of place, and what kind of elements of representation are mobilised in such a process. Further, what are the effects of these representations in terms of settling in new (resettlement) areas. My thinking was that in the process of illustrating and evoking such descriptions, I would locate the intricate strengths and fragilities that connect ethnicity to the practice of social belonging and its imagination to dwelling and movement (Basso & Feld, 1996). Here, too, my intention was to go beyond the existing reasoning associated with the factors of return of displaced persons to their place of origin. This was to review the spectrum of the ongoing academic and non-academic debate around the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Most research on this subject, i.e., research from Paulo Israel (2017; 2014; 2020), Joseph Hanlon (2010), Joao Feijo (2019; 2020) and more narrowly focuses on traditional art and rites, poverty, and the lack of social cohesion, resource exploitation, and public and humanitarian responses. Within this last sphere, this study would also propose to renew debate and practice on humanitarian approaches to rural urbanization engendered by forced displacement and resettlement. Focus on Barth's (1969) and Vermeulen and Covers (1994) criticism, I would even argue that the academic debate about Cabo Delgado's conflict goes even further and generalises the concept and practice of ethnicity, ethnic boundaries and culture.

I have been working on and studying forced migration and human mobilities since 2013. My honours degree monograph addressed labour migration in the context of coal mining, in Tete. My first master's degree addressed cross-border migration between Mozambique and Malawi. The present research derives from this background, and, mainly, from informal conversations about conflict and displacement in Cabo Delgado, and from dozens of field trips. I am employed by the Norwegian Refugee Council, where my main assignment is to provide technical assistance to the Government of Mozambique (through the *National Institute for Disaster Risk Management and Reduction* **-** INGD[2]) in the development and implementation of the natio2024 andy and Strategy for Internally

[2] Tralansted from its official Portuguese name: *Instituto Nacional de Gestão e Redução do Risco de Desastres*

Displacement Management – PEGDI established by (Resolution 41/2021) and its Action Plan (approved in 2024, and launched in 2025). I also conduct individual research for academia. Often, during these trips and discussions – including at academic conferences, emphasis on displacement and return would be given to the economy and family livelihoods, but rarely to the basic cultural variations in the concept, practice, and elements of *home*.

1.2. Rationale for the Research

The province of Cabo Delgado has historically been the melting pot for various ethnic and religious groups, mainly Makonde and Makhuwa, or Christians and Muslims. In 1973, Rita-Ferreira wrote *"the Makonde despise the Makua people as people whom they never feared and who served as victims for their slave raids"* [(Rita-Ferreira, 1973, p. 72)]. These conflicts and perpetuated hate were also reported by Alpers (1966) and Newitt (1972) in events dating back a few centuries ago.

A recent study published by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) concludes that the conflict in Cabo Delgado is rooted in organised crime and regional differences, rather than ethnic divisions. The study goes on to suggest that Mozambicans have historically identified themselves in terms of their region rather than ethnicity, but the latter has been instrumentalised and politicised at different times of Mozambican history. These ISS conclusions can easily be challenged. It is arguably true that ethnic identity has been politicised, and this would exactly be the reason why one would prefer to identify themselves in terms of ethnicity. Generally, ethnicity was not a popular factor in the ISS study, but it suggested having observed some tensions between the Kimwani and Makhuwa displaced people (IDPs), who accused each other of being responsible for the insurgency and corruption by the elite of an ethnic group that controls most Mozambican resources and determines who gets jobs and who does not. Thus, the study does not exclude ethnic problems that bring about growing inter-ethnic tensions among the Makonde, Kimwani, and Makhuwa, and how Makondes are favoured for most high-level jobs, especially strategic military positions, which they dominate. Contrary to the ISS report, the study conducted by Fraym (Devermont, 2024) found that the pattern of ASWJ attacks in Cabo Delgado between 2017 and 2019 suggested the targeting of some ethnic

groups, *i.e.,* the Kimwani. The latter have been envious of their erstwhile neighbours, the Makonde, who have for several decades held the reins of power and lived in greater affluence.

Within this tradition of historical cleavages, two features prompted my attention. First, according to different literature, there has always been a connection between the peoples of the coast and the people of the interior in Cabo Delgado, for trade or commerce and other social ties, including ritual practices. Second, as of mid-2024, it was estimated that over five hundred thousand internally displaced persons had returned to their (so-called) place of origin. Then, the question: *what would trigger this massive trend of return and returnees?* I decided to explore this question by focusing on the '*ethnic heterogeneity of Cabo Delgado before and after the conflict'*, i.e., how these ethnic groups are manoeuvring their social space now, and what kind of future can be imagined or produced.

1.3. Problem Statement

Ethnicity can be both a tool for social transformation and a weapon for discrimination, depending upon the context. Processes of ethnical cleavages, antagonism and violence play out differently across the country's respective histories. These may condition the hosting of displaced persons within and beyond national borders, however, few discussions paid attention to the status of and roles of ethnicity on the reception and settlements of IDPs.

The following research questions are explored:

a. What are the narratives of displacement and the experience of being displaced among the Makonde and Makhuwa?
b. How do these groups manifest and contest their collective identities in finding social belonging and home or a place to dwell?
c. How do these groups negotiate and/or give meaning to a place while seeking refuge, what elements are mobilised, and what are the implications for their future aspirations?

1.4. Aim

The scope of this research is conflict and displacement, circa 2017 – 2024. The main purpose is to explore the dynamics and role of ethnicity in social transformations or cultural variation of home in conflict-related displacement. The study focuses on the linkage between ethnicity and how the IDPs manoeuvre their daily struggles and experience of being displaced.

1.5. Objectives

i. To comprehend how the ethno-based experiences lived throughout displacement influence the decision to or not to resettle; and
ii. To reflect and to create an entry point of discussion about how the sense of place and place-making, belonging and identity reflect entirely different factors that can contribute to the construction of new debates about human mobilities, policymaking, and rural development in Mozambique.

1.6. Research methodology

1.6.1. The research setting and methodology

This study uses an ethnohistorical approach and applies chronological and ethnographic lenses to comprehend the social transformation and cultural variation from the Makonde and Makhuwa people, over the construction of material concept of place and home (placemaking). The research was completed over a period of four years and entailed trips to and from Cabo Delgado, particularly in the third quarter of 2025, after it has commenced in 2021. The peak of this research was between 2024 and 2025, which included specific on-the-ground research with 12 families in the province, in-between Pemba city, and the districts of Pemba-Metuge and Ancuabe. I also interviewed a total of six families and residents/host communities, who fall within the middle- and upper-class categories. In using ethnography as a tool, my intention was one and only, that of Boas's cultural relativism: to relegate my own moral judgment and prejudice, then, to narrate these variations and constitutions in the same way as my informants and 'natives' would (Eriksen T. H., 2017). I believed that the 'tool' would transform not only my own understanding of those cultures as institutions and the many people and relationships that underpin it, but the study of them in a broad manner. Moreover, that would alleviate

the voice of marginalised communities who would otherwise stay invisible, and it happens in many studies.

As background, in 2021, I conducted and participated in several discussions with key informants and IDPs themselves across the country while developing the PEGDI. In 2022, I was fortunate to interview a total of thirty-five displaced people and five host families in Pemba city. These interviews produced two papers (Sturridge, Feijó, & Tivane, 2022; Tivane, 2024a).

In 2023, after I enrolled in the Master's program at UNISA, and while I was formulating the course of my research, I realized the need to engage in discussions with anthropologists who have been or who are still working in human mobility in Mozambique. In addition, I approached S. Gaye Thompson – whose insights and informal discussions are still recorded (with her permission) in my phone and were of great benefit. Several discussions followed, with S. Gaye Thompson and Anthony Roland Brouwer, to narrow my research. In 2024 specifically, I spent extended periods of time reading, publishing papers (Tivane, 2024a; 2024c) and attending national and international conferences. These proceedings were also published (Tivane, 2024b). This work helped fill in my own theoretical gaps, first in Anthropology, and secondly regarding the issues of ethnicity, placemaking, and belonging.

Being an 'outsider'[3] or 'the Other' – as Fabian (1983) describes in his book 'Time and the Other' – and perhaps somewhat naive toward what (social) anthropology is about, I thought I had acquired enough experience to write about these complexities. I was wrong. Being an outsider could not attach an prejudice, because, as Eriksen (2017) stated, when one is able to see one's own culture from a marginal vantage-point, that one can understand it in anthropological terms. I had to start reading extensively literature and studies (theories) on conflict and terrorism (in Africa), displacement and resettlement, memories, ethnicity and collective identity, social belonging, etc, while also prioritising material on Cabo Delgado (and northern in general), from many ethnohistory scholars, as David Hedge suggested. At this stage I was particularly

[3] As those who come from outside the province of Cabo Delgado are labelled and called there.

influenced by works by Fredrik Barth *(Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*), B. Anderson (*Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*), T. H. Eriksen (*Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*), C. Antweiler (*Ethnicity from an anthropological perspective*), Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers (*The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries'*) and the fascinating thesis of K. Saegusa (*Our Dwelling Place: The Making of a Sense of Place in Semi-rural England*). This exercise extended beyond description and analysis, *i.e.,* critique and questioning of many source material on Cabo Delgado, essential for the creation of my own argument, from Jorge Dias (1964b; 1964a; 1970), Christian Geffray (1990; 1990; 1988), Yussuf Adam (1993), Harry G. West (1977; 2004; 2005; West & Kloeck-Jenson, 1999) to Paulo Isarel (2014; 2017; 2020), Alexander Ives Bortolot (2007) and more.

1.6.2. Population and Sampling

One aim of my study was to compare groups. In that, ethnographic quantitative data was needed, so I wanted to obtain as representative a sample as possible. I targeted lower-class Makonde and Amakhuwa peoples, who constitute the bulk of IDPs. Therefore, I applied a mixed-sampling method: snowball sampling method – where identification of potential participants, introductions and approval of study objectives is assured through personal endorsement; and purposive sampling methods - a non-probability sampling method where the participants were selected because they share [1] similar ethnic identities and likely come from the same districts, [2] where they were forced to flee due to conflict, and, most likely, share [3] the same language, beliefs, and patterns of behaviour (Sulaiman-Hill & Thompson , 2011).

The people I studied in this dissertation are those who were forced to flee terrorist attacks and killings. They consisted of members of two different ethnic groups. The general demographic information concerning this population is available and published on the website of the National Institute of Statistics - *INE*[4]. The target groups for the interviews consisted of the following:

[4] National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística)

- Group 1: displaced population from the following ethnic groups: Makonde and Makhuwa,
- Group 2: host communities' members from the following ethnic groups: Makonde and Makhuwa

1.6.3. Household interviews

Anthropology concepts are always informed by native or 'emic' concepts used in society under study (Eriksen T. H., 2017). For that, household interviews play a critical role. Interviewing households has become a proven means of gathering information concerning many subjects. Nevertheless, the main issue to address is in deciding whether to choose the household or the individual as the primary unit of analysis (Hubrich & Wittwer, 2014). For this research I choose both, multiple household members or the individual, depending on who was present at the house, at that moment. A total of 12 households were included in this study to explore their living strategies and factors re-shaping their multi-sited perceptions and constructions of home. Additionally, 6 households from host communities were included.

This research was designed around "juxtapositions of locations". It took place in the districts of Pemba city, Pemba-Metuge and Ancuabe (see figure #1). According to the existing statistics, the population of both districts is growing at a much faster pace than other districts due to displacement. The identification of these areas was based on the number of displaced persons, their long history of relations with the navigators of various origins (Arabs and/or Persian Arabs, Swahilis, Indians, Portuguese, etc), and their differentiated processes of social integration, resulting from various political-administrative systems and differentiated migration processes[5].

---

[5] For instance, the Pemba-Metuge district is located 40 kilometres west of the city of Pemba, bordering Quissanga district to the north, Mecúfi district to the south, Ancuabe district to the west and Pemba city to the east. There are three ethnic groups: Emakhuwa, Makonde and Muaní. The city of Pemba has a controversial history. The city is the capital of the Province of Cabo Delgado and is in the northern region of Mozambique. It is limited to the north and west by the Metuge district; to the south with the district of Mecufi; and it is washed by the Indian Ocean. It was elevated to the category of city on 18 October 1958 by Ministerial Order no. 12.712, under the name of Porto Amélia and to the category of municipality in 1997 by Law no. 2/97 of 18th February. It is a cosmopolitan city, lived by different social groups and forming an authentic 'ethno-space'.

1.6.4. Observation and participant observation

In social sciences, there are two broad categories of information: observation and reporting. Observation refers to an object or practice. Reporting refers to people talking about the object, or practice. In both cases, there is a continuous interaction between theories and concepts, observation and methodological choices, both during and after fieldwork (Eriksen T. H., 2017). On that analogous decision, I choose to employ participant-observation to ascertain correlations in social practices and homemaking. As it has been said, anthropologists may use a variety of research methods, but the main one is participant observation through fieldwork (Eriksen T. H., 2017, p. 43).

I also observed the social life of groups and individuals, and the contexts of social practices where those different groups interact. I explored the correspondence between socio-cultural formations and ethnic-based identities by focusing attention on the presence of discourses that might reveal dissident views or hegemonic ideologies. The participants were free to interact and share their own personal experiences. The challenging part was the language. As an outsider, I felt like an intruder invading someone *else's world*, with the unfortunate need to translate that 'world' twice: local language to Portuguese and then Portuguese to English. I felt like this had a negative impact on the study, assuming that some essences were lost in the process.

1.7. Data analysis.

Based on the qualitative nature of the study, three related processes: describing the phenomena, classifying the data, and seeing how the concepts interconnect. The data collected was analysed for various meaningful patterns and approaches, including hermeneutic or interpretative, narrative, discourse and cross-cultural analysis.

I kept field notes of all observations, participant observations, and interviews as a record of each occasion and the informant, as well as a reminder and index of the content. The interviews were recorded for the purpose of transcription and translation. The interviews were semi-structured. Almost all were conducted in the local language, except for those that I managed to conduct in Portuguese. All were then translated into Portuguese. It was at this point that I became aware of an unforeseen Hunt and Trotman's dilemma: to let the interviews speak for themselves or to appropriate them. Following their example, I decided to appropriate them whenever it was necessary for two reasons: First, I assumed

that the translation of the interview from one language to the other occurred with some minimal changes to the original content. Second, the intention is to raise public awareness about the experience of displaced people and the implications of integration or return, which I believe might contribute to addressing the challenge of reconstruction; and inform decision-makers, development practitioners, and humanitarian actors. Then, they were broken into analytically relevant units.

1.8. Ethical considerations

As this research progressed, I understood two obligations. One to adhere to the ethical code of the South Africa's Human Sciences Research Council and the UNISA Code of Ethics. Second, to make all necessary efforts to bring the research and findings to the public domain in an appropriate manner. To this end, all proper consideration regarding participants' rights were respected and protected. During the study, the following ethical issues were identified and addressed:

- **Protection from harm**: the fundamental ethical rule of social research is that it must bring no harm to participants (Babbie, 1994). From this point, and as an ethical obligation, interviews took place in settings designed to protect participants from any form of physical or psychological discomfort. Participants were informed about the implications of taking part in the research, and they participated voluntarily.
- **Informed consent:** participants were informed about the nature of the study to be conducted and were given the choice to either participate or decline. Consent forms that described the nature of the research were signed by all participants, or any representative – for those who could not sign. This consent served as a tool for negotiating the limits of the relationship between myself and them to avoid ethnocentricity. It also gave them autonomy and the right to withdraw at any time, before giving the consent to proceed. No personal data was collected for the purpose of this study.
- **Privacy and confidentiality:** considering the challenge that I would face to obtain formal permission, because they (participants) are in constant mobility, I decided to collect anonymous data. Nevertheless, I explained to all the participants and

the government entities how this information would be used, and destroyed, once it is no longer needed.

- **Honesty and professionalism:** the research was conducted in strict adherence to ethical standards of honesty. The first action, then, was to request ethical clearance from the College of Human Sciences College Research Ethics Committee (CREC) at the university; the second from the authority responsible for disaster displacement in Mozambique: The National Institute for Disaster Management[6]. This contact was easier, due to my four years of interaction with the institute. Finally, the last action was to request ethical clearance from CREC, again.

1.9. Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation can be divided into three periods, pre-and-post colonial and then the present-day's Cabo Delgado, encompassed in four main chapters, aside from introduction. From the onset, Chapter 1, I set out the basic problem that I deal with in the dissertation and described both the methodology and issues of ethicality for conducting this research.

In chapter 4, I analyse my own fieldwork. Prior to this, I dedicate chapters 2 to 3 discussing issues arising from the first two periods, *i.e.,* previous literature which informed my fieldwork and analysis. Chapter 2 examines previous studies of Makonde and Makhuwa people in the Northern, focusing on the development of their society and the influence of the colonial and post-colonial governments. In chapter 3, particularly, I examined ways in which these groups lived, and the transformation of those traditions over a relatively long period of time external influence (Dias, 1964a). I look critically at attempts to classify forms of place and home using dichotomies such as colonial-era and post-colonial practices of placemaking. Against such emphasis on external influence, this study describes home as a multilayered concept that generally denotes similar materialisation for the two ethnic groups, and that has characterized the few centuries-long history of the Makonde and Makhuwa people. In chapter 4, I describe the implications of the post-colonial transition to the concept of place and home. From the

---

[6] *Instituto Nacional de Gestão e Redução do Risco de Desastres – INGD*

outset of my literature review to my over four years of clustered-ethnography fieldwork, and in the context of war in Cabo Delgado, the concept of home continued to be proliferated in various layers: safety and security, house, community and communality.

The Chapter 4 is also dedicated to the analysis of data collected about the institutional home and lives of the Makonde and Makhuwa people and about the ethnic perspectives of their patrons. As discussed above, in the present-day Cabo Delgado, the concept of home in wartime continued to be multilayered. My analysis in this chapter is concerned with these layers; their importance and discourses found at the districts where this study occurred and how this positioned the IDPs with respect to their manifestations about placemaking and their future. Finally, and central to this research, Chapter 4 also provides a general overview of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, and introduces the central questions addressed in the chapter: the dimensions of home, the diverse ways in which it is understood and acted upon. As discussed above, my intention in looking at the concept of home in wartime is to bring breadth to my analysis. This is significant in this respect since it was often presented by my informants in various ways. However, while I explore the differences, I also highlight that it would be a distortion to cast these representations as opposite.

1.10. Struggling with the orthography of Cabo Delgado's languages.

Before closing this chapter and introduction, and you and I embark on navigating these narratives, I feel compelled to share my own struggle with language and pronunciation, which I believe results from a lack of formal phonetics training. Often, I would be corrected and questioned about how I would pronounce, questionably, 'Macuas', 'Makuas' and 'Makhuwas' – which had to do with practical aspects of standardising the writing, and specific aspects of marking the tone and word segmentation (Ngunga & Faquir, 2012), apart from the social and historical disparities among their speakers, which are much harder to bridge, this issue with orthography is also evident in scholars and literature that I came across, from Alpers (1966; 1974) to Paulo Israel (2014) and Bortolot (2007), they all struggled in finding consensus.

In analysing and transcribing data collected, I chose to follow the orthographic convention laid out in *Colecção: As Nossas Línguas III,* which is based on the

orthographic convention established by NELIMO (*Núcleo de Estudo das Linguas Moçambicanas*). Thus, I use Makonde (to refer to the Makonde people) and Makhuwa (so on) and by extension Kimwani as well. In using Paulo Israel's (2014) approach, I decided to aggregate the *connexive* prefix of adjectival constructions to the noun, rather than separating it. As he noted, both Makonde and Makhuwa orthographies are not completely stabilized, therefore, I might have approached the spelling of individual words on shaky grounds, and negatively impact the efforts carried out to date in stabilising these orthographies. To redeem myself, I made a conscious effort to use words in the local language, written by my informants/interviewees themselves. These words are highlighted in italic.

The transcription and translation of the interviews and audio recordings were carried by Lazaro Cossa – a former colleague from my time at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) – who is fluent in Makhuwa (though less so in Makonde). The interviewees themselves also helped with translation; however, the translations were not formally reviewed or verified due to limited funding.

The draft versions of this dissertation were read by Professor David Hedges and Gloria Sauti, both of whom provided insightful critiques. While Gloria was phenomenally doing her work as my supervisor, I chose to engage with David Hedges for his critique and critical view. It helped me revise all material with extra care, prompting me to cross-check my understanding, meaning, and implications for my arguments within the existing literature, which he believed to be important to avoid mistakes and ensure clarity. Based on his recommendations, I rewrote Chapter 2 entirely, moving beyond descriptions and including analysis (e.g., critique and questioning) of all source material essential for the development of my own argument, prioritising material on Cabo Delgado. Hedges' critique complemented Gloria's, as it provided guidance to address the limitations of the research from an internal standpoint.

1.11. Conclusion

This first chapter outlined the introduction and the following (4Ws): what, where, when and why I chose to study the intersection of ethnicity and the concepts of home and place. The chapter goes beyond and brings information about the problem statement,

the aims of the study, a brief synopsis of the research strategy and ethical considerations. Last, it also describes my own limitations and struggles in finalising the study. The main aim of the study is to describe the lived experiences of two ethnic groups in navigating the impact of displacement and finding refuge amid conflict. The central question of the research was *where and when is home*? The research design used to answer the research question is qualitative in nature, encompassing (ethnographical) household interviews and observations.

2. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Eriksen (2017) once argued that when one discusses abstract phenomena, terminology strongly influences what one perceives and how one perceives it. This chapter discusses concepts and the main theme of this dissertation: ethnicity, belonging, and place-making (or dwelling). These terms were discussed not to lay down their definitions – a task beyond the scope of the present study, but rather to terminologically locate them and their application in this research. To this end, emphasis was given to the relevance of these concepts and terminologies for the historiography and anthropology studies about Cabo Delgado.

2.2. Ethnicity

To some extent, no more arresting subject in social anthropology exists or, ultimately, has been written about than ethnicity. This spate has also factored in controversies and a lack of consensus. However, scholars generally agree that the concept of ethnicity has evolved from that of static culture to include the genealogical dimension, which unavoidably refers to origins, and always involves some form of kinship or family metaphor (Vermeulen & Covers, 1994; Roosens, 1994, p. 83). I would agree that, whenever these concepts contest new points of view, fieldwork becomes essential to uncover the indispensable 'native voices' which must be contextualized to be properly understood (Roosens, 1994, p. 81).

In the field of social anthropology, ethnicity has been a central topic of discussion since the late 1960s, and it remains a central focus of research ever since. Modern studies amongst academics and alike emphasize a far-reaching exploration into the meaning, manifestations, and significance of ethnicity, and examine it as a basis of social transformation. They situate ethnicity as an evolving factor of social evolution, influenced by everyday life, and whereby minority groups, expanded by migration and their experiences, become vital and highly conscious forces within almost all contemporary societies (Vermeulen & Covers, 1994, p. 2).

These studies and literature are vast. According to many scholars, Barth's (1969) *Ethnic groups and boundaries* is a benchmark reference for the study of ethnic groups and

ethnic identity. Indeed, though many other social scientists played a role in these changes, there is little doubt that Barth’s central tenets were clearly formulated and still stand, and that they have even gained a new relevance (Vermeulen & Covers, 1994). The book outlines an approach to the study of ethnicity which focuses on the on-going negotiations of boundaries between groups of people. In his view, such groups are not discontinuous cultural isolates or logical a *prioris* to which people naturally belong. His core can be formulated in three statements: (1) ethnicity is a form of social organization; this implies that (2) 'the critical focus for investigation becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group rather than the cultural stuff that it encloses'; the critical feature of ethnic groups is (3) the characteristic of self-ascription and ascription by others (Barth F. , 1969, pp. 10-15). Barth's book pioneered the shift in focus to the processes of boundary-making, from static to interactional approaches to ethnicity, emphasizing that the *situational* condition of individuals’ self-identity with different ethnic categories depends on the logic of a situation and their own calculations of predicted benefits/losses. The shift from a static to an interactional approach was accomplished by differentiating the notion of ethnicity from that of culture. Barth presented ethnicity or ethnic identity as an aspect of social organization, not of culture. He perceived ethnicity as more of a social process involving perpetual active work of inclusion and exclusion, establishing self-articulation and identification by interactions with others.

Prior to Ethnic Boundary, Barth’s Ph.D. thesis (1959) represented his early attempt to describe the political structure of a society (in the Swat valley of the North-West Frontier Province of Afghanistan) prior to state formation and builds his assertions on (social) contractual relationships for the establishment of social order. Influenced by his *transactionalist* approach, which focuses on individual social actors making choices based on personal economic and political gain, Barth provides a descriptive analysis of the socio-political organization to demonstrate how ecological variation, migration, and interaction with other groups has resulted in variations in organization and identity among Pathan groups. In this sense, migration both changes Pathan identity and extends it to non-Pathans, and that this is possible since, among the Pathans, political allegiance is a matter of individual choice (Barth T. F., 1981).

Vermeulen and Covers (1994) seem to agree with Barth's insights, but suggest a review of Barth's work, or what they call new directions in the study of ethnicity post-Barth. They devote their attention to the renewed interest in the central issue of the relation between ethnicity and culture, and discuss other connections, relating ethnicity to the individual and to the issue of social responsibility. The relation between ethnicity and culture, in their opinion, can be viewed as the threefold: ethnicity refers to the consciousness of (ethnic) culture, to the use of culture, and at the same time is part of culture (Vermeulen & Covers, 1994, p. 4). Their conception of ethnicity outlined here entails that ethnicity as an element of social organization implies regulated interaction, and ethnicity as an element of culture entails consciousness of difference, *i.e.,* meta-cultural in the sense that it is a reflection on what 'our' and 'their' culture is about.

While considerable extensive research has been conducted on ethnic groups in Cabo Delgado, relatively little attention has been paid to these dimensions of social organization and ethnic identity (from other social identities). Aside from the Portuguese ethnologist Dias and his wife Margot (1964a; 1964b; 1970), Martínez (2004) and Conceição (2017), no in-depth study has been carried out on Mozambican ethnic identity, constitution and cultural variations, particularly on the concepts of *home* and *place* from an ethnic perspective. Israel (2014, p. 21) noticed, before Dias, the only literature produced on the Makonde consisted of travelogues and notes written by colonial administrators. The team set to inquire into the tribe's way of life, following the customary headings of the classic ethnographic monograph. This would explain the reasons why Israel himself built almost the entire chapter one of his book based on Dias and Margot findings. The recent studies and literature about the Makonde and Amakhuwa peoples focus on the debate around the manifestation of their traditions, performance, class, and politics (political identity). Altogether, this is not surprising given the fact that ethnic groups and ethnicity have been instrumentalised in many ways.

Jorge Dias, and his wife Margot, are the pioneering reference for the "little-known ethnic group" of Mozambique: the Makonde. They spent several months in the field, producing the four-volume monograph: *Os Macondes de Moçambique,* which has been described as the most prominent work of Portuguese colonial ethnography. Altogether, these volumes provide characteristics of self-ascription and ascription, i.*e.,* an extensive

description of ethnicity in Vermeulen and Covers's three dimensions and degrees of cultural uniformity. Diases' work concurs with Barth, and the new research on displaced people in Cabo Delgado and the process of placemaking. It rejects the idea of identity as rooted in deeply felt, often ancient and natural or organic bonds like kinship, language, and culture (Tivane, 2024a). Martínez (2004) took almost the same approach as 'the Diases', concerning the Amakhuwa peoples. He focuses on contemporary issues of material culture of the 'Makuan People', and describes their cultural values, social structures, and the life-cycle rituals of the largest ethnic group in northern Mozambique.

Current research on ethnic groups in Cabo Delgado has been shaped chiefly through Israel's work about the Makonde's traditions, performance and politics, and, I would say, by the political sphere of analysis. It is very important to note and recognise that the conflict in Cabo Delgado, when explained from an ethnic spectrum, aligns with the view whereby ethnicity is used as a tool to achieve specific goals, such as gaining power, wealth, or status. Scholars have stated that historical ethnic tensions and marginalization contribute to grievances, and that it has been instrumentalised and politicised at different times in Mozambican history. Bussotti and Nhaueleque (2022) defended that the process of formation of the African Nation-States in Mozambique was not only based on old traditions used to justify a unity achieved with bloodshed, but also on ethno-political alliances aimed at political and economic betterment.

Contrary to what West (2004) believes in political and economic marginalization of the Makonde people within Mozambican society and beyond, to which I debunk, I would agree with Israel (2017) and argue that they used existing discursive constructions of and about themselves (Makonde-speaking residents), nationalist rhetorics and narratives of wars for their political and economic ascension, and, ultimately, the exclusion of other ethnic groups. For the argument of 'boundaries of consciousness', I found one case in the field (Marocane displacement camp) where someone – a man – who is Kimwani requested to be interviewed and identified as Makhuwa because he is married to an Makhuwa woman.

Both, Barth's and Vermeulen and Covers arguments call for a rethinking and renewed discussion of the body of writing on the theme of ethnicity and constitution of ethnic groups in Mozambique, and the nature of the boundaries between them – principally in

Cabo Delgado, I would suggest. Let us take the Makonde people, for example. Who are they and what it entails to be (called) a Makonde? They have been portrayed mainly from the perspective of the *myths of Mueda – the Makonde Plateau*, at least in the last couple of centuries. Makondes are describe as people who remained uncharted and only appeared on European maps in the mid-nineteenth century – over three centuries after the Portuguese landed in northern Mozambique. They (Chimakonde people) were known as Mavia or Mawia, a derogatory denomination meaning "the irascible" (in Chimakonde), or "the most exclusive tribe in East Africa," or "fierce and inhospitable," and complete savages, according to Israel (2014, p. 20). They were also known for the Mapiko masks and dance, carved in wild kapok, or for the aesthetic abstraction and athletic precision, and the watchwords used to warm up their drums on crackling, burning straw, while intoning songs of defiance, and challenged their rivals with tricks and styles. These elements of definition proceeded and were then galvanised by the myths and stories of the Mueda massacre – which has largely been told in the voices of victims turned victors – solidified into an official narrative (Israel P. , 2017; 2020); about those to whom the national liberation struggle had brought triumphalism (Israel P. , 2014; 2024; Bortolot, 2007) and *ethno*-superiority. On one hand, for instance, this simplistic view that geographical and social isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining Makonde identity, or that they maintained their culture through a 'bellicose ignorance of its neighbours is no longer entertaining (Barth F. , 1969, p. 9). As I argue, the emerging of *ethno-mingled communities* demonstrates the inadequacy of this view.

Aside from a few studies (Conceição, 2017; Martínez, 2004), the Makua people, on another hand, have been represented as Makonde's worst enemies – whose land was subject to rides from the Makonde to capture or abduct their women as slaves, untrustworthy people – friend and ally of the colonial Portuguese government, etc. The foundation of these elements and representations has been questioned, and attributed to the problems of elitism, regionalism, and ethnicity inherited from the colonial legacy (Alpers E. A., 1974, p. 41). Both, the Makonde and Makua identity exceeds these confining terms, and those two Barth's arguments alone should set the tone for new anthropological studies on ethnicity, identity and the character of ethnic boundaries.

2.3. Belonging and Dwelling-place

The concepts of belonging and homemaking, particularly in the context of displacement, are complex and have been extensively researched from several angles. Firstly, belonging is, arguably, regarded as a need, *i.e.,* each living body has the need to belong. The term 'need' implies that belonging is necessary for humans, to the extent that it aids survival. In his theorization, Malinowski (1944, p. 10) said that biological impulses or needs underlie human behaviour, some of these *being kinship and protection*. Each of these concepts relates to belonging and social group living. Based on his work in the Trobriand Islands, he argues that the *Trobrianders'* intricate patterns of exchange were not purely economic in nature but indexed and reinforced political standing and social relationships. In his theory of 'hierarchy of needs', Maslow's (1943) states that the need can only be fulfilled when it is satisfied. This is so true to say, belonging is a need that can be fulfilled once physiological and safety needs are fulfilled.

Secondly, the concept of belonging as an adaptive mechanism. This (adaptation) implies the idea that social and group living have been necessary for the continuation of human beings, whereby cooperative group living plays a critical role in the survival of their community. Living cooperatively would have therefore provided safety, protection, and teamwork when it came to hunting and surviving. (Leary & Cox, 2008). The emphasis on safety concurs with new studies about belonging and homemaking in displacement settings, amid conflict. Setting aside cultural aspects for a moment, Tivane (2024a) closely looks at the (social and economic) experiences people have developed and carried with them through their displacement (and return) narratives as the main factors influencing the decision to or not to return. The author argues that there have been changes in Cabo Delgado, including those of safety, and this has influenced people, including children, to leave their homes or abandon their communities in search of safety and now live with adoptive families. His study goes beyond and concludes that cultural identity and belonging embody safety. Displaced people return to their place of origin to fish, assess safety and security conditions. In this sense, and in that context, safety (and economic aspirations) becomes a crucial factor for their decision to or not to belong to a place. This is to stipulate that where conflict persists, the economic structure, security,

and safety create an enabling environment for socio-economic integration, and returning would not even be considered a possibility or option (Tivane, 2024a, pp. 6, 10, 13-14)

The dimension of belonging also concerns the notion of place, specifically, the process of place-making (Mookerjee, 2003; Saegusa, 2004), and is common in the literature. Feld and Basso (1996) relate these developments to the acute world condition of exile, displacement, diaspora or inflamed borders, and, moreover, to the struggles by indigenous people and cultural minorities for their ancestral homelands, land rights and sacred places. Within the world of geographers, Relf (1976) advocated the need to focus on human consciousness to perceive the environment and its embodied meanings, an approach crucial for them to distinguish the notion of 'place' (from that of 'space'). 'Place' signifies an organised world of meanings which is constructed by human actions and imagination (Tuan, 1977). On this basis, the relationship between a person or a group and a particular location reflected the importance in the process of personal or collective identity-building. This view of human consciousness is also shared by anthropologists. James F. Weiner's study (cited by (Saegusa, 2004, p. 10)) about the Foi of Papua New Guinea describes how people inscribed meaning onto the landscape through everyday activities and created a poetical and spiritual relationship with their surroundings and their past (ancestors) through dreaming and singing, in particular locations – perhaps, a process akin to the one from *Mueda Plateaus*. This focused on spatial experience highlighted a few limitations of the term, which were further explored by Feld and Basso (1996). They focused on native constructions of localities, *i.e.*, the perception and experience of place, and used phenomenology and the concept of dwelling to trace the social scientific studies of 'place'. Their interest centred on the cultural processes and practices through which place is rendered meaningful, or in the local knowledge and localised form of expression of imagination involved in making place both meaningful and multidimensional. Joining this view, Gupta and Ferguson (1997, pp. 37-40) call for an anthropology of space grounded in the understanding of the realities of boundary erosion, diaspora and dispersal, mobility and movement – a concept which goes 'beyond culture', and, where stabilized territories are replaced by hybrid and fluid zones.

Appadurai (1990, pp. 296-298; 1992, p. 48) seems to agree with this view, but refuses to concur with the idea of 'homogenization' of culture, in places; and persists with the

notion of cultural heterogenization, i.e., that landscapes of group identity are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogeneous. He argues that today's global interactions of cultures do not necessarily imply dominance of the metropolis (one culture). In this interaction, often, these forces from the metropoles are indigenised (acculturation) in one way or another. He further introduces the concept of 'ethnoscapes', to describe the brute facts of changing social, territorial, and cultural reproduction of group identity. He argues that *ethno* is now smooth due to group migration, regrouping in new locations, and reconstruction of their histories, and reconfiguration of their ethnic projects. Appadurai (1992, pp. 48-49) highlighted a cultural dynamic called *'deterritorialisation'* as one of the fundamental characteristics of post-modernity. As a result, ordinary persons' lives throughout the world who move out of or away from their original dwelling places for various reasons become an increasingly common condition of the world. Appadurai urged attention to the actual or imagined de-territorialised condition of cultural reproduction, or of the formation of collective identities (Anderson, 1991). Clifford (1992) argued that this condition of de-territorialised culture, which became explicit because of the ongoing large-scale displacement of our time, was actually a natural state of culture, and the long-accepted notion of territorially localised and bounded culture was artificially constrained.

More recently, Warsi (2015) explores Afghan being and belonging in Delhi and concluded that belonging is built from a plurality of experiences and sentiments that are not exclusive to Afghans. Many scholars have revealed a similar plurality, encouraging consideration of the categories of group, individual, and nation, the varying and contradictory relations between them, and the implications or significance of this plurality. His work problematizes the national lens in framing belonging, complicating the idea of community as a given and primary unit of identification, and questioning whether multiple or contradictory frames of identity necessarily lead to 'incoherence'. His thesis reiterates that Afghans can hold multiple ideas of being and belonging but suggests this is not a trait particular to Afghans rather than part of the human condition.

My core argument on displacement and belonging (homemaking) is the rejection of *primordialism* views – that of ethnical identity and belonging are, to some extent, rooted

in the idea of a *natural place*. Yuval-Davis (2006, pp. 197-202) looks at belonging from a political standpoint and deconstructs notions of national and ethnic, and it interrogates the effects that different political projects of belonging have on members of these nations, therefore acknowledging the multifaceted tendencies of belonging. She believes that belonging is a fluid concept, constructed on a few levels. First, there are 'social locations' – classifications such as gender, age, race, class – that position people, often in intersectional ways, within the social landscape. Second is 'identification and emotional attachments. Here, individuals' belonging is defined by the way they and others view themselves – their identity – and what they feel or their emotional affiliation in relation to specific social groups. All levels take us back to Barth's situation concept (of self-identification and boundaries) and, again, to question: what are the constitutive elements that entail to be (called) a Makonde or Makua; and where or when would they call a place home?

2.4. Conclusion

The reviewed literature and material above indicate that the subject of ethnicity (and place) has evolved since Barth's works and has been studied and presented in different contexts by scholars around the world, but not in Mozambique. Studies of broader conflict and displacement have focused primarily on traditional art and rites, poverty, and the lack of social cohesion, resource exploitation, etc, ignoring the issues related to ethnicity and cultural variation among two ethnic groups reported to be in secular conflict against each other. This study takes the subjects of ethnicity, place, and home as the central terms. It showed that altogether these terms are absent in Mozambican historiography and ethnography studies. The existing little literature that focuses on the Makonde and Amakhuwa peoples is centered around the manifestation of their traditions, performance, class, and politics (political identity), and that reflects how ethnicity as a unit of analysis has been (politically) instrumentalised.

3. CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL SETTING, SOCIOCULTURAL CHANGES, AND HUMAN MOBILITY AMONG THE MAKONDE AND MAKHUWA

3.1. Introduction

This chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive characterization of Makonde and Makhuwa pre-colonial and colonial societies. This is not its objective. For such purposes, there are well and purposive-oriented body of works by Jorge and Margot Dias (1970; 1964b; Dias, 1964a) and Paul (2014), Edward Alpers (1966; 1974), Christian Geffray (1990), Pierre Macairre (1996), João Conceição (2017) and Francisco Martínez (2004). Instead, this chapter seeks to bring about the different few elements of representation and wisdom that were present in the places these groups called home. This non-exhaustive description seeks to give a simple characterization of these groups, to analyse alternative of cultural practices, variations (cf., e.g., (Ingold, 2000) and features associated with their 'new lives', post-displacement, in modern Cabo Delgado. It should be noticed that, according to Medeiros, *'the formation of specific ethnic entities was underway at the time but was interrupted by the European conquest. Later, in the colonial context, they were reconstituted, though not in the same way'* (Medeiros E. d., 1997, p. 45).

3.2. The Makonde people,

3.2.1. Nature, origin, and political organization

The Makonde, erstwhile known as the Mavia or Mawia people, are reported to be a minority ethno-linguistic group of Mozambique, yet arguably one of the most well-known for their fearlessness, initiation rituals, and for their traditional quarrels and conflict with the Makhuwa people (Israel P. , 2024, p. 1). A social characteristic of the Makonde, Dias (1964b; 1970) says, is their socialization for war, whether to confront hostile animals on the plateaux or for quarrels with other villages or the Makua people (Henriksen, 1983, p. 7) about the preferred occupation of the plateaux. As a result of this, they were portrayed as violent and irascible, a reasoning supported by their geographical isolation (Dias & Dias, 1964b); and the term Mavia – "the angry people" – by their indigenous neighbours and the earliest Western explorers who visited the Rovuma area. Moreover, their history has been defined by continuous instability and radical change (Bortolot, 2007; Israel P. , 2014, pp. 1-2).

In 1970, the Makonde were estimated at 25,000 individuals (Rita-Ferreira, 1973). This number is very unlikely, considering that there were 130,000 Makondes in 1962, according to Dias (1970, p. 11). In 1997, their number had risen under 250,000, or approximately 0.015% of the national population in Mozambique (Bortolot, 2007, p. 3). These people are descendants of the Bantu – from the Benue-Cross River region in south-eastern Nigeria, but it is also believed that they are fugitive slaves from the Ajauas tribe. According to Dias (1964a) and Israel (2024), very little is known about the origins of the Makonde people, probably due to the absence of tribal organisation, as there is no collective consciousness or common historical destiny.

In Cabo Delgado, references to the ethnonym in slave records, as well as linguistic evidence, suggest that the first mention of the Makonde dates to the mid-18th century, referring to conflict between the Makonde chief of Mongalo and coastal Muslim chiefdoms, according to Israel (2024, p. 2). Yussuf Adam's and Harry G. West's theory challenge this hypothesis. They find no catalyst for collective consciousness and understand these people as a mixture of persecuted people, slaves, and others brought together by the capture of prisoners in the countless battles that had to be fought (Roseiro, 2013, p. 38; Adam, 1993, p. 9). They even come to the hasty conclusion that Makonde identity must be a recent construct, as a mere assemblage of slave refugees. However, Dias (1964a) disproves this hypothesis, and, as Israel (2024, p. 3) suggests the more accurate conclusion is that: "these narratives testified to a later process of "Makondisation" of neighbouring populations. A preexisting group with their own specific identity and cultural patterning, the Makonde functioned as a pole of attraction for people who wanted to flee slavery and take to the highlands, independent from the influence of chiefdoms and state power". What is commonly agreed is that their roots come from the peoples of the Rovuma River basin, a region that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a ground for the Indian Ocean slave trade. Seeking refuge from the chaos and predation that surrounded them, these proto-Makondes converged on the remote Mueda Plateau and gradually coalesced into a culturally homogeneous population by the late 1800s (Bortolot, 2007, p. 1).

In Mozambique, although lacking detailed statistical demographic information, there are two major plateaux inhabited by Makondes, namely, Macomia and Mueda, in Cabo

Delgado Province. Historical records suggest that these groups kept themselves isolated for a long time (until the arrival of the Portuguese, who managed to control the areas inhabited by them), irritable recluses who detested visitors and rarely left the borders of their highland realm (Bortolot, 2007). This isolation helped to differentiate them from the Makonde of Tanganyika, the *Matambwé* and the *Andonde*. The linguistic differentiation that exists today between the Makonde of Tanzania and Mozambique, and even between them and their *Matambwé* neighbours, proves that there has been a long process of differentiation that has only been possible over the course of a few generations (Rita-Ferreira, 1973, p. 71).

As Dias (1964b) recognise, the geographical location on the plateaux allowed their relative isolation, which associated with a certain social constraint, allowed them to preserve a strong cultural cohesion which, despite having decreased in the years following the arrival of the Portuguese, succeeded in resisting in various aspects. The symbolism of masks and tattoos, the ideals of matrimonial (in)compatibility with respect to some historically hostile peoples, virilocality, the initiation rites, superstition with respect to the forest and ferocious animals, including traditional religious aspects that were only subjugated and dominated by Christianity around 1930.

Unlike other people, where there was a strong tradition of hierarchisation, the Makonde organized themselves in small family groups, with no sovereignty other than that of the village chief. Only sporadically, in marginal areas, does it appear that a few chiefs have emerged, whose authority extended over a few villages. Rita-Ferreira argues that it is questionable whether they were real rulers or authentic paramount chiefs. Livingstone, when passing through the Rovuma in 1865, said of the Makonde of the north: *'They are all independent of each other, and no paramount chief exists...'* (Roseiro, 2013, pp. 38-39).

The life in that plateau region was neither easy nor peaceful, for two reasons: firstly, because of the frequent wars fought with the *Maviti* and Angóni, also of Bantu ethnolinguistic origin, and secondly, because of probable climatic changes at the time of the migrations, when the drought was intense and lasted for several years, to the point where the rivers dried up, the land didn't produce the resources they needed and the game left the territory. The Makonde feel linked to the supposed history of the exodus of their ancestors because of a prolonged drought, followed by plagues of locusts and

sleeping sickness; from this perception of history, they draw the reasons for moving to the Plateau (Roseiro, 2013). Fülleborn cited by Roserio (2013, pp. 40-41) says that around 1900s, there was a prolonged drought, and as a result, the people suffered major casualties (Israel P. , 2024, pp. 2-3). Taking advantage of the natural conditions, they hid their villages in the densest parts of the forest, creating narrow, winding, labyrinthine access routes, where intruders would get lost in the thorny tangle of paths (Rita-Ferreira, 1973). The thick undergrowth served as protection, but for greater security, all the villages were fortified places, surrounded by palisades with one or two entrances that were locked at night. In addition, among the bushes that surrounded them, they opened ditches, into which they placed pointed stakes disguised with branches (Roseiro, 2013; Osório & Macuacua, 2014). The Makonde generally had antagonistic relations with the outside world. Paradoxically, there was a unity against anyone who attacked one or more of the people. In this sense, war was a mechanism for respecting laws. Within the alliance, the most important was that of kinship. Crimes were generally judged by the village chief. However, when they were more serious, they were judged by the ruler or the administration, according to Dias (1970, p. 346).

Before the colonial era, which began in earnest in Cabo Delgado in 1930, the Makonde people lived in settlements whose residents were related through a matrilineal clan. Before 1964, each village chief could freely move his people to whichever location he preferred, within the vast territory of the Makonde. From the 1960s onwards, each chief who wanted to move his village (within the same governorate) had to notify the governorate (*régulo*) of his decision, though formal authorisation was not necessarily required. This could only occur when a new post was assigned (by the colonial government) and was used as a way of controlling the population (Dias, 1964a, pp. 11-136; Israel P. , 2024, p. 3).

In the first two decades of Mozambican independence, following a ten-year war of national independence that ended in 1974, the newly installed socialist government resettled the Makonde people into communal villages that were organized explicitly to disrupt entrenched family alliances and foster participation in state-controlled social, political, and economic structures. Those who had demonstrated the greatest loyalty to the government and the strongest commitment to its socialist vision were generally

rewarded with influential positions at the village or district levels of government, while traditional elites, including lineage elders and ritual specialists, were overlooked (Bortolot, 2007, pp. 11-12).

3.2.2. The Economy

In the early 1880s, reports to the Royal Geographical Society produced by British missionaries paint a chaotic picture of slave raids, famine-induced migration, and banditry in the entire region delimited by the Indian Ocean and Lake Malawi to the east and west and the Rovuma and Messalo Rivers to the north and south (Israel P. , 2024, p. 2). This picture of drought and famine was alluded to by Alpers (1966; 1974) and Rita-Ferreira (1973), but this was not the situation a century later. According to Dias (1964a, p. 103), the Makonde were a largely agrarian people with a kin-based system of land stewardship traced through matrilineal clan affiliation. The land itself came to be conceived as an essential element of Makonde identity, and in the etymological origins of the term Makonde, which other researchers have demonstrated was originally understood as a geographic reference.

In 1964, Dias wrote that the Makonde economy was in transition. Although they were mostly farmers, the economy was in transition from subsistence to market-oriented agriculture. There are studies that report increased production for export in the last decades of colonialism. In fact, the gradual settlement of the Portuguese forced the Makonde to produce more than usual, including through compulsory labour. These surpluses were sold to the Portuguese in exchange for cloth (for the women), salt, sugar, machetes, etc. Before the Portuguese arrival, the Makonde also traded rubber along the coast, in Mocimboa da Praia, in exchange for gunpowder. With the devaluation of rubber on the (coastal) market, Makondes turned to the production of export crops: castor oil, sesame, and cotton (in the lowlands) (Adam, 1993, pp. 16-20). During this transition period, small commercial activities were already being practised by small traders who went up to the plateau to exchange cloths and dried fish for crops. With the emergence of new commercial activities in the second half of the 19th century, the sexual division of labour began to decline. Men began to take part in agriculture. Dias also suggests that man's participation in farming activities suggests that agriculture was not just an ancient activity, but a fundamental part of their economy (Dias, 1964a, pp. 97-155).

The author (Dias, 1964a, pp. 97-155) also believes that men's participation in field activities can be explained by the need to guarantee women's safety when they went in search of water. This division of labour is believed to have only begun in the early 1900s. Prior to this period, it is believed that the men devoted their time to hunting and the women entirely to farming. Maize was the most widely grown and favoured crop and was even used to measure a good or bad harvest year. At the time, it was estimated that maize was produced at around 300kg-350kg per hectare. The success of production was aided by a rite, through a supposed magic drug (*ntela*) or through the magic of the snake (*mboma*) [see also (Rita-Ferreira, 1973)].

They also produced manioc or cassava, rice, peanuts, beans and *mapira* (sorghum). Mapira flour was considered a tradition and was even used in various initiation rites. They also raised small livestock (pigs and goats), poultry, and continued to hunt and gather wild fruits and plants to supplement their diet. The production technique was slash and burn. With the introduction of new crops, crop rotation was also introduced. This system of cultivation obliged women to have or cultivate at least three active fields simultaneously, and at least six fallow fields. The fields are sown at the beginning of the rains, and after the harvest, during the dry season. So, the Makonde have at least one field in the first phase (*munda*), another in the second (*iyala*) and another in the third (*indina*) (Dias, 1964a, pp. 97-155).

There were two farming systems in place. In the lowlands or the interior of the plateau, where land was abundant, itinerant farming was practised - typical of various regions of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, and other African countries. On the other hand, in regions with limited land availability, due to population density, rotational farming was practised. In the first region [lowlands], it was common for the population to occupy unused land. In other regions, it was the chief who made the distribution or allocation of a new field. Dias flagged doubts regarding the idea that each settlement had its own delimited area. The isolated villages had their fields around them, which were established after a bush area that marked the boundaries. Before 1964, says the author, there was some conflict over land, which was immediately overcome (Ibid).

Land ownership varied from region to region. Initially, the Makonde didn't own land, it belonged to everyone. Everyone chose where they wanted to farm. When the village was

moved closer, the land could belong to any family - except for the trees that had been planted there. If the village was moved farther away, the trees belonged to those who lived nearby. This practice was still present in the 1960s, in the lowlands where demographic pressure was not yet felt. However, there was a different practice in regions with high population density. The author noted that in the regions of Miteda, Muitide, and Muidumbe, the notion of individual hereditary property was beginning to take shape, and quickly. In these regions, there was a transition from collective to individual ownership. When a family abandoned a field, another family (or farmer) from the same village could ask to use it (from the original owner). Most of the time, given the great spirit of solidarity that existed, the tendency was to agree. On more fertile land, population density increased very quickly, and ownership was then individual and hereditary. Individuals asserted this right by arguing that the land belonged to their relatives (ancestors). These cases were very visible with the return of the Makonde who had emigrated to Tanganyika. It should be noted that there is no specific tradition regarding the right to transfer ownership of land. When a Makonde dies, her rightful heir may be a nephew or a sister's son, who inherits valuable objects (bicycles, rifles, etc). The rural property belongs to the woman. As the common marriage is to the daughter of the mother's brother and the residence regime is avunculocal, the fields pass from the mother to the daughter, and her husband, who is her cross-cousin, benefits from them. However, if the wife dies first and the residence is patrilocal, the widower considers the fields his, which, if he remarries, belong to the new wife. It was only in 1958 when the first sale of fields was recorded, for £2, to a Makonde returning from the Tanganyika plantations. Land sales were rare on the plateau (Rita-Ferreira, 1973; Dias & Dias, 1970, pp. 338-341; Adam, 1993, pp. 16-20).

The Makonde continued to walk long distances for cultivation. There, the men built a house to serve as a shelter or temporary residence while they cultivated (*kulima*) the land and cleared the forest with an axe (*mbebu*). Other materials used for cultivation were the traditional alfeia (locally made), the machete, and a kind of sickle (*mundu*). The women were given the task of visiting the men to provide them with supplies (Adam, 1993, pp. 16-20). There are cases in which, depending on the work required, the whole family would participate, including during harvest times. This practice was confirmed by some displaced people in Pemba, recently (Tivane, 2024a).

Apart from agriculture and poultry, the Makonde also engaged in temporary migration into neighbouring Tanganyika as wage labourers. This only became possible after the pacification of the Angoni and the abolition of slavery (Adam, 1993, p. 11). The professional census map in the Makonde region found tailors, carpenters, bricklayers, locksmiths, turners, blacksmiths, and sculptors. According to the reports, these specialities were in the surrounding regions, such as Tanganyika and Kenya. Some were employed by other Makonde or by individuals outside the group (Dias, 1964a, pp. 97-155). According to the 1942 census in southern Tanganyika, out of 12,901 male workers on sisal plantations, 6,348 (nearly 50 per cent) were from Mozambique. The 1948 census recorded that there were 27,489 Makonde from Mozambique, the majority of whom lived permanently in Tanganyika. The records show that only 1,390 worked on sisal plantations. This number seems too low and probably does not include short-term migrant workers. Taking into consideration that the total number of Makonde in Mozambique was less than 200,000, it is apparent that a significant portion of them had migrated to Tanganyika (Funada-Classen, 2012, pp. 170-171).

3.2.3. Social practices and Identity

It is widely argued that the Makonde people kept themselves isolated from the world and the events occurring in Mozambique before 1930. Their history reveals that the Makonde and their social institutions were in fact highly sensitive to events and remained intact from their origins in the nineteenth century through the turmoil of colonialism and national independence. From there, the elements of their social identity have consistently maintained a *bifurcated gaze*, i.e., *splits into "two-ness",* looking both outward and inward (Bortolot, 2007). They have often strategically engaged in historical turbulence to advance and empower themselves in their own societies and structure their actions. The formation of Makonde ethnicity must be seen as the direct result of turbulent times, which led to the reshaping of the social landscape of northern Mozambique. From the middle of the 18th century, the existing (economic and) social relations along the Mozambican coast, which were still largely based on ancient Swahili mercantile patterns, underwent dramatic transformations. The central motor of these changes was an increased demand for slaves, and many of these slaves came from the north of Mozambique, especially the districts of Cabo Delgado. Several waves of drought,

as well as migrations of warlike Nguni people from Southern Africa, compounded a situation of social instability. The Rovuma River was a corridor for slaving caravans, often led by the Yao of Niassa or the Makua of Angoche, who formed powerful chieftaincies. Cabo Delgado remained a hotspot of illegal traffic until the beginning of the 20th century (Israel P. , 2024, p. 2).

The Makonde village is home to a complete family group, headed by an elder, *Nanolo*, who inherits leadership rights through *avuncular* succession. For the Makonde, the village is not, as it is for us today, a geographical concept, but a group concept. The name of the village is the name of its chief, owner, *mwene* (*mwene kaya* = owner of the village). The name of the chief is passed on to his successor, who, as a rule, is the firstborn son of his eldest sister, possibly married to his daughter. This ensures the continuity of the village as a collective personality (Dias & Dias, 1970, pp. 82-112).

Over the years, the villages changed location. This may be in search for fertile land, the deterioration of houses, or by decision of the village chief, or even because of an epidemic disease, which claims many victims. The decision to move must reach a consensus within the community, and the delimitation of a new village must also reach a consensus with the spirits of ancestors or supernatural beings (Ibid).

Villages are relatively small because, roughly speaking, they correspond to an extended family unit, *avunculocal* and are typically inhabited by a chief, his brothers and their wives, nephews, and other relatives. Each village has a variable cultivation area, if land is available. Both the hut and the fields are considered the woman's property. The layout of the house is in the shape of a circle or an oval around a large yard with fruit trees. In the centre is the men's meeting house (*chilala*). The houses in the first row (of the circle) are inhabited by men or by a woman with the same blood ties through the maternal line of a common ancestor (*lokola*) to which the village chief belongs. Each house is home to a family nucleus (Dias & Dias, 1970, pp. 82-112; Israel P. , 2024, p. 3)

The Makonde, although they believe deeply in certain magical and religious principles, are by no means mystical, devout, or inclined to piety (Dias & Dias, 1970, pp. 383-395). They are well-known for their particularities of rites and cultural events. Aside from their historical lack of political unity, Makonde unity is simply cultural in nature. “Makonde”

cultural identity is relatively young, and it is striking that many of the markers of identity outsiders have ascribed to Makonde – namely their plateau homeland and their cultural institutions – are those that the Makonde have themselves used to construct a corporate identity distinct from their neighbours' (Rita-Ferreira, 1973, pp. 71-72). They can be easily seen in the manner with which they used to accept strangers who came for good reasons and who wanted to settle, assuming the Makonde identity (Israel P. , 2014).

According to the 3rd volume of Dias's work on the Makonde, rites of passage among the Makonde are related to four events: birth, puberty, marriage, and death. Of all the rites, puberty is not only the most important, but it can also be said to represent the central institution of the Makonde people around which everything gravitates [see also (Bortolot, 2007; Israel P. , 2014)]. While the rites of birth, marriage, and death level of men and women on an equal footing, the puberty rites emphasise the role of women in society. The puberty rites aim to teach women (and men) several cultural traditions about each sex (Dias & Dias, 1970, pp. 162-168, 241-267). The Makonde rite occurs precisely by and for the group and is directed to a "closed" sociocultural circle (of great community control), even given its behavioural ethnolinguistic characteristic Bartolot (2007) observed a tendency in the interviewed Makonde of greater secrecy in sharing the values and practices of the rites. Compared to other groups, the duration of the rites is longer. For example, circumcision is performed without anaesthesia (in cold blood) and at younger ages than in other communities. Additionally, girls are taught specific practises, such as deliberate manipulation of the lengthening of their labia, deliberately, in a manner distinct from that of the *Amakhuwa's*.

Paulo Israel (2014) and Bartolot (2007) concur that the creative practices of mask carving and masquerade performance, collectively called mapiko in Makonde, constitute a structuring schema through which individuals have pursued and articulated fluid social identities in the past and present. These masks, finely carved from wood and frequently embellished with paint and human hair, have been a defining element of Makonde society since at least 1876. Mapiko – the territorial basis of Makonde identity – is complemented by a set of shared social institutions that are largely absent from other ethnic groups in northern Mozambique. Masks and masked performances are of essential importance to

Makonde identity in Mozambique[7]. Not only is their existence exceptional in a region that is not particularly rich in masquerade traditions, but mapiko masks, performances, and groups are institutions that crystallize some of the most basic and essential elements of social structure, including conceptions of gender, kinship, and religious belief (Dias & Dias, 1964b; 1970; Bortolot, 2007).

Above all, mapiko is a medium through which many aspects of social structure are reinforced, contested, solidified, and reconfigured. At the most basic level, mapiko delineates gender identities and gender roles. Until the postcolonial era of Mozambican socialism (for the Makonde, effectively 1964 to the early 1990s), mapiko was the sole preserve of men. For instance, in some rites, mapiko is performed at the conclusion of both boys' and girls' initiations, but, while the boys have learned the "secret" of mapiko's human basis as part of their initiation experience and are sanctioned to participate in the performance, the girls are given no such entrée, and the gendered quality of the masquerade is reaffirmed. Mapiko is equally important because its practice has historically reflected power differentials and directional flows of authority among the Makonde (Rita-Ferreira, 1973; Bortolot, 2007; 1970; Israel P. , 2014).

Before the colonial era, mapiko groups were composed of men from the same settlement, and like the settlements themselves, were headed by senior lineage members. Performances from this era were designed to consolidate these individuals' authority, giving preference to mapiko's spiritual basis and threatening aura. New social and economic dynamics from the colonial era reshaped social structures, giving young men economic power and reducing their dependence on the patronage of their elders. As vertical structures of power in the settlement began to weaken, mapiko group membership began to change. More mapiko groups formed not along kinship lines but through *vikudi* (sing. *shikudi*), friendship networks among age mates who had undergone initiations together. These young men used these more autonomous mapiko groups to

[7] Apart from the Makonde, there are relatively few mask-producing populations: neighbouring Angoni communities (descendants of pastoralist Nguni groups that migrated to the area from southern Mozambique in the 1830s and 40s, and they appear to have no known traditions of mask sculpture and performance), the Yao, Mwani, and Emakhuwa populations (occupy lands colonized by Swahili Muslims in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and seem to have abandoned whatever masquerade traditions they may have had upon their adoption of Islam by contrast) (Bortolot, 2007).

pursue their own visions of masquerade, shifting mapiko's emphasis away from presenting the spiritual to representing the terms of contemporary experience that had played a part in their success. Masks enjoyed a greatly expanded subject matter that included Europeans and caricatures of other African ethnicities, while dance choreographies grew much more complex and narrative in form (Israel P. , 2014; Dias & Dias, 1970).

There has been a long process of differentiation, which can only take place over several generations. After independence, women, who had previously been barred from participation in the medium but had been empowered as soldiers during the war, also began practicing mapiko as a sign of their new positions of equality in Makonde society (Rita-Ferreira, 1973, p. 71)

Another practice is related to pregnancy. During this period, the woman must take care of herself and receive treatment. This includes food and restrictions that are related to vomiting during pregnancy. A pregnant woman should not greet anyone or say goodbye. Even so, a pregnant woman works until the latent stage of labour. The food is prepared by the woman, who also has the task of chopping wood in the bush. The wood is used to make the fire for the kitchen. Preparing food requires an even greater effort than that expended by peasant women (Dias & Dias, 1970, pp. 146-162). Upon their maturation, young men would leave the villages of their fathers to live in those of their mothers' brothers – their maternal uncles – who shared their clan affiliations and, in return for their fealty, provided them the land, money, and goods they needed to embark upon their adult lives. In this way, authority assumed a vertical quality, emanating downward from the oldest and most established to the youngest generations of men (Ibid).

3.3. The Makhuwa people

3.3.1. Nature, origin, and political organization

In comparison with the Makonde, the Makhuwa people are, undoubtedly, one of the least known inhabitants, despite being a large population. According to Rita-Feirreira (1973, p. 69), in 1970, the *Amakhuwa* were estimated at 3,000,000 people, compared with an estimated 175,000 of the Makonde: around (Henriksen, 1983, p. 8). In 1980, calculations from the Census estimated that the Makhuwa constituted 35.6% of the population; *i.e.,*

over three and a half million people (Henriksen, 1983; Rita-Ferreira, 1973; Martínez, 2004, pp. 13, 41).

These people are descendants of a large Bantu group originating in the Central African region (African Great Lakes) - the large Congolese forests. They migrated to the southern African region in search of fertile land. Within Mozambique's borders, all Makhuwa traditions of origin and nature trace and place them at the source of the Luli-Lurio rivers in what is now Lake Niassa (Nyasa) – from which they have since dispersed widely to stretch roughly from the lower Zambezi to north of the Ruvuma. A few studies trace their origin to Mount Namuli, in Zambezia (Martínez, 2004, pp. 41-43). The date of the first crossings of the Ruvuma into what is now Tanzania can only be conjectured, but it is certain that the Makhuwa (crossing) had been preceded by both the Mwera and Makonde, and this was not prior to 1850 (Whiteley, 1954, p. 349). There are strong traditions and clear evidence to suggest that during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, they were dominated and unified by Marave invaders and ruled by monarchs, chiefs, or paramount chiefs known as Lundo and Caronga (Rita-Ferreira, 1973, p. 69).

Pires Prata, cited by Rita-Ferreira (1973, pp. 70-71), divides the Makhuwa proper into four regions: (i) the central region between the Lurio and Ligonha rivers, in the interior; (ii) Cabo Delgado, between the Messalo and Lurio, on the coast rivers – this one is of primary value for this study; (iii) the northern coast, between the Nacala and Lurio rivers, on the coast, and (iv) the Uvomo, in the valley of the lower Lugenda. As regards dialects, he suggests the following: Lumue (Lomwe) between the Licungo and Ligonha rivers; Meto, in the interior between the Lurio and Messalo rivers; Chirima, at Malema, Amaramba and neighbouring regions; Marrevone, on the coast, between the Ligonha and Larde rivers; Nampamela, between the Larde and Meluli rivers and extending to Boila; Mulai, in the sub-district of Antonio Enes; Maharra, in Mossuril and the Island of Mozambique; Chaka at Erati. Nineteenth-century migrations created small pockets of Makua outside Mozambique in Tanzania, and beyond: Madagascar, the Seychelles, and Mauritius (Martínez, 2004, pp. 41-42)

This study seems to give primary focus to the *Amakhuwa*-mêto. This group lived in the interior of Cabo Delgado, between the Massalo river and the Lúrio river, and from Chiure to Marrupa, under the leadership of great chiefs (Mwalia, Matico, Mwera, Megama, etc.)

who had a centralised and powerful political organisation, governing countless small chiefdoms. In the period before imperialist penetration (1842 - 1894), the political power among the *Amakhuwa* -Mêto social formations was concentrated in the lands of Balama, Namuno and Montepuez. This western region of the Mêto, apart from being heavily populated and agriculturally developed, was a corridor for ivory caravans and slaves travelling to the coast. Since 1853, the region has also been a centre for the production of sesame, wax, and rubber (from 1875) for the international market (Medeiros E. d., 1997, pp. 74-75; Martínez, 2004, pp. 67-73).

After the structuring of the *Mwekoni* clan power in Balama (around 1830), small chiefdoms were formed towards the east, along the caravan routes. Thus, a chain of chiefdoms with the same tribal (a specific ethnic unit with its own political and territorial structure) origin was formed. The traditions also stipulate that clan federations were the only impermanent features of the political structure, matrilineal and exogamous units, and they were named tracing ultimate descent from a male clan-founder (*nikokoto, ma*). These clans underwent metamorphoses over time, and these traditional kinship communities acquired characteristics that one might call essentially tribal, with frequent cycles of intra-conflicts (Medeiros E. d., 1997, pp. 74-80; Martínez, 2004, pp. 67-73).

According to Alpers (1974, p. 40) these conflicts were, in part, the result of colonial policy interference, which consisted in distorting people's actual history and relations with their neighbours and frequently rationalising them on the basis that they were 'traditionally' enemies. This instrumentalization policy continued to be perpetrated over time. For instance, after the events of 7 September 1974 (leading to the signing of the Lusaka Agreement and the ceasefire), the 'Commercial, Agricultural, and Industrial Association of Niassa', was formed. Its leaders claimed to represent the *Amakhuwa* -Lomwe speaking peoples of the country: "*the only ethnic group profoundly rooted in Mozambique" and* lobbied for a central position for their ethnolinguistic group in the future of the country, including the relocation of the capital from Lourenço Marques, in the far south, to Nampula. *At the same time, they declared the Makue-Lomwe to be 'the traditional enemies of the Makonde'.* They implicitly aligned themselves against FRELIMO, which the Portuguese-Salazar regime sought to characterize as being largely a Makonde

movement, and with the former Portuguese government, whose propaganda portrayed itself as a friend and ally of the *Amakhuwa* -Lomwe people (Alpers E. A., 1974, pp. 40-41).

In 1966, in Niassa, after the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)[8] had opened its front in Niassa province, the Portuguese distributed many pamphlets claiming that *"… the Makonde tribe is the enemy of the Macua tribe, and that therefore the Macuas should join forces with the Portuguese to fight against the Makonde […] (later on, in Nampula – where the Portuguese seem to have set up their major line of defence in the area of the large Macua tribe) the Portuguese, in fact, liked to call the fight a tribal war, between the Portuguese and the Makonde tribe. In contrast, the Makua were called a loyal tribe, though some Macua have joined FRELIMO"* (Alpers E. A., 1974, pp. 41 - 42).

These tensions and quarrels around elitism, regionalism, and ethnicity haunted FRELIMO since its creation, be that as a movement or political party. Tribalism was seen as 'a highly positive factor' which could be used against FRELIMO, and they understood the need to promote tribalism, regionalist and racialist slogans, creating contradictions between people of different regions, confusing the definitions as to who is the enemy and undermining national unity (Mondlane, 1969, pp. 23, 55, 72; Simango, 1969, p. 5).

Other conflictual traditions are reported in the sphere of inter-clan and tribal or ethnic groups. These intra-clans, tribe, or ethnic conflicts did not, however, prolong massive Makhuwa' (continued) migration, but did influence the shaping, fragmentation, and interpenetration of clans and dispersal of the 'originality' of lineages and groups (Whiteley, 1954). This concurs with Newitt (1995), who says that the Makhuwa's original common culture has been adulterated through admixture with other groups, and the clans have fragmented into successively smaller clan-units, each of which was independent.

Whiteley (1954, p. 349) argues that most of the Makhuwa clan-heads remained south of the Ruvuma, not accompanying the sections of their clans as they moved progressively farther north. This does not imply whatsoever that all of them remained in the south. According to some evidence, around the 1950s, it was estimated that "*there were*

---

[8] Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

123,316 Makua living in southern Tanzania, where clan heads (wenye; sing. mwenye) who remained in Mozambique (primarily in the district around Montepuez, which was formerly known as Meto) were still recognized by their kinsmen as being superior to the junior clan leaders (wenye wadogo) who led the nineteenth and twentieth century migrations of Makua north across the Ruvuma river" (Alpers E. A., 1974, p. 43).

During the pre-colonial period, their political organization consisted of a very large number of wholly independent chiefdoms, leaving margin for independent group actions at the village, which was generally composed of four to five generational matrilineages (*oloko*). Village leadership was invested in the senior male of the founding matrilineage, although he, then, in turn sought the counsel of other elders, male and female, in each component *oloko* (Alpers E. A., 1974; Whiteley, 1954).

Recent history suggests that the lineages progressively achieved autonomy (Whiteley, 1954, p. 350). Through these political organizations, they were able to unify and stand against the Portuguese. It is argued that after a peaceful coexistence with the colonial settlers (in the early 17th and mid-18th centuries), the *Amakhuwa* people retaliated with a war of attrition from 1749 onwards, against the Portuguese and those ethnic groups that supported the colonial interests. Unity of action was assured mainly in the face of a common outside threat, during times of warfare, however, competition for control of trade, the spoils of war, or simply the jealous protection of independence from any superordinate control made these polities fragile (Rita-Ferreira, 1973; Alpers E. , 1966, p. 110).

3.3.2. The economy

The base and foundation of the Makhuwa people's economy – like many other ethnic or tribe groups in Africa – were shaped and reshaped over centuries, and these changes were driven by several events: migrations, war or territorial invasions or chiefdoms structures and long-distance trade; all of which took place in a specific geo-economic region, such as the entire area lying in the north of the Zambezi.

The *Amakhuwa* (lomwe and mêtto) established themselves around East-Central Africa. According to Alpers (1966, p. 10) the region also had a common historical unity: the inter-African commercial relations largely influenced by the Yao, Maravi and Makhuwa, who

dominated the trade routes developed there, then. The development of these (rudimentary) trade routes or trading connections and network (in Kilwa Kisiwani to the remote interior) in the second half of the 12th century marked a turning point in the economic development of the Makhuwa.

Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, in the late 15th century, Kilwa was an important *impôrt,* capturing most of the gold (seaborn) trade and serving as the principal trading state on the east African coast; and, about that same time, it extended its political hegemony to include Mafia, perhaps Pemba and Zanzibar, and much of the immediate mainland coast.

This monopoly was certainly challenged, with the arrival of the Portuguese (1498) into the Indian Ocean, as they took control of the seas and of certain strategic ports. The Portuguese established a factory and built a fort at Kilwa in 1505, but they withdrew their garrison from the fortress and left the island to its traditional rulers in 1612 (Alpers E. , 1966, p. 15; Alpers E. A., 1974; Martínez, 2004, p. 57).

Along with gold, these chiefdoms and *foreigners* traded other merchants: cloth, firearms, gunpowder, slaves, copper and ivory. Such a market existed where the *moradores* were excluded from the gold trade by virtue of the monopoly of the Portuguese. These trade dynamics continued to grow beyond the middle of the 18th century. From that point onward, the introduction of firearms intensified ivory trade and the inter-tribal wars for the capture of slaves escalated (Alpers E. , 1966, pp. 37-39).

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Martínez (2004, pp. 55-59) reports that the Arabs and small Afro-Asin coastal states introduced large scale trading, new agriculture techniques, new plant species and slave trade into the Makhuwa society, from Nyassa (the Maúa). These Makhuwa were on the boundary of the Meto chieftaincies.

In the nineteenth century, agriculture is reported to have been the fundamental activity practiced by the Emakhuawa, although this likely refers to those living in the interior. The *Amakhuwa* of the coastal region did not cultivate the land but fed on the fish they caught in the lagoons and dried for later conservation, completing their diet with fruit and roots. For those in the interior, their livelihood activities included hunting, fishing in regional rivers or the coastal area, and gathering wild plants. Gathering (*ehepelo*) in the forest was

a practice to harvest material and wild fruits needed for their diet. These fruits were supplemented by hunting, which was also practiced for self-protection against wild beasts, to demonstrate strength, bravery, and to procure meat. Their dwellings, the huts, were built on stilts to protect themselves from the lions. Due to the patriarchal nature of the tribe, mainly men and initiated boys would take part in the hunting, and only in rare cases were the children permitted. Hunting campaigns were preceded by ceremonies to invoke the ancestors for good luck. The meat was eaten fresh, but it could also be dried over fire and preserved with salt. Animal skins were used to make purses, cloaks, belts, and musical instruments. Animal tails were used in certain rites of passage as symbols of authority and supernatural powers (Whiteley, 1954, p. 351; Martínez, 2004, pp. 55-57).

The issue of land tenure was not segregated. Private land ownership was not the norm. Land belonged to the community. Agriculture typically started with the clearing (*mphelelo*), which was carried out during the dry season (August – October). They were originally an ironworking society, so their working instruments would be made of metal. These metals, *i.e.,* axes and small hoes were used for clearing land with a short cut. They barely used fertilizer. Their agriculture was rain-fed. The rain (*epula*) and the rainy season ("*eyita*") were critically important to the Makhuwa for their survival and for their agriculture due to the limited use of irrigation systems (Martínez, 2004, pp. 55-77). Some of the crops planted and produced included maize (corn) cassava, pumpkin, sweet potatoes and rye or, in some families, sunflowers, cotton, rice and beans.

The Makhuwa were also an integrated part of forced labour. For instance, the Montepuez area has been a cotton-growing region since the 1930s and was the headquarters of SAGAL (Sociedade Agrícola Algodoeira Limitada, created in 1934), the main concessionaire in this region until independence. There were also other agricultural companies and plantations, such as *Rufidgyia Pflanzungs Gesellschaft* (in Kissanga), *Companhia Colonial de Nangororo Lda*, *Sizal Aktiengellschaft* (Metuge), *Plantação de Arimba* and *Plantação de Miéze*. In these districts, where the Makhuwa also lived, there were reservoirs of cheap labour used for forced labour (Conceição, 2017, p. 10).

In general, as Whiteley (1954, pp. 349-351) argued, their economy was based on an exchange of services and the matrilineal extended family through which it operated, and which stands at the very core of their kinship system. The economic structure of Makua,

as among others of these matrilineal groups, was characterized by two main features: the absence of wealth, in the form of heritable material goods; and, closely linked to this, the lack of permanent attachment to a specific piece of land (Whiteley, 1954, p. 350). The Makhuwa, practising shifting cultivation and lacking specialized crafts, were unable to accumulate goods. Agricultural produce will not keep beyond a season.

3.3.3. Social Practices and Identity

The Makhuwa culture and identity had, then, been the least explored, and the scanty literature prior to 1930 reflects the passing impressions of travellers rather than careful research. Early written traditions about these ethnic groups affirm that they were converted to Islam due to Arab influence in the region before the arrival of Europeans. The culture of the coastal Makhuwa was so strongly influenced by Arab and Persian presence over many centuries that they can be considered a distinct group (Rita-Ferreira, 1973, p. 69).

The Makhuwa form the most north-easterly extension of the great belt of matrilineal peoples. The Makhuwa people have no written record in their mother tongue, and their stories and customs are transmitted orally through rituals that tie the life of the Makuwa people, from birth to death. All these rituals are expressed in the native language of the Makuwa people, and although the country's official language is Portuguese, the Makhuwa language functions as the de facto official language of the people (Whiteley, 1954, p. 349). An example of this is the so-called initiation rites or rites of passage, into adulthood for girls and circumcision for boys. Medeiros (1997, pp. 74-75)summarizes the social function and objective of the rites as being the fulfilment of reproductive roles and restructuring of secular powers to guarantee group identity between generations (Osório & Macuacua, 2014, p. 225). Circumcision is mandatory, and during this ritual, the elders transmit advice to boys and introduce them into adult life. This process begins when a boy attains the age of 12 years, when his parents decide on the timing for his circumcision. The Makhuwa people do not circumcise girls, but after the age of 12, young girls undergo female genital rituals and are taken away to their *chiputu* places. Two elders are chosen to train the girls in *Amakhuwa* traditions. The girls normally stay away from their parents for two weeks. When a girl reaches or attains the puberty stage, she must undergo training for her future life. No Makhuwa girl will take a man in marriage before

attaining puberty. If a girl becomes pregnant before she is traditionally married, she is treated as an outcast, and her presence is a bad omen (Osório & Macuacua, 2014, pp. 188, 278).

Marriage is another symbolic practice among the Makhuwa. This group practises matrilocal marriage, without payment of lobola, in which the exclusive family rights of the mother are exercised over the children. Makhuwa people regard marriage as a sacred and noble plan to raise a family in line with God's wishes. Marital relationships are usually strong, with a high level of respect given to women in comparison to other Bantu peoples. Traditionally, marriages were 100% polygynous. In old traditions, no Makhuwa girl was allowed to marry a non-Makhuwa man; likewise, no Makhuwa boy was allowed to cross Makhuwa borders and take in marriage a non-Makhuwa girl. The *Amakhuwa* people paid no dowry to marry a girl. They regard a dowry as commercialising marriage. Males leave their social group to join their wives' village. If the marriage did not endure, he was required to leave, and the woman could re-marry (pattern of exogamy or endogamy) (Conceição, 2017, pp. 47-53).

Their sexual division of labour is centred on gender roles. Women have historically been responsible for all domestic tasks. In towns and cities, they are generally confined to the home, whereas in rural areas, they play an important role in the agricultural labour force. These groups (women) are also responsible for producing ceramics and clay pots for cooking.

This ethnic group also believes in their traditional ancient African worship. They believe in a God ("*Muluku*") who created the whole world and is almighty, but who is also remote and not involved in the ordinary daily things of humans. The forefathers are treated as intermediaries between them and God. They have a saying in Makhuwa which states "*Muluku mukumi, makholo murette*": God is life, the forefathers are "medicine". This is a very significant saying, which reinforces the role of *Muluku* (God), who gives life and is the creator of all things. Every clan in Makhuwa had a shrine where they worshipped God. These shrines were normally under "Msoro" tree and not at any other place. The place was normally kept clean, and the *Msoro* tree was normally wrapped up with a new piece of cloth, "*Nakoto*", made from the bark of a "*Mpakala*" tree to warn would be worshippers

that the place was sacred. The forefathers are those who live in their daily lives, saving the lives that are given by *Muluko* (Martínez, 2004, p. 231)

According to Martínez (2004), young children are rarely separated from their mothers, they are often treated with affection but are taught to respect their elders and begin work at a young age. The birth of a child is one of the most important events in Makua society. Then, there is *ikahi*, perceived as a pregnancy briefing which takes place when a woman is around six months pregnant. This gathering is prepared by the couple's parents. *Ikahi* briefings are mandatory for couples who are expecting their first child, but the practice is primarily considered the responsibility of the woman. Men are not allowed to attend, and likewise, a woman who has never conceived may not attend.

In addition to this restriction, there are other prohibitions commonly known within the *Amakhua* community that pregnant women are expected to follow carefully. It's believed that failing to follow these prohibitions a pregnant woman can result in serious health problems. For example, a pregnant woman must not have sexual relations with other men. She must not drink water given by another woman who is in her menstrual period. Culturally, when a woman is in her menstrual period, she is considered impure and cannot serve food or perform other duties for her husband. Menstruation is also seen as a sign that a potential pregnancy has been lost. She must not participate in funerals. A pregnant woman's husband is prohibited from digging graves. The Makua regards death as an unwanted, uncalled for event caused by bad spirits or man. They also believe that there are strong forces or spirits that are more powerful than God Himself, which is why people lose their lives and die. In Makua belief, no death occurs without connection with witchcraft or bad spirits (Conceição, 2017, pp. 54-58).

Art and music events are played in a version of mancala with pebbles and holes dug in the dirt. Traditional weaving is common amongst men and women, men make mats to sit on instead of dirt floors, and women weave baskets as well as mats. The culture has a rich musical tradition that includes *acapella* as well as traditional percussion and instrumentation. Dancing is a large part of celebrations and religious ceremonies. The Makhuwa men dance on two-foot-tall stilts, hopping around the village for hours, dressed in colourful outfits and masks. Storytelling is another traditional art form, especially important in areas with low literacy rates (Conceição, 2017, pp. 62-65).

Regarding gastronomy, although there is an importation of cuisines from other peoples, such as, Indians, Arabs, and Portuguese, Makua cuisine is quite rich and traditional. There are several types of food, such as "*shima*" (food made from maize flour and sorghum), *nikujukhu* (food made from piled corn and *yugo* beans), *matapa* (a mixture made from cassava leaves), *mwatranka* (a kind of polenta made from manioc flour.) These foods reveal the identity of the Makuwa people. (Sefane & Gomes , 2021 , pp. 5-7)

Linguistically, the Makhuwa-Lomwe are usually divided into about a dozen dialectical sub-groups. Makhuwa speech differs markedly from neighbouring languages in Tanganyika and, to some extent, from those in Mozambique. Under the term Makhuwa, however, many dialects can be subsumed, some of which are mutually unintelligible. Linguistic unity can only be claimed if one accepts that, despite wide differences, these dialects are grammatically and phonetically more closely related to each other than to languages outside the cluster. Even then, one must exclude those persons who, while born of Makhuwa parentage, have nevertheless deliberately adopted Yao language and customs (Whiteley, 1954, p. 349). The names "Makhuwa" and "Lomwe" are little more than descriptions of the country inhabited by this ethno-linguistic group, although they have each assumed a distinctive tribal connotation in the twentieth century. Moreover, both names take on the decidedly ethnocentric pejorative meaning of "savage" when used by those Makhuwa -Lomwe who regard themselves as culturally superior to another lineage of them, in one respect or another (Alpers E. A., 1974, p. 44). This definition is, however, of only limited value here.

Within the framework of their social organisation, their dances (*tufo, n´soope*), cultural customs (the use of *musiro*, of the *capulana*), cookery (consumption of sorghum and millet), socioeconomic activities (trade of knickknacks, agriculture and fishing), and their religious art of dressing have been influenced by two intersecting contexts: the Bantu and the Arab-Swahili. In this panorama, the matrilineal kinship is the decisive factor of social organisation. Among the Makhuwa group, consciousness precedes a sense of family belonging. Though like the Makonde, the Makhuwa regain their sense of family belonging after entering the adult phase, which is strongly shaped by the initiation rites (Osório & Macuacua, 2014, pp. 178, 282, 323, 336, 367).

3.4. Conclusion

This third chapter used Barth's ethnic boundary to describe social (organizational) distinctions between the Makonde and the Makhuwa, and, moreover, to locate these ethnic groups in their specific culture. In comparison to the Makonde, the Makhuwa constitute the larger population. Consequently, some assumptions have been made in profiling these groups. Further, it shall be appreciated that with the continual development of different (local) governments and administrations associated with several social phenomena, some of the features described in this chapter may no longer exist. The ethnic distribution changed considerably in what are now Nampula and Zambezia provinces from at least the late 19th to early 20th centuries, as it had changed before and as it would change later, with the migration flows, the establishment of colonial forces, and the independence.

4. CHAPTER FOUR: CONFLICT, DISPLACEMENT, AND PLACEMAKING AMONG THE MAKONDE AND MAKHUWA

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is central to this dissertation. It starts with a brief description which locates the manifestation of ethnicity and culture under the country's liberation movement and post-Independence single-party Frelimo's policy and describes how, under the (new) socialist ideology, Frelimo held the cultures of the Mozambican peasantry. Moreover, the chapter narrates the experience of these ethnic groups in facing the impact of the new and ongoing conflict in Cabo Delgado. Lastly, the chapter centers in responding to the main question of the dissertation: *where and when is home*, to emphasize how these groups are negotiating space and building new *homes*.

4.2. The narratives of Conflict and Displacement between the Makonde and Makhuwa

Mozambique is falling under fire and crusade from recurring localised and countrywide conflicts. In Hanlon's words, Mozambique suffered three decades of almost continuous war: 1964–74 liberation/colonial war, 1976-80 Rhodesia war and 1981–92 Cold War proxy war of destabilisation (Hanlon, 2010, p. 79). This alone is enough to reject Bertelsen's (2016) idea of "*violent becomings*", which he used to describe short-lived violent clashes, proliferation of urban riots, and spates of lynchings occurring between prolonged wars. Nevertheless, these small events have indeed constantly challenged the processes of state formation, as he suggests. The Mozambican historical trajectory, the anticolonial and civil wars, and the country's complex contemporary social and political dynamics have been entangled in violence and conflict for the past sixty years (Cahen, Rosario, & Morier-Genoud, 2018). It is fair to say that the unfinished social construction has transformed into a series of protracted internal conflicts.

After decades of nationalist movements and revolts (from the mid-nineteenth century) against the Portuguese pacification campaigns and subsequent formation of the party/state FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front[9]), the war for independence began in

[9] FRELIMO was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1962 as result of the unification of three organisations: MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI. These were the primary anti-colonial organisations, or "the proto-nationalist movements", that formed the basis of FRELIMO. **MANU** (i.e., the Mozambique African National Union was formed by the Mozambican-born Makonde in Tanganyika – Diwane Vanombe – on 16 June 1960 - a leader

1964. The stage for the beginning of armed conflict was none other than Cabo Delgado, in Chai Circumscription. This can, arguably, situate the revolution within the outskirts of the Makonde land, Muidumbe – which borders Mueda, an historical place for the Makonde. The Mueda Plateau is considered the starting point of the rural revolution for independence (Adam, 1993; West H. G., 2005; Israel P. , 2024). Four years before the war, in 1960, the Portuguese, in that district not only declined the aspirations for independence from the [Tanganyika] migrants' Makonde but also decide to slaughter locals on what come to be known as *the infamous* 'Mueda massacre', in *June 16th* (Israel P. , 2020, pp. 1010-1012; 2017, p. 1157).

In my view, not only the Plateau's myths but also the 1960's event call for a need to revisit the traditions, which is a more interesting task of reinterpretation. This is the immediate conclusion I draw from my own reading of the contradictions in Mondlane's (1969) and Simango's (1969).The literature says that the deaths on June 16th awakened the political consciousness of a generation, but the events of Mueda were inscribed as a foundational moment in the narrative of national liberation through a variety of memorial means. Moreover, as Israel (2020) points out, those who survived the massacre began to recount it according to a mould that would later be corroborated for self or group interest, rather than a national one , until it solidified into an official narrative (Bussotti & Nhaueleque, 2022).

---

of the (MANU), **UDENAMO** (i.e., the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique / National Democratic Union of Mozambique was formed in Bulawayo in South Rhodesia on 2 October 1960, 45 days after the Mueda Massacre) and **UNAMI** (i.e. União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente / African National Union for Mozambican Independence was formed by the migrant workers from the Tete, led by Baltazar Chagonga – in exile in Nyasaland, District). Despite their differences MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI had a number of common unifying features: (1) they were formed outside Mozambique by exiles and migrant workers; (2) they had regional variation amongst their participants and their support bases; (3) their respective formations were influenced by the political situation and leading African political organisations in the places where they were set up; and (4) none of them had a strong support base inside Mozambique. MANU was formed by the Makonde from northern Mozambique and operated in Tanzania or Kenya; UDENAMO was established in Southern Rhodesia by the Ndau from central Mozambique and UNAMI operated in Nyasaland and was formed by those from Tete District in the north-west. There was considerable deviation between the different organisations in terms of economic development, education, religion, languages and political perspectives (Mondlane, 1969; Simango, 1969; Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's war of independece, 1964-1974, 1983).

In response to the war, in 1964, the Portuguese military launched the paradigmatic counterinsurgency approach, which combined the militarization of the state and resettlement of rural residents with a promise to promote economic and social gains. As part of this resettlement program, nearly one million people were relocated or "regrouped" into *aldeamentos*. The politico-military success of the Portuguese counterinsurgency approach is highly contested in the literature. After much meandering, the new Portuguese government and FRELIMO signed the Lusaka Peace Treaty in September 1974 and agreed that Mozambique would become independent in June 1975 (Henriksen, 1983; Funada-Classen, 2012, p. 269; West H. G., 1977, p. 678).

After the liberation war (1964–75), a new conflict or civil war started in 1976 – with the creation and establishment of the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR – later RENAMO) and formally ended in 1992. Existing literature does not produce a reasonable consensus around the causes of this civil war. Nevertheless, the anthropological work of Geffray (1990), West (1977) and Geffray and Pedersen (1988) and West and Kloeck-Janson (1999) prompted a paradigm shift away from explanations focusing on external factors to those focusing on internal factors. These authors re-emphasise the role of external forces but localise the conflict as internal. Frelimo embraced socialism as a formula for modernization, rejecting both traditionalism and rural culture by disregarding traditional authorities. Hall and Young (1997) described Mozambique's attempt to construct a socialist society and argue that Frelimo lacked resonance with Mozambican society, particularly with the peasantry in the countryside, for whom the promises of modernizing institutions and collective gains from the war remained unfulfilled (West H. G., 1977, p. 677; West & Kloeck-Jenson, 1999, pp. 455-458). They also document in detail external attempts (by the minority regimes in southern Rhodesia and South Africa) to destabilize the country (West H. G., 1977, p. 676), even to the extent of sponsoring the RENAMO insurgents. This conflict alone resulted in over five million people, *i.e.,* approximately one-third of the population to flee their homes and communities (GOVERNO DE MOÇAMBIQUE, 2021).

In 2010, Hanlon (2010, p. 77) agreed with the Peer Review Mechanism Forum regarding Mozambique's self-evaluation report to the African Union Peer Review in February (2009) stating that a return to war in Mozambique was highly unlikely. However, the widening

chasm between rich and poor and growing social exclusion were creating a 'serious risk' of conflict. Two years later, a new conflict rooted in old quarrels resurged and only ended in 2016. The conflict involved the state, dominated by the Frelimo party in power since 1975, and the opposition party RENAMO. The intensification of this conflict resulted in widespread displacement in affected areas, including thousands of people being displaced across borders to Malawi and Zimbabwe (Tivane, 2024c).

In October 2017, a new form of violent conflict erupted in Cabo Delgado – a province located in northern Mozambique, following the discovery of large reserves of natural gas. The conflict has arguably been labelled as terrorism, led by Ansar al-Sunna and the Islamic State of Mozambique. Since the first attacks, the government has adopted several efforts to combat the terror, but attacks expanded all over Cabo Delgado province and into the north of Nampula province as well.

According to Hanlon (2021), Tivane (2024), and Bonate (2024), the nature and roots of the conflict stem from a major economic change in Cabo Delgado, socio-economic marginalisation, corruption, and weak governance, lack of economic inclusion, and youth unemployment, to the exclusion of local processes and mechanisms for negotiation and mediation. These disputes led to community grievances that were then expressed in attacks that escalated into violent conflict. From the viewpoint of displacement, as of March 2024, According to IOM (2024) the conflict alone forced over 1.6 million people to flee their homes and communities, from which 0.6 million IDPs are returnees, living in villages where safety and security remain volatile and pose risks – as the attacks continue even in the southern part of Cabo Delgado and the northern region as well. While conducting my interviews, I heard many reports of attacks. One took place in Metoro, near Marocane camp, just four days after I had left that camp.

> *"When they say that the situation there has improved – some people go, but it is not yet completely over... Sometimes I hear people saying that the villages a little far from the headquarters of Mocímboa are already being attacked again [have they attacked again?]. They usually attack from time to time"*

The narratives about the praxis of conflict entail terror, slaughter, killings, kidnappings, houses set on fire, and stories of fleeing death.

"They even caught me twice. [Twice? And how did you escape?] I escaped because the first time they caught me, I was leaving the bathroom. I was wearing clothes, women's clothes, a capulana. I wanted to go change that capulana in the cubicle because, after the cyclone, there were no houses. So, they came and caught me there. Some of them said, 'let's kill him', but then two others stood out and said 'no'. The one who caught me was the one, who said let's kill him. So, the two who were their colleagues said 'no, we can't kill him, he's young, full of energy, so let's take him with us, maybe there, he can do the same work we're doing. Then they asked me, do you have trainers or boots? I said 'no, I don't have boots, but I do have trainers. Do you have trousers? I said 'yes, I have trousers. Do you have a jacket or a hoodie? I said 'yes, I do'. They said, go and put them on and come with us. I said, okay. Then those two had already left, they left the place, so the one who stayed there was waiting for me... He was there waiting for me... I went outside and from there I said, hey! I must try it... I didn't want to join that group ... jumped over the yard, when he was chasing me, he ended up falling, and I escaped..." [Man IDP – Marocane Camp]

"... There were two male guests inside the house. They couldn't run; they didn't know where to go. After the house burned down, we separated. I ran with the children in one direction, and others ran to the mosque, where people were praying. They caught him right there. Then, he asked them to kill him inside the mosque, so that's what the terrorists did. They tied him up and beheaded him inside the mosque... [Why did he ask to be killed in the mosque?] I don't know, he was Muslim, he was near the mosque and those al-Shabab were leaving the mosque. There was a group inside the mosque because they knew that until 4 o'clock there would be a group arriving here to pray." [Woman IDP – Pemba city]

Most of the Makonde and Makhuwa people recount their own stories and memories of how they managed to escape and find refuge in the city of Pemba, Pemba-Metuge and Metoro. Their narratives and memories share images of losing loved ones, and their properties. They describe the extortion tactic used by terrorist groups to obtain money through threats or actual violence. For many, these traumas represent despair, as this woman put it...

“I was surprised at the door by the terrorists, and they asked me to give them money. I said, ‘I didn't have any money’, and they replied, ‘Your husband always travelled to Tanzania, how come you don't have any money?’ [Did they know your husband?] Yes. [So, these terrorists were people from the neighbourhood?] Yes. They asked where my husband was, and I said, ‘I didn't know’. They repeated the same question, and I said I didn't know. Then they burned the house. Others went into the yard and set the car on fire. They also told those who were nearby to leave the house, as it was already on fire... There was a coconut plantation, my father was weaving that straw used to build Portuguese-style beach houses and hotels. My father had a large plantation; he had three thousand coconut trees –and they were all burned [Did they burn everything?] Yes, they burned everything. The elephants ruined it, too.”

To run from being slaughtered was the only option. These circumstances, they say, prompted them to abandon their communities. Some took one day, others a few days, or even a week to reach a safe zone or area. Many of them arrived first in Pemba or Montepuez, and were then relocated by the local Government, or by their own decision – many already knew where they intended to go, usually to a family’s house, relatives, or acquaintance. Some had two or three stops in different districts or villages; thus, they couldn’t manage to take anything aside from a few clothes and their children. Everything else was lost – including their sources of income and food...

“There, I had my farm, I had my house, yes, I had my coconut trees... Yes, I was able to harvest coconuts and sell them, but not in large quantities. I sold 10 coconuts to buy food, and during the chestnut season I was able to sell two or three bags, which I used to buy clothes for my children and my wife” [Man IDP – Marocane Camp].

4.3. Where and when is home: the concept of home and its intersections among the Makonde and Makhuwa.

Figure 6: Map of Cabo Delgado Province Language



Source: Translators Without Borders [here]

> *"What is home... this is a complex question! I think what we do is to leave it up to the person to decide what they want. Whether they want to return or remain. What is a durable solution? This is the analysis we do. If what you mean is that home can be in a new place, then the basic principle we follow is that the person should decide where they want to live. Whether they want to create a new home, or if they want to decide to live somewhere else or return to their ancestral place." [humanitarian actor]*

> *"Well, I am a sociologist, and I have this social component, which I think we ... have some challenges in responding to... For us, a house is not a theoretical concept, it is a space that shelters people, and obviously incorporating all these components of climate resilience that are part of our mandate, but fundamentally it is a structure that accommodates people in a given context, whether urban, which is our main focus, but even in rural areas we have several approaches to building resilient houses as well ." [humanitarian actor]*

> *"So, when you start looking at shelter as a programme, people might focus on technical aspects, the typology, and all that, right? But I think we, especially when considering the softer component of what shelter or house represents, I think we really need to recognise that shelter is the centre, not just in terms of technicality, resilience, or concepts like better shelter or safer shelter, but really looking at those four areas of work ... So, if you understand those four words... it makes shelter as the centre of all the other activities or all the elements that families or displaced populations need. So, in this way, I just wanted to highlight that shelter is really a centre of all the response that we would provide" [humanitarian actor]*

For humanitarian actors and for the purpose of responding to crises, home is circumscribed to physical structures. Even if theorised, the diverse array of practices, meaning, and imaginative forms or feelings surrounding the sense of rootedness are condensed into structures, and those other particularities are seen as secondary or neglected – left aside. And this is justified within the concept of frameworks, scopes, and limited funding. Humanitarian aid and funding have long faced severe limitations and cuts. It's fair to say that to neglect social dimensions of home is a matter of conceptualization, not the myth about funding. What is also true is that the money spent on foreign aid is earmarked for the needy and the relief of the suffering (lifesaving) of people effected by crises. Those investments are not intended to eliminate hunger, misery, and poverty. In practice, the shortcomings of aid are numerous, and enough to raise questions about the viability in linking it with the development of crises-affected communities and the country, itself. Here, a nexus is needed to create a linkage with countries' development plans and practices. The humanitarian industry tends to be reframed in this direction to respond to funding shortage. In 2025, the humanitarian aid

sector was disrupted with severe cuts in aid availability and resources. USAID funding was formally shut down, eliminating the world's largest humanitarian aid agency, which had supported millions lives in low and middle-income countries over the past two decades, including Mozambique.

The close association between the concept and practice of home and belonging has long been a focus in anthropological literature. The intersections and affinities are indeed multifaceted and symbolic, indicating cultural beliefs from each ethnic group, or tribe and clan.

> *"Nhumba[10] is a house. It is the* physical structure – a set of bricks, arranged in a cube or rectangle, with a marbled and patterned roof. *Ukaia is a community and communal living– a neighbourhood where people live together. It is a village. It has houses, beds, children, hens – it has everything.*
>
> *Here, then [he said it indicating his surrounding] is Ukaia. When you are there [machamanba] – and you say, 'I am going to ukaia', it refers to the community or village – even if we live together with the Kimwani and Makonde, it has the same meaning." [Man IDP – Marocane Camp]*

Humanitarian actors frame physical shelter as a basic existential need. Shelter is described as simply one aspect of home. However, it is houses and other elements and beliefs embedded in homes that are wrapped up in the desire and struggle for belonging, which underpin imagination and future aspiration of displaced people.

Home is a house and security: any human being would need a physical structure – a shelter – to start dwelling or settling. This is the case in Cabo Delgado. In rural and peri-urban areas, the use of locally sourced materials like earth, bamboo, and palm leaves is emphasized in both traditional and adapted building practices. The poor province and country are predominantly populated by villagers living in simple mud huts; but these huts resemble different typologies of housing in their dimensions of space and time.

---

[10] Referred as house in *Kimwani*

"Back home, [enupa or inupa] is a hut that holds family's belongings... in the past everything was simple. I mean, I have a house, I'm going to build a house, what am I going to have there, what do I hope to have? A house would have my bed – It can be single or double, or first I must have my machete, my hoe, these are the tools, my arrow, these are the tools of that time... Nowadays, it's different. Even peasants want to have a living room table, they want to have a bicycle, they want to have I don't know what else, as they manage to achieve some things, but that was the essence" [Man Host Community – Pemba City].

House constructions using cement are more common in urban areas, where the lower and upper middle classes – people with more stable financial situation – live. Those huts called 'traditional buildings' are built using endogenous techniques and often involve locally sourced material such as earth for walls, sometimes stabilized with straw or other binders, and bamboo for roofing structures, frames to support palm leaves, providing a natural and readily available material. There are differences in how they characterise and need a house for. An old man from Muedumbe and Makonde said:

"A house is prepared. [in a situation which] I don't have a house [and feel in need to have one – what we do is]. In the evening, you sharpen your katana, and you take it to the bush to cut bamboo or stakes, and rope from trees. Each type of bamboo has its own rope. You design the structure of the house on the ground, – and must be big: a four-sided hip-pyramid roof house. Then, you start building it up to the walls, which must be plastered with mud or clay". [Man IDP – Ngalane 2 camp – Metuge].

By extension, one of our interviewees – who happened to speak Makhuwa, but she was *Kimwani* – described:

"I had nhumba yango [my house], big one, made of bricks and cement. I used to live there with my parents, husband, and children. It had two doors... A house must have a yard, a bed, a freezer, a TV, and I had all of these, but it was burned by the machababo [or mashababe]. We had a machamba with palm trees, around 3000 coconut trees. We used to sell palms to the owners of the local hotels" [Woman IDP – Pemba city].

This account comes from a widow, whose husband was killed by terrorists, when she was eight months pregnant with their third child, a little girl. She now lives in her brother's house, along with her parents and sister-in-law. Her brother works in Maputo, and her father is currently hospitalized. Like her, other women interviewed described the concept of a house in gendered terms, with a pot, kitchen, etc. I noticed that the design of their houses typically includes two doors – one at the front and another at the back, leading to the yard. When I asked why there were two doors, she explained: "… *Some people, men, would use the back door to enter the house, while others, women, would use the front doors and stay on the porch to chat…"*. The doors also serve purposes of safety and security, as the house itself does…

> *"Having two doors in the house is a symbol of its own design. You decide the number of doors when you are designing its structure and inside compartments. The importance of having two doors is that at some point, someone might come to attack you and your family, and the person might come from the front door. Then, you can use the door in the back to get out of the house, also the back door is useful for resting. Let us say that it is afternoon and it's sunset, we can use the back door to go in and out of the house and access the yard, [Man IDP – Ngalane 2 camp – Metuge].*

The dimensions and functionality of a house go beyond physical shelter and basic existential needs; this was reconfirmed in interviews conducted in Metoro and Pemba, by Makhuwa and Makonde, respectively. One of my interviewees went so far as to question about the viability and practice of shelter assistance, at its most fundamental levels. The dignity of housing or shelter conditions in displacement camps is both deplorable and concerning. On the page following the cover of this dissertation, there are some images. Emergency tents are considered crucial for providing temporary shelter to populations affected by conflict and disaster, but they come with limitations and drawbacks.

> *"… a tent is usually not the most preferable option, right? Even if we anticipate a very short displacement period, we somehow have to consider what is more conducive or preferable for families, not only by providing them with brand-new shelters, but also by looking at alternative solutions, like if they are in host*

> *community, then how can we support the host community or host families to extend their shelters with the shelter materials.*
>
> *If you look at the shelter typologies, it really depends on the context. It's also connected to the relationship with the communities and to land availability. Many other factors come into play, including what the government or the district authority thinks regarding the allocation of public or private land to the newly displaced populations" [humanitarian actor]*

Displaced people often end up living in those tents for years, under deplorable conditions. Some even use these tents as roofing for their pent or mono-pitch roof huts. From a cost-benefit or "value for money" perspective, locally and reinforced buildings would have different social impacts. These pent or mono-pitch roof huts have no rooms and accommodate over 4 individuals, including children. They were built by families who initially clung to the hopes of returning home, but the war has now stretched into eight brutal years. All *houses should have two doors, rooms, and beds. I have no rooms here – I have never seen that. [I don't have a room] because I came running here. If I had conditions, I would build my house with rooms. Here, we are as refugees, which is why the house I built has no room. We just built this for a temporary refuge, and rest for a few days. We thought that we would be returning soon – we did not know that this situation would last this long,"* – the old man said.

The symbolism and beliefs around the structure, dimensions, and functionality of a house are not unique to the Makhuwa and Makonde people. In 2019, when I was deployed to respond to Cyclone Idai in Sofala – Buzi district, an entire community (Guara-Guara) dominated by Cisena and Cindau people rejected Oxfam's (COSACA Consortium's) approach to delivering latrines or toilet technologies and their WASH rural solutions. Their argument was simple: 'you cannot build latrines or bathrooms in front of house doors'. Toilets and sanitation facilities had not been commonly practiced in that area for a long time, let alone cultural beliefs and affinities for preserving traditional house-building techniques. Faeces were excreted in open spaces (fields, bushes, forests, bodies of water). In 2015, while conducting a socio-economic assessment to determine the eligibility for compensation of people involuntarily resettled in Mozambique's

Limpopo National Park; I also encountered an entire area of the Xichangana people using built toilet facilities as barns to store their livestock and agricultural harvest, crops, etc.

Safety and security are critical issues for the Makhuwa and Makonde people. The memory of displacement and surviving slaughter and mutilation still strongly challenges their willingness to return – the images remain vivid in their eyes.

The killings and slaughter are still present, as the widow woman said: *"last week, in Quissanga, fishermen were killed"*. Many people prefer to rebuild their lives far away from that terror. To rebuild her life, she needs a house and land (to return to).

After centuries of Portuguese colonization, Mozambique has undergone a difficult period in combating poverty, infrastructure deficits, and [un]controlled urban expansion. This is to say that reconstruction starts with uplifting local knowledge and practice of housebuilding, to reduce pressure on non-existent financial resources, from both humanitarian and government institutions. The typology of houses in Cabo Delgado reflects this dichotomy between the communities and government *versus* humanitarian actors – between what is principled and what is resourcefully possible. The houses in Marocane camp are far better than those in Ngalane 2 camp. They were built with support from humanitarian agencies, but the Marocane prototype is severely criticised by humanitarian actors and a few scholars due to the unprincipled humanitarian process, violation of human rights, and 'forced resettlement' – which reflected a return to communal villages. Many scholars defend the idea that those prototypes represent a continuity of the authoritarian modernization policy pursued by the Mozambican state during the radical socialist period (1975-1990), *i.e.*, communal villages. For humanitarian actors, criticisms came from questions related to ownership: who owns the house, is it the state or the displaced people? The international humanitarian Law (IHL) stipulates that people forced to flee their homes are entitled to some form of compensation for loss and damage, but not to a free house.

Post independence, the state managed the housing sector and allocated housing to citizens (who had to pay rent), direct provision of housing is no longer as prevalent. Communal villages were, arguably, a failed government attempt to urbanise rural areas, soon after the independence (West H. G., 1977). Samora Machel's vision for

Mozambique, *i.e.,* a Marxist-Leninist solution, was rooted in a nation-building agenda, which included modernising the *Aldeamentos* (fortified villages) and liberated zones.

For many Makonde, the promised modernity has always seemed to arrive in fragmented and dysfunctional ways: tractors without spare parts, hospitals without doctors, schools without books, pipes without water, banks without credit, consumer goods without the money to buy them, free markets without job opportunities, elections without safe choices (West H. G., 1977, p. 677).

Critics argue that these villages were built behind the rhetoric of providing security for populations post-1975 but served other purposes. They were used for securing control over a territory and populations and to reinforce the state's authoritarianism particularly during the civil war. Today, they are being used to take advantage of resources from humanitarian aid and to win back the electorate in an opposition zone (Mandamule, 2023). These arguments are questionable.

The province of Cabo Delgado has a long history of settlement and resettlement, and it has been its cornerstone. It started with *colonatos* – a settlement approach used by the Portuguese colonialists to protect their interests or serve for security protection and perpetuate colonial dominance. The *colonatos* consisted of bringing in immigrants and metropolitan colonialists to dominate peasants. For some reason, these villages were located along the main road in Cabo Delgado[11]. Then, the Portuguese introduced *aldeamento* in 1966 in Cabo Delgado. It is estimated that over 250,000 people were moved into 150 villages from a fifty-mile strip. This resettlement policy had military and political objectives (Geffray, 1990; Hall & Young, 1997; Henriksen, 1983, pp. 155-164). Militarily, the policy was to insulate the rural population from either joining or being attacked by FRELIMO guerrillas. Politically, it is argued that the Portuguese intended to regroup the population to bring in basic amenities and to make rural areas a place of pleasantness, thereby reducing social grievance and imped, again, the social alignment of the peasants with FRELIMO. Running water, electricity, schooling, and medical

[11] Began in 1968, the *Colonato* in Montepuez site, as a keystone in the *aldeamento* network, was allocated top priority and agriculture. Lisbon donated 250 hectares of land. A house. Twenty-five cattle and agriculture advice to each immigrant family. By 1970, it had 150 residents' families (Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974, 1983).

assistance became economically feasible to compact communities otherwise out of reach for dispersed people[12]. The fortified villages were also located close to the main roads, and transportation was also envisioned. Both *colonatos* and mainly *aldeamentos* were perceived as a counterrevolution by the Portuguese and a sociopolitical strategy alternative to FRELIMO's liberated zones, which were also launched in Cabo Delgado as the basis for Mozambique's future. Many scholars argue that the Portuguese strategy ultimately failed (Henriksen, 1983, pp. 143-154); leading to a profound reshaping of Mozambique's society, including Makonde and Makua's. According to West (1977, p. 677), for most people in Mueda, modernity's partial and fragmented delivery has fomented division, envy, and confusion, despite claims to establish a more beneficial social order. As Israel (2024, p. 1) stated, the Makonde relocated into communal villages; partook in collective production; scattered throughout the country; and embraced Mozambique's single party, Frelimo, as a cornerstone of their identity. These transformations entailed the adoption of a hierarchical social structure, which superseded – and conflicted with – the horizontal organization of Makonde precolonial society.

During the 1970s and 1980s, FRELIMO opted to create communal villages to rebuild the country's economy. The concept of communal villages emerged in 1975, partly as a response to the crisis in the countryside in the immediate aftermath of the Portuguese settler exodus from Mozambique in 1974–1975. FRELIMO used the same logic and arguments of the colonial government to structure communal villages. The concept was built on the hope of promoting social and economic progress, but collectively. The first communal villages were established in Cabo Delgado soon after independence, encompassing or compounded in the *aldeamentos* and Liberated zones. The dynamics of population mobility in Cabo Delgado reflect the dichotomy of practice and theory of development (Tivane, 2024a, p. 7). The rejection and criticism of communal villages by these scholars and humanitarian actors tend to focus on poverty and the macro-responsibility of the government in providing housing solutions. However, nor do these

[12] To this – sporadic population – the Portuguese used to argue that was used to prey to intimidation and a source of guerrillas' food, information, shelter, manpower and concealment (Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's war of independece, 1964-1974, 1983).

criticists suggest alternative housing solutions. The immediate response to non-existing houses in displacement and resettlement camps in Cabo Delgado has been the provision of emergency tents. Displaced people end up living in those tents for years, under deplorable conditions.

Displaced people interviewed in Marocane and Ngalane 2 at least those who managed to rebuild their houses, are happy and safe in those houses resembling 'communal villages'. The generalization of a 'failed strategy' referring to a communal village in Cabo Delgado, from this angle of the typology of houses, is questionable. This does not deny that the situation may differ in other provinces, such as Nampula, as one of our interviews pointed out. There was more on anti-traditionalist policies than house typology. In Cabo Delgado these structures already existed, inherited from the colonial government, and some of them with running water, electricity, schools and medical facilities. This was not the case in other provinces where FRELIMO had to start from scratch.

Many scholars use Geffrey's (1990) argument about the social base that RENAMO gained during the civil war to explain this failure. To summarise his argument, Geffray attributes a much more important role in the origins and expansion of the conflict within the confines of its national borders, and to peasant dissatisfaction with government policies and attacks on local belief systems.

It is true that these historical processes of human mobility result from and contribute to a traumatic collective memory of forced or voluntary resettlement, invariably affecting the local socio-economic structure. It is also true that these ethnic groups tend to negotiate power dynamics and adapt to changing circumstances. This is why the local authorities in Cabo Delgado continue to argue in favour of "local problems, local solutions", *i.e,* creating permanent housing solutions using local, natural building materials. The establishment of a house takes place within wider inhabited surroundings, and the spatial layout and design of the dwelling vis-à-vis neighbours.

Factually, just help them build the houses of their own, I would suggest. The relationships between the terms house and home must be established in varying cultural and historical contexts. The practice of building houses (or vernacular architecture) by the inhabitants themselves is learned through the craftsmanship from their own experiences.

Those so-called traditional huts, [spontaneous] living spaces, self-built dwellings, and settlements reflect the cultural practices and resources available in those communities. In haste and with limited economic resources, those houses represent a well-defined physical structure to provide safety. They are often considered an integral part of their urban fabric.

> *"Yes. If you look at Ngalane and compare it, for example, with Saul, which is further down into Metuge, you´ll notice some differences. Saul is directly linked to the host community. Ngalane is somewhat distinct from it.*
>
> *If you focus on shelter conditions, although Saul is farther from the metropolitan area than Ngalane, it is much more advanced in terms of shelter conditions. This is because Saul has achieved successful reintegration or local integration with the host community, which is closely tied to their livelihood, the Machamba. They have consistency in terms of how they meet their needs, particularly food, which allows them to focus on improving other aspects of their lives, including shelter conditions...*
>
> *But if you look at Ngalane, even though they might be better positioned in terms of livelihood, not only do they have their own Machamba, but also to other opportunities, because they are very close to the job market in Pemba..." [humanitarian actor]*

Home is land and food: smallholder farmers and pastoralists have been disproportionately affected by the conflict and displacement, not to mention artisanal or small-scale fishermen, mainly Makhuwa people. These groups are not only marginalised, but, in displacement camps and resettlement zones, their pattern of land use differs from those at their previous homes. Land issues are problematic and one of the main factors of conflict and resentments among displaced people. While describing the controversies around the "traditional authorities" in post-1975, Harry G West and Scott Kloeck-Jenson (1999, p. 458) assert about how the 1979 Land Law worsened the social conflict between generations in rural areas; and how RENAMO used this conflict for their benefit during the civil war (Geffray & Pedersen, 1988; Geffray, 1990). In practice, the politics of land provides a clear example of the impasse reached between former chiefdoms and

representatives of the post-independence state. What can be asserted is that these cleavages disregard ethnicity. They are not ethnical driven conflicts, but rather the result of unresolved processes involving the government and local authorities, thus reflecting structural and institutional factors. There are no ethnical land boundaries in there, but community land boundaries, contested access to land-based resources, and ultimately, an insecurity surrounding land tenure.

Spontaneous and government-planned displacement and resettlement process implicated the transportation and human mobility of people who were then settled in 'one's land'. This resettlement occurred in the southern part of Cabo Delgado, these lands belonged to (the state) an Makhuwa – not from the littoral or coast, but from the interior. So, now these *natives' lands* (as they are called) were granted to displaced people: Makonde, *Kimwani* and Makhuwa.

Land constitutes one of the most valuable resources in rural areas, where nearly 70 per cent of peasants depend on it and other natural resources for their livelihoods and daily food needs. Both the 1995 Land Policy and 1997 Land Law recognise customary land tenure for land access and management while seeking to promote investments without jeopardising the *natives*. On the other hand, the same Law or policy establishes basic guiding principles for transferring land use rights between Mozambicans, and states that land use right is guided by the principle that land itself remains the property of the State and cannot be sold, alienated, or mortgaged. Moreover, only the right to use and benefit from the land known as (DUAT - *Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra*) can be transferred under specific conditions, primarily focusing on development and involving community consultation and compensation where applicable.

In case of disaster – such as human-made conflict, as defined by the DRR law (*Lei n. º 10/2020: Lei de Gestão e Redução do Risco de Desastres*)[13], there are no legal provisions, e.g., for compensation for land allocation and occupation (*trespasse de terra*). It lies under the local government's responsibility to allocate the land (for house and agriculture – minimum standards) and support with the legalisation of DUAT. The Land Policy and Land Law explicitly recognise the importance of smallholder agriculture and land

[13] Law No. 10/2020 approving the Disaster Risk Management Act.

occupation, under the customary land systems, and recognise the role of local leaders in conflict prevention and resolution and the formal demarcation and registration of land use rights. This was not entirely the case in all three sites visited for data collection. The process started with allocation of land (15/20m) for building houses, and, in some cases (Ngalane 1, and Marocane) land was allocated for agriculture (*machambas*); but it stopped there. The process of legalizing land occupation (DUAT) was never stated or completed (República de Moçambique , 1997; República de Moçambique , 1995; República de Moçambique, 2024).

Natives are now complaining, intimidating or menacing and taking back their lands from the displaced people. There is no ethnic group safe from this recouping, be it the Makonde or Makhuwa. According to the law, land cannot be sold. Land is being sold, borrowed and rented in all visited camps, including peri-urban areas of Pemba. For the displaced people to use the land for agriculture, they must pay an *onus* – this also happening with the houses, for those unfortunates who did not happen to secure a plot to build one (Tivane, 2024a). One interesting story from a woman in Ngalane 3 (spontaneous displacement site) shows the importance of land in that context. She says that she will never go back to her district due to the horror that she saw and even swore that *"even if this place/community was attacked, forcing me to be displaced twice, I would never go back" [Woman IDP – Ngalane 3].* On land issues, her husband bought the plot where their house (equipped with running water, TV and electricity) was bought from a native for an amount of 300 mzn; but their *machamba* was bought for 5000 mzn. This might also indicate that it is a large plot for agriculture, or that the price of land in that district and community has increased. This is not an isolated case. A young man from Marocane, who happens to be a member of the local authority structure, received a plot for house and built it with the support from International Organization for Migration (IOM), Northern Integrated Development Agency (ADIN) [14] and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) – he said; had also paid for *machamba* an amount of 5000 mzn for what he estimates to be 5 hectares. Other members his family were not as fortunate they were slaughtered by the terrorists, a group that included women, he

[14] Agência de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte (ADIN)

stated. This might suggest and illustrate a new norm in recruitment and radicalization. The self-proclaimed Jihadist group are using tactics to reorient and manipulate gender roles in that conflict, leveraging social media, and using discourses of offering a sense of empowerment or belonging, and exploiting their vulnerabilities to their recruitment and radicalization. The local leaders try to do their job in preventing conflicts over land or in resolving disputes. The cornerstone of the problem is that the government did not finalise the formal demarcation and registration of land use rights. The husband of the woman referred above was one of the first to arrive and settle in Ngalane 3. Working together with the leaders from Ngalane 1 (an area referred to as belonging to "natives," though they are not)[15], the district authority appointed him to help coordinate the settlement in Ngalane 3, by helping to host and to allocate land for the displaced people who were arriving in the area. This approach was replicated in many cases. Whoever arrived first, and fit the purpose, the district government would ask support, and it would consist of "if you are from Macomia district, you would be responsible of receiving and hosting the people from that same district and so on" – according to the camp leader and our translator, who is also member of local authority structure. These dynamics contributed to kind of rebuilding those districts in a different appropriated space. This also created a new rural-urbanization and second displacement phenomenon. Those unable to acquire land or plot for agriculture, are moving further to the interior, to find arable land for agriculture. Local reports from local leadership indicate that some displaced people are being invited by others who arrived earlier. This is the same pattern of human mobility which lead to the spontaneous settlement of people in Ngalane 1 – those who call themselves natives in that area.

In other words, consider that there are local dynamics of human mobility and new human settlements emerging, wherein there is a confluence of all these ethnic groups, appropriating space to build their new homes. Moreover, there are conflicts over land allocation and use. These conflicts reflect the combination of ineffective implementation of land legislation and lacking transparency that leads to a deep-seated prejudice against

[15] Ngalane 1 borders Ngalane 2 in the northern, and Ngalane 3 in the southern.

smallholder agriculture, resulting in the marginalisation of local leaders and customary land systems (Filipe & Norfolk, 2017, pp. 13, 96).

Land occupation and sale is not new in Cabo Delgado. Reports of land being sold in plenteous among the Makonde date back to the 1950s (Alpers E. , 1966). Between the 1975/80 and 1990s and 2010s, the province of Cabo Delgado and the country in its entirety saw rapid acquisition of large land concessions and land grabbing by the elite and political establishment. For instance, in Cabo Delgado, hundreds of Makonde were moved to different districts, including to Pemba in different periods. First when the capital of the province was transferred from Ibo to Porto Amelia (now Pemba city). Second, soon after independence and in the 1990s; and, last, with this ongoing war. These voluntary and forced human mobility have culminated with land occupation, land grabbing and eviction from their ancestral homelands, particularly from the Makhuwa. Their land were granted to politicians or the "intellectuals" Makonde, their family members and partners, and to foreign investors (Filipe & Norfolk, 2017, pp. 15-17), excluding other Mozambican people from this process that would indelibly mark the history of the post-colonial country; as argued by one of my interviewees...

> *"I happened to be born in the district of Mocímboa de Praia, because my parents were working there for the government, so I ended up being born there, but my parents' origins are Maconde from the district of Macomia, administrative post of Chai" [Women Host community – Pemba city].*

"Where there is no land for agriculture, there is almost no food" *[Man IDP – Marocane camp]*. The lines and boundaries between these ethnic groups are more visible and defined here, contrary to what happen in their social beliefs around houses and land. Here, each of them knows what they can or cannot eat. The Makhuwa come to even despise the Makonde cuisine. This is more visible in urban areas, and expressive in rural areas as well. Food and cuisine reflect the highly un-unifying aspect of the local regional identity, which can be classified into, or analysed in terms of ethnic categories. Food has an importance in the production and reproduction of ethnical and religion identity and placemaking in Cabo Delgado. Those who live or used to live in littoral and coastal areas are Muslims and Islams. Fish is their main dish, as well as rice and leafy greens (with fish).

> *"... We [Makonde] are considered people who eat everything. Even the Makhuwa from the coast and the interior have different diets; those from the coast eat more fish. So, similarly for the Makonde, there is more bushmeat or those domestic animals that people raise, and I don't know what else, which exist everywhere, but specifically the Makonde, we eat almost everything that does not harm the body, if it's safe, the Makonde will consume it. We are talking about pork, bushmeat such as monkey, among other bush meats..." [Women Host community – Pemba city].*

As for the Makonde, their main source of livelihood and income is agriculture. Their cuisine is thus based on whatever comes from the land and bush, including drinking and spending nights drinking. Their cuisine and dishes are a long list that goes from snail to monkey and hogs (swine). "We the Makonde eat everything. We are known as those people who eat everything" – said one of our interviewees who is not an IDP, but a well-positioned politician in the city. The line is drowned from here. For instance, hogs are classified as *najas* by the Muslims and Islam. They could never eat it because it is inherently unclean and defiling. Eating it would compromise the state of purity, making them unfit for certain religious activities.

The Makhuwa people might not feel quite home in the *hinterland* and far from sea. The success of the harvests of fish and sea food and distribution (sell and consumption) have been central to the communal practises and their attempts to realise the long-standing moral imperative to 'nourish the people'. Not having fish, and sea food distinct and serve the unique culinary needs for them. In households, cooked or fried fish has been the core feature of daily meals. Typically, amakhuwa cook and serve rice, unseasoned grain or vegetables with fish. Seafood has been vital to sustaining life in this historically coastal society. The harvest, sharing and eating of sea food also nourish relationships of family and kinship.

My finding suggest that the Makhuwa people's homemaking journey is Janus-faced. This group is simultaneously looking back and remembering the past – which leads them to go back to their 'place of origin' only to harvest fish, while adapting to the present and reconstituting their places in these state-planned and spontaneous settlements. An examination of this tension shows how diverse material contexts influence the way to interpret and invoke food memories (Sen, 2026). Food defines a variety of displacement

places as well as larger ecologies and spatial imaginaries, otherwise invisible in the studies of displacement in this country. In Marte's (2012) words, these common conceptions of displaced foodways can be perceived as enactment and preservation of 'ethnic' identity. However, they can also underplay the social and politicized struggles displaced endure in their process of place-making in a new society, and the intersecting negotiations of class and gender in everyday household reproduction.

Foregrounding the significance of maintaining 'traditional' food practices, demonstrates how the "low " and "middle class" utilize cooking as 'political memory-capital' for self- and group determination of ethnical boundaries, as a healing strategy, and as a site of demands for culturally appropriate survival. Home cooking, usually considered a private ritual, has public implications as an investment of labour, energy, and time that helps the displaced exercise some measure of control over socio-economic uncertainties, while indirectly helping to defray the costs to maintain ethnical identity (Marte, 2012). Food serves as a crucial aspect of these ethnic groups and their displacement experience in shaping the feelings and perceptions of their belonging and exclusion that underpin their identity. The coexistence of Muslim and Christian communities in urban and rural settlements and displacement camps provides an opportunity to explore the dynamic use of dietary habits in constructing, maintaining and transforming ethno-religious identities from a historical perspective (García, 2025). In both urban and rural contexts, we have not seen signs of foodways undergoing a transformation, in what is now a shared ground or space. Here there is more ethnographic studies need. For now, the bounders and 'traditional' of foodways and practices are well defined in a sense of protecting or changing individual identities. This is more of the same with marriage.

Home is marriage and religion: my first interview was with a group of three men from Quissanga, Namagula, from where their parents come from, as well. Only one was responding to our questions. They were all Amakhuwa and their parents as well. I found them eating in their aunt/sister's house, who happened to be the one who cooked and invited them to come and eat. That seemed to be a common practice in-that extensive family and familiarity. I asked them: what a house is and what must it have? He began by saying:

> *"To have a house, I must have conditions or resources to build one. When you are a child, you don't need a house [here, I think that he meant to say that he would live with his parents]. When you are grown, the first thing to build a house is that you should marry or look for a spouse... a house should have a fireplace [traditional stove to cook], food, a bucket, beds for sleeping overnight."*

He also said that he has all these items in his new house and used to have more back in Quissanga, but he lost them due to conflict. He had to marry before building a house. This was not unique for him. For instance, another young man, from Muidumbe, also had to marry before building his *ngolota (house)*. It was burned by the terrorists, now he lives with his parents-in-law, together with his spouse and daughter. Marriage and multiculturalism are inflexible exercises that often do not allow for the accommodation of multifaceted identities. Like food boundaries, marriage flexibility is also a matter of region. It is frequent to see Amakhuwa people marrying *Kimwani*, not Mokondees. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious families are not easily produced and shaped in those communities, but it seemed that, when they do, the burdens of conversion and assimilation tend to fall on men. Men interviewed were reluctant, but women seemed to be flexible about marrying a man from a different religion and ethnical group. I met and talked to people who were born into Amakhuwa or *Kimwani* and married to an individual from inter-and-intra ethnic grounds, or within the same clan. I also met and interviewed people, men and women, who were born in Amakhuwa kinship, but raised by Makonde families. I was not fortunate in finding examples of inter-ethnic and religious marriage. That is not to say that they don't exist they are simple rare. One of the main impediments is food and cuisine, as well as the everyday lifestyle.

The concept and materialisation of "multicultural families" is inflexible. These families are not often constructed, perhaps to avoid passing through the complexities of conversion and the social implications of being labelled a "multicultural family". These marriages might reflect an imagined future society (in these camps and resettlement zones), suggesting that it is worth deeper interest in exploring how this situation is complicated further or would factor coexistence when, for instance, a Makonde converts to Islam, and how these people would negotiate their notions of identity and belonging. Nonetheless, this research offers several important and meaningful contributions to the

field and brings new knowledge about conflict and coexistence to the fore, and a fresh ethnographic perspective, specifically through an inter-ethnic and religious family's lens to the study of conflict and displacement.

The entry points in this study help to better frame the experiences and struggles of displacement in ethnic groups, demonstrating a future societal shift away from conflict-centered narratives, as suggested by Alpers (1966; 1974) and Rita-Ferreira (1973) that these groups are "ethnical traditional enemies". By deepening and foregrounding the significance of these entry points, especially through Cabo Delgado's case study, it offers nuanced, intersectional lenses through which to examine many existing social issues operating in that society; particularly the notion and practice of foodways, traditional food, multicultural family and coexistence, particularly highlighting the intersections between inter-ethnic marriages, belonging and homemaking or ethnophobia. The practices of ethno-terror were lifted over time and space. If they still exist, the society finds itself needing to rapidly adapt existing systems and economy, given the importance placed on the idea of social harmony.

One last entry point is to highlight the specific uses of motifs of loss, grief and melancholy. How people, who experienced terror and fear in its profound form and felling, mourn their loved ones. I did try to draw attention for a nuanced understanding of the dead body, tombstones, morning and melancholy – how these intersect with the concept of home. The findings are very limited to highlight in depth. Many of those people felt pain in discussing this subject and simply said, "I go to the cemetery to visit''. As Atas (2023) says, building on the notion of harmony, discussions about melancholy as an expression of devotion to the ideal of a (free) homeland or a stubborn attachment to home, as grief for a loved one lost in political struggle, as the source of a criminal act as well as an endless grief for a lost female "honour" in a community beset by matriarchal cultural norms and values would also offer and elicit representations of healing, peace and coexistence.

4.4. Living together: ignoring roots, negotiating home to belong or '*revolving door*'?

For millions of Amakhuwa and Makonde, eight years – and counting – have passed since they were forced to flee death and seek refuge in safe physical spaces to stay. Many of them first conceived it as temporary displacement. Now, almost a decade after, they

have decided to adapt. What was perceived as a temporary appropriation of physical spaces, was claimed and transformed, imbued (attachment) with meanings into a personal or ethno-cultural significant place. Amakhuwa and Makonde people are living together and giving those settlements cultural constructed and articulated meanings of belonging, compounded in houses, farming land, food and foodways, marriage and family unities. They have negotiated their perception and social spatial beliefs and affinities about 'where and when is home', by negotiating their memories of rootedness and imagining 'a home to be'. Conflict and terror, safety and traumas played vital role in this negotiation of ethnical and spatial boundaries. This is not to say that they did not use to live together. They did. However, they did live in a confined *ethno-clan space*, this to refer to space and community (village) where many inhabitants would be people from the same (blood) family i.e., kinship, clan and ethnic groups; and across the round would be a different ethnic group and configuration. Now, they are *ethno-mingled communities* or societies. This is the case in Ngalane 2 and 3, and Marocane; not to mention the urban areas in Pemba city (which deserve further elaboration).

> *"[Are there Makonde in Macomia too?] Yes, that's where the Makonde tribe begins. Macomia is a zone of divergence, it's where the* Makhuwa *ends and the Makonde begins. The coastal area is Kimwani, yes. So, the Makonde plateau begins there in Macomia and goes to Muidumbe, Mueda. [The plateau begins in Macomia?] Yes. Mueda is the highest point, I would say that. [And in the area where you were born, where your parents are from, were there* Makhuwa *too?] Well, the district of Macomia is made up of three tribes, the* Makhuwa *the Makonde and the Kimwani, and these three tribes are very friendly with each other in Macomia. That's why it's rare for a Makonde from Macomia not to be able to speak Kimwani or* Makhuwa *and vice versa. Both the Kimwani and the Macuas get along very well and respect each other, and they respect each other so well that, at least in Macomia, there are no tribal problems... Each understands the other's tribe and respects it above all else. The Kimwani know how the Makonde live, and they respect that. Let me tell you a story. My grandparents are Makonde, living in the village of Litamanda, in this case my mother's parents, in the administrative post of Chai, they are Makonde, but at the time my grandparents welcomed the Kimwani who came from*

the coastal area for trade there in Litamanda, on the banks of the Messalo River. They stayed at my grandparents' house, so my grandparents, knowing that these friends were Kimwani and of the Muslim religion, out of respect and friendship, did not allow pork to be consumed in my grandparents' house. Anything that was haram had to be cancelled while the guests were there... because it was consideration and respect, you know. And that created family ties, different tribes, Kimwani and Makonde, and vice versa. Even though they were Makhuwa*, that was the situation. The* Makhuwa *also knew how to respect the other tribe, as did the Makonde, at least there in my parents' area of origin, you know. I lived there..." [Women Host community – Pemba city].*

There is a *social transformation* in Cabo Delgado, in space and culture or ethnicity. There are emerging *ethno-mingled communities* and rural neighbourhoods (*bairros rurais*). Now, these ethnic groups come to rely on 'territoriality' (Casey, 2009) to maintain the stability and security of a home-place or home-region by foraging patterns of 'ecological niche'**,** and yet retaining basic cultural and ethnic unity over long periods (Barth F. , 1956).

Individual and collective displacement results not only in the loss of permanence of place but its very availability. In these circumstances, social mores and expectations based on existing kinship or where comfortable attachment is often absent and disrupted, navigation and negotiation are put in motion to find one's position and place. This navigation and negotiation are underpinned by readjustments required to the place of origin, as well as managing the imagined preconception and experience in the new places (Allwood, 2020).

Edward Casey (2009) dedicated the 2nd edition of his book *("Getting back into place...")* to tracing and fully allude to different dimensions of place and belonging. Our lives are so place-oriented and saturated to prolong any imagination of living in a void place, he alluded. Casey (2009) goes on to add that even when we are displaced, we continue to count upon some reliable place, if not our present precarious place, then a place-to-come or a place-that-was. For those displaced ethnic groups, home is communality, a place to find safety and belong to. From Marocane to Ngalane 2 and 3 or all-over other displacement and resettlement zones, those are 'place to come' and 'a home to be'. Those are reliable, safe places and a home for now. This is true to sustain my argument.

It is true that we should give careful attention to the variety of boundary-making strategies, as well as to occurring processes of changes in and of ethnicity, but it is also true that ethnic boundaries are characteristically porous and mutable, to some extent. This renewed sense of belonging (together) expresses the process of cultural and social transformation and presence of ethno-mutual support that creates a way of life to which belonging is established. This also describes the process where old roots of each group grew into fashioned out characteristics, for instance, the type of mapiko masqueraded women. They are not mandatory anymore. These women, particularly those living in the cities, have found and encountered new ways to manifest their *makondisation* and *Makhuwalization*.

One of the defining characteristics of these *ethno-mingled communities* is **impoverishment**. Human mobilities often result in transrootdness and is also expected to lead to a form of *gentrification* in areas of arrival. Here, again, displacement has created a Janus-faced dynamic of urbanization. First, a sort of *gentrification* – of course. These areas now have electricity, increased property (land) values, new schools and hospitals and sometimes influx of new 'wealthier' residents. If looked from the perspective of resettled people and built neighbourhood, the Marocane camp reflects this sort of gentrification; but, from the perspective of host community – the impact is contrary. People have lost their farming and ancestries' land and access to other natural resource, due to unfinished processes from the state, as described. Gentrification is a valid description for those areas and districts where gas and minerals are being explored. Second, and specific to some of those displaced areas (e.g., Ngalane 2 and 3), there was also a process that can be (forcedly) considered de facto "*slumification"* – observed evidence of heavy distress or impoverishment in the physical fabric of dwellings and communities. Take the case of Pemba city, and the communities in Ngalane 2 and 3. For millions of displaced people, conflict and displacement brought impoverishment. Being forced to move meant both to have your life spared, but then, to face several risks in the process of escaping terror and find refuge. This risk included the unhappy prospect of disorientation, of not knowing your way between places: having no proper or lasting place, no place to be or to remain and, ultimately, to return to. Displacement and resettlement areas became a sort of a *transition house* – which is better than none. In the

fact of this risk, millions of displaced people are forced to adopt foraging patterns of '*revolving doors'* – a de facto *refoulement***.**

There are three dimensions of return. There are those groups who have returned to Quissanga and Macomia, for instance, just to harvest fish and bring it to the safe zones, for consumption and sale. There are those who, on their way back to their place of origin (Nangade, Muidumbe or Palma), decide to establish a temporary *transition space or house* in Mocimboa da Praia (relatively safe) while waiting and assessing safety in their districts, which are nearby. Lastly, there are those who decide to return point-blank to their old house or ancestral lands to live in danger. The concept and practice of '*revolving doors' or* de facto *refoulement* only encompass these last two groups.

The second feature in these *ethno-mingled communities* is **peace and harmony** or reshaped communality. This is what I call societies and communities *entangled in rapprochement and appeasement*. This is not a diplomatic strategy *per se*, but rather a *fine-tune* social strategy for coexistence – this, assuming that there was conflict between these ethnic groups. When I asked my interviewees, no one had memories of conflict in rural areas, but in urban settings. The oldest man I interviewed was so happy saying, "*I have friends who are Makhuwa and Kimwani. There is no conflict here. There never was before – even where I come from… of course I would marry an Makhuwa woman, but I have my wife now [who is also Makonde]*". Most of the conflicts reported are not ethnic-related but are an integral part of broader social relationships and are motivated by resource scarcity, such as land and access to water in fountains. Those are typical within any community.

In urban areas, it is completely different. There is still tension between these two ethnic groups, which might be secular, but it can be argued that it has intensified between the 1960s – 1990s; and even more in the past 10 years. I saw a few factors fuelling this tension. One is economic in nature, or access to economic resources. The amakhuwa people believe that the Makonde are part of the elite and political establishment which led the large land concessions, dispossessions, grabbing, and eviction from their ancestral homelands, particularly after independence, when Samora Machel and his government decided to mobilize and allocate the Makonde to the main cities and villages and main political positions – during the formation of the modern State.

The empirical evidence from this research, and from other scholars, such as Adam (1993) (2024; 2020), would completely reject West (2004, p. 2) assertion that the discursive construction of the Makonde-speaking residents of the Mueda plateau reproduced their political and economic marginalization within Mozambican society and beyond. It is the opposite. Bussotti and Nhauleque (2022, p. 161) argue that the amakhuwa people were excluded from the process of sharing the dividends of independence. They believe that an alliance of the Machangana and Maronga (from the south[16]) and Makonde guerrillas (from Cabo Delgado) carried out this exclusion.

> *"They took on such an important role that it was impossible not to recognise them as having an important place within Frelimo ... this operation passed the temporal space of the liberation struggle, permeated the socialist experience of Samora Machel, and continued, with the given differences, to manifest itself until today, even after the democratic opening of the 1990s"* (Bussotti & Nhaueleque, 2022, p. 5).

Now, the ideologies have changed, but the internal scenario has remained practically unchanged. One of my interviewees believes that this exclusion was justified due to lack of trust on the Amakhuwa people. They are believed to have fought along and affiliated with the Portuguese against FRELIMO, during the independence. The problem of trust and suspicion between these ethnic groups' dates back centuries, but it turned into antagonism during the 1960s and 1970s (Simango, 1969; Mondlane, 1969). The Amakhuwa people also blame the Makonde for corruption and poor governance, which led Mozambique into deepening poverty rate. In the past ten years alone, the poverty rate rose from 46.1% in 2015, to more than 65% according to the 2025-44 National Development Strategy (ENDE). They believe, the idea that nationalism and its narrative served to unite both linguistically and culturally various populations against both external and internal threats is false.

There were three moments cementing Amakhuwa people's exclusion. First when the capital of Cabo Delgado was moved from Ibo to what was then known as Porto Amelia

[16] Who dominated the formation of Frelimo, led by Eduardo Mondlane until he died in 1969; then continued under the leadership of Samora Moisés Machel.

(Pemba) in 1929. Second, soon after independence and it was extended to 1990s; and, finally, currently during this conflict. Moreover, it also believed that with the change in the government, the Makonde have lost their power and are now trying to reinvent themselves; whether by massification of cultural events in the city or by creating their '*makonde*' WhatsApp group, where only meddle-class and elite Makonde are part of or can be added. Two days before I finish my field work, the municipality announced a massive and exclusive Makonde event, to take place in August 2025. This can be perceived as one of *fashionisation* of their roots. What is true to say is that the Makonde tradition is represented differently in urban and rural areas. One of our interviewees said:

There is an apparent ethnical harmony colouring the city of Pemba. I was told something akin to this while conducting my interviews in Pemba. I witnessed firsthand how the discursive construction of this antagonism plays out among players on the ground. The sense of superiority and uniqueness, suspicion, and accusation of defilement and immorality between them. All these and more come together condensed and melt down, fuelling a clear and often expressed tension, mainly driven by access to resources and political power. Regarding the Amakhuwa people and tradition, and I must agree – based on my own reading, the 'Makonde are an ethno-linguistic group constituted in relatively recent times'. They have emerged from their political and economic marginalization within Mozambican society and beyond (West H. G., 2004). They managed to forge their history and alliances very well to position themselves with distinction within Mozambique's political and economic *constellation*. In general, the traditions about the proto-Makuas (compounding the northern branch giving rise to the modern Makua and the south-eastern branch – *i.e.,* the Lolo and Lomwes) date before 800 and 1 000 A.D. The Makonde, on the other hand, are "a little-known ethnic group" and "very little is known about *their* origin… The absence of tribal organization made it impossible for a collective consciousness of a common historic destiny to develop amongst them" (Rita-Ferreira, 1973, p. 71). There is nothing much unique in them, I believe. Adam (1993) and West (2004) came to a similar conclusion that Makonde identity must be a recent construct, as a mere assemblage of slave refugees. This is so true that O'Neill was disappointed in his hope of discovering "some curious customs special to this tribe, which had earned for itself such a name for exclusiveness and idiosyncrasy" (2014, p. 20; 2024, p. 2). The

ancientness of their tradition is more rooted in assumptions of their lives on high ground, rather than in historical facts. Alpers (1966) located Makonde's tradition around the eighteenth century. Harry West (2004) corroborates Alpers but opts to question Henry O'Neill's narrative of his first encounter with residents of the plateau, in 1882. According to West (2004, pp. 2-3), O'Neill's narrative – the first of any significance in the written record on the inhabitants of the plateau – almost dismantled all the narratives and colonial epistemology about the tradition of the Makonde. While many scholars described the inhabitants of the plateau as primitive, irascible, untrustworthy, isolated and exclusive, rude and aggressive, or fierce and inhospitable, O'Neill's account described them as civilized and civilizing people, "hospitable,'' "generous,'' and "harmless folk. O'Neill's description does not serve to undermine how the Makonde have been portrayed, considering that the residents of the Mueda plateau would embody multifaceted and sometimes contradictory subjectivities borne of the complexity of the historical moment in which they live and lived. Indeed, West (Ibid) prefers to believe in his intuition, as would most contemporary anthropologists, he argues, that those residents of the plateau with whom Henry O'Neill met more than a century before were rather more complex subjects than O'Neill suggested (West H. G., 2004, p. 2). O'Neill's description served to provide a significant figure in the ethnography and ethnology of the Makonde.

What also prompts my questioning is the constitution of the Makonde as an ethnic group, and the nature of the boundaries within the group and between them and others. They do feature the traditional proposition from which an ethnic group was understood, before Fredrik Barth, but it is also true that existing social anthropologists and ethnographers, and ethnology work on these ethnic groups in Mozambique have largely avoided discussing the representation of the encompassing social system within which smaller, concrete groups and units may be analysed. As O 'Neill did point out, among the Makonde, there was widespread practice of facial scarification and the use of the lip-plugs among women and men, distinguishing them from neighbouring tribes; but he concluded that they had much in common with the Mavia people. This corroborates with Fredrik Barth's (1969) ideas of ethnic groups and boundaries. Ultimately, the word Makonde, as a collective or (adjectivally), as Makonde art or culture, has evolved over time.

4.5. Conclusion

Two main conclusions were drawn from this chapter. Firstly, ethnic manifestation and identity survived dramatic changes after independence, wherein (cultural) traditions were seen as treat, and it should be purified of all residues of obscurantism, tribalism, and sexism and made into a new national culture. In its core manifestation, the same pattern of resistance has manifested with this new war: critical dimensions of ethnic manifestation and identity survived dramatic changes caused by the terrorism, today. Secondly, while the concept of *home* may have survived these changes, its spatial manifestation (in place) and some elements of home did not. For instance, some structures of a *house* have been changing, from the impact of Portuguese colonialism war, the Frelimo regime, and civil war; and nowadays with terrorism.

5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

The objective or rationality behind this dissertation is to narrate the (impact) lived experience of two main ethnic groups, in displacement and re-encountering place (to dwell or belong), highlighting the ongoing conflict in Cabo Delgado. The ethnic groups I refer to are the Makonde and Makhuwa people, who are reported to be involved in a secular ethnic conflict, and, to whom the current political situations, conflict and other crises (such as cyclones, famine) situations give rise to people becoming displaced and 'refugees' in their own land. Here, in a dual behaviour, they must negotiate between the experiences of the past and the expectations of the future, to find home.

Totally relying of ethnography, I used a total of eighteen (twelve displaced families, and six host families) life-stories and descriptive writing to navigate about the events that took place to present their socio-cultural context, where they must emulate practice of placemaking and dwelling. I also use some reflective writing, including my own experiences as a migrant – to put in Roland's words (he believes that I was also 'forced' to displace myself for studying, and ended in settling in Maputo); to complement the how I approached the observations. The main research question was the *ethnic-specific elements of what makes a home (in place) and if these elements could be transposed to another space or place?*

The above questions draw attention to the entry stories, how displaced people see themselves and interpret their experience of displacement, how that affects their overall life experience and expectations, what elements are mobilised, and what are the implications for their future aspirations regarding finding (new) home. In this regard, the study made the following observations.

First, lower-class Makonde and Amakhuwa people [re]created and expanded their social networks through temporary and permanent appropriation of space and new neighbouring practices, characterised by a sort of appeasement and rapprochement. This did not entail changes in the concept and practice of *home*, as it continued to be a plural-multilayered material concept, but it entailed changes for its spatial manifestation (in place) and some elements of *home,* taking *house* as an example. To put it in different words, and to begin with*: just give them legalised access to farming land and means to*

build housing. This amounts to giving a starting and central point of departure to a sense of belonging to a place, to dwell, and to socially reconstruct their lives.

This study argued and demonstrated that many displaced people, encompassing both the Makua and Makonde people, have returned to their place of origin, in a process of *de facto* 'refoulement' or 'revolving doors'. This could be framed onto impoverishment and unmet safety and economic needs (variation of skills) within the scope of forging new patterns of 'ecological niche', among other factors. Nevertheless, it is also true that many more have found a place they call home. The concept and practice of home only changed geographically, in terms of location, but remained a plural-multifaced material concept. Home equals communality, encompassing house (which are different in structure), farming land, and community (ethnical units and groups, tribe and clans, etc.). Moreover, the malleability of social networks versus individual needs within these ecological niches. These elements (of home) demonstrate how ecological variation, caused by displacement, and the interaction with other groups, has resulted in variations in organization and identity among Makonde and Amakhuwa peoples, and the identity indeed focuses on individual social actors making choices based on personal gain, in relation to a specific historical and social conjuncture. This is where what I call ethno-mingled communities or societies have emerged. They represent and show how the displaced ethnic groups dealt with their immediate environment in the aftermath of displacement: how they appropriated spaces and built new neighbouring practices. These ethno-mingled communities or societies ultimately constitute a starting point for forging peace building and peace maintenance, a sort of appeasement social transformation, in a context of an overt pacific process of generating ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance.

Second, it is too soon to defend the idea of a simultaneous process of stretching and dilation of ethnic boundaries. It is true that ethnic manifestations were transplanted to another geographic space, and these ethno-mingled communities or societies also represent the [re]creation and stretching of inter-ethnic social networks; but the empirical characteristics and boundaries of those ethnic groups do not accord with my assumption of an unproblematic and parallel process of stretching and dilation of ethnic boundaries. Practically all my reasoning rested on the premise that while ignoring roots

(of 'traditional enemies') and living together, these ethnic groups, in their own discrete culture, embarked in dilatation of their internal constitutions and variation – whereby their essence were maintained while living in isolated space because there was no change and acculturation [cf., e.g., the Makonde - they are famous for and romanticised as the isolated "angry people"]; and stretching their boundaries to the extent whereby geographical and social isolation could no longer be the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity. The empirical data about ethnic boundaries (amid conflict) documented here lead to two discoveries, which demonstrate the inadequacy of my view. First, there was indeed 'stretching' in these ethnic groups, which only consisted of physically extending the geographic dimensions of their 'local' and 'locale'. This is the only factor sustaining social transformation, the emergence of ethno-mingled communities or societies. Second, there was no dilation. Cultural differences persist despite their inter-ethnic contact and interdependence. This is true to say that ethnic boundaries persist, despite the fact of having these ethnic groups mingling in the same communities. Living together did not entail an entire social process of incorporation and acculturation, or even, from one angle, "Makondisation" yet. Stable, persisting, and often vital social relations were maintained across such boundaries, sustaining the social appeasement and rapprochement. By this, I do not mean to exclude dilation and blurred boundaries from an immediate future equation. This might be the case of the next generation of children born into displacement, who are usually from their parents' relocation or resettlement place. They would or would not maintain ties to their own ethnic group, for example, through bilingualism, marriage practices, and informal interaction, and may thus identify with another ethnic group.

The third conclusion: there is a sort of 'appeasement' and 'rapprochement' in and around ethno-mingled communities or societies in rural areas, but not in urban settings. For rural areas, I would say that the idea that these ethnic groups are "traditional enemies" is often a distortion created by external forces or political actors for their own gain, rather than an inherent or long-standing reality. In urban areas, ethnic differences account for deepening social and political tension in urban areas, and it has intensified over the past decade. Makua people are still labelled untrustworthy by the Makonde people, who they also accuse them of being responsible for the insurgency and corruption to control most

Mozambican resources. These tensions and quarrels around elitism, regionalism, and ethnicity are secular in the province and have intensified since the 1960s.

The conclusions above prompted me to question how the discussion about ethnic groups and ethnicity in Mozambique has been theorised, which entailed simplistic generalizations: race = a culture = a language; independently of other social characteristics, and a view of strictly and geographically bounded ethnic culture. Despite the temptation, I do not wish to diminish the importance of my predecessors, particularly in relation to this research, but rather to suggest a rethinking based on a combination of theoretical and empirical data of individual and collective manifestations of ethnicity. It has become clear to me that I tended to fail as well in not avoiding using abstracted concepts of 'culture' and 'society', as well, to elucidate and represent the multiplicity of social systems within these groups and units that emerged, or processes involved in generating and maintaining ethnic groups. In the contemporary Mozambican historiography, ethnic groups (less of ethnicity) have been at the heart of the few scholars' research, but, these major theories and empirical studies mainly analysed ethnicity as political identity (politicization of ethnicity), for many reasons. However, prioritizing ethnicity in this way risks overlooking the potential impact of other social factors and, consequently, the range of implications to how identity should be conceptualized and why some forms of identity are activated, mobilized, and contested; how identities are represented or intersect with other salient identities; and, most importantly, in our case, what factors affect the integration of immigrants or displaced people and which varieties of social lives enable the flourishing of plural identities. My 'ethnohistory' viewpoint suggests that from the 1930s, when the Makonde started to relocate themselves from their isolation in the Mueda Plateau to the littoral and the hinterland of southern Cabo Delgado, they became involved in a sort of dilatation. They have been reported to be essentially open to whoever wished to become Makonde. This also happened with the Amakhuwa people and is even more visible. There are Makhuwa-mêto, Makhuwa-nahara, Makhuwa-lomwe, and so on. These amakhuwa culture-bearing units emerged while they were settling along the areas of what is known as Niassa, Zambezia, the littoral of northern Cabo Delgado and Nampula. This expansion, accompanied by adaptation to the environment of territories with varying ecological circumstances, entailed regional

diversities of overt institutionalized behaviour – such as pronunciation, which does not necessarily reflect differences in cultural orientation.

In the light of the above, my researcher contributes to the studies on the Makonde and Amakhuwa peoples in three distinct ways. First, as it has been argued by few scholars, from a methodological standpoint, the research is pioneering in its interdisciplinary orientation, bridging anthropology, urban-rural studies and displacement theory. It is an integrative lens that enables a holistic portrayal of both, the urban and rural displacement phenomenon that surpasses discipline-specific limitations. It also situates the localized case of Mozambique's Cabo Delgado within broader global discussions on displacement, migration, and urbanization trends, offering transferable insights for scholars and practitioners worldwide. Second, studies of broader conflict and displacement have focused primarily on traditional art and rites, poverty, and the lack of social cohesion, resource exploitation, etc; ignoring the issues related to ethnicity and cultural variation among two ethnic groups reported to be in secular conflict against each other. This dissertation fills in a gap in the literature by addressing contemporary ethnicity and cultural variation, on which little research has been conducted since Dias and Margot. Second, calls attention to the fact that, now more than ever, the issues of culture, ethnicity, and ethnic boundary are valid and have even gained a new relevance. There is an 'awakening' and a profound shift among the youth concerning their perception and awareness or interpretation of the war in Cabo Delgado, whereby issues are being raised over the fact that the (Mueda) Plateau Makonde has not been subject to any kind of attack since the war started, turning it, again, into an ethnic conflict and hunting.

Lastly, it was revealed in this dissertation that a new trend and dynamic in youth radicalization, which involves and evolves around recruitment and violent instrumentalization of women. The self-proclaimed Jihadist group is using tactics to reorient and manipulate gender roles in that conflict, leveraging social media, and using discourses of offering a sense of empowerment or belonging, and exploiting their vulnerabilities to their recruitment and radicalization.

5.1. Future Studies or PhD Research

During my Master's (this second one), I attended several conferences and published a total of 3 articles (including a book chapter). For instance, in 2024, I attended the 8th Annual Conference organized by the Refugee Law Initiative [at the University of London] and presented the outcome of my research (Tivane, 2024b). There, aside from meetings with different scholars from across the Globe, I had many discussions (to point the one with Nicholas Maple – a senior Lecturer in Refugee Studies at the University of London and Co-Editor-in-Chief of Refugee Survey) and started to frame my PhD or a Book – now that I have decided to take a two-years' *hiatus*, from studying.

A PhD or a Book Project would represent a thorough study of the same subfield and area of inquire in this dissertation. Why, one would ask.

[I must] "run to live", one old former fisherman from Quissanga district, Mozambique's Cabo Delgado, told me – in March 2025. This, by far, lies in the very core of what it is to experience war and displacement, today and many years to come. War is not only terrorizing people, or 'displacing' cultures, it is at the heart of social transformation in Cabo Delgado, particular from the standpoint of (rural) urbanization – with the emergency of *ethno-mingled communities or societies*. This social transformation is by no means new. Similar processes took place in 1930, 1975-77 and 1992, I would argue. Direct or indirectly associated, these processes have all led to prolonged conflicts. If we take and analyse the loss and gains experienced in these processes, from an ethnic perspective, and the resentments carried upon; I believe that ethnicity and cultural variation would be one of factors fuelling recuring conflicts, and these factors should be revisited, not set aside. While now these factors may not play critical role in rural areas, it does in urban areas – where ethnic difference continue to sustain Barth's idea (economic politicization of ethnicity). The narratives given to me by those I interviewed in urban areas are similarly characterise by hatred, accusation and contempt, and these narratives contribute to feelings of exclusion, marginalization and perpetuated distorted discourses (of 'traditional enemies'). Hopefully a continuation of this research focus will add to the literature bank of this nature as it is needed in the Mozambican historiography to inform decision making for planning urbanization and policy development to support planned and involuntary displacement.

The neglection or dearth of work in the field of ethnicity and cultural variation in Mozambique had two lasting consequences to the field of Mozambican ethno-historiography. The first was to narrow the focus of cultural inquiry to matters of customary authority and supernatural belief, disregarding and thus foreclosing the study of ethnicity and identity away from other social factors and more complex lines. The second was to produce a representation of the one ethnic group as a political other. For the Makonde people, the Makhuwa people are not trustful and should not join the political constellation and somewhat estranged from the political processes of which they were supposed to also be protagonists (considering they effort in fighting colonialism).

A second subfield to dive into is that of humanitarian laws and affinities within displaced communities. No one that I interviewed and asked if [they would] know about humanitarian laws, responded positively. I would even risk saying that this lacking knowledge goes beyond displaced communities. Of course, this has several implications and raises questions about the relevance of the humanitarian laws, the fairness of lasting solutions and accountability in such complex and vulnerable situation, be that from humanitarian practitioner's point or from the viewpoint of those who make decisions. This area of inquire and research lens [culture of laws, law and social change or legal anthropology], would be completely new into the existing literature on Cabo Delgado (over last decade), but, still, it does not excite me. Nevertheless, it could excite legal scholars and practitioners alike.

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adam, Y. (1993, Outubro). MUEDA, 1917-1990: RESISTENCIA, COWNIALISMO LIBERTAf;AO E DESENVOLVIMENTO. *ARQUIVO 14*, pp. 9-101.

Allwood, A. (2020). *Belonging in Brixton: An Ethnography of Migrant West Indian Elders in Brixton, London* (1st ed.). London : Palgrave.

Alpers, E. (1966). *The role of the Yao in the development of trade in East-Central Africa, 1698 - c. 1850* (PhD Thesis ed.). London: Univeristy of London.

Alpers, E. A. (1974). Ethnicity, Politics, and History in Mozambique. *Africa Today, XXI*(4), 39-52.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: reflection on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Andits, P. (2015). Rethinking Home, Belonging, and the Potentials of Transnationalism: Australian Hungarians after the Fall of the Berlin Wall. *ETHOS, Vol. 43, Issue 4*, 313–331.

Antonsich, M. (2010). In search of belonging: an analytical framework. *Geography Compass*, 1-31.

Appadurai, A. (1988). Introduction: Place and Voice in Anthropological Theory. *Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 3, No. 1, Place and Voice in Anthropological Theory*, 16-20.

Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 294-310.

Appadurai, A. (1992). Global Ethnoscape: notes and queries for transnacional anthropology. In R. Fox, *Recapturing Anthropology: working in the present* (pp. 191-210). Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of America Research Press.

Asher, R., & Moseley, C. (2018). *Atlas of the World's Languages*. London: Routledge.

Atas, A. (2023). *Resistance, Loss and Grief: The Implications of Melancholy in Modern Kurdish Novels (Thesis)*. London: SOAS University of London.

Babbie, E. (1994). *The practice of social research*. Belmont: Thompson Wadsworth.

Banks, M. (1996). *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions*. London: Routledge.

Barth, F. (1956). Ecologic Relationships of Ethnic Groups in Swat, North Pakistan. *American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 58, No. 6*, 1079 - 1089 .

Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (1 ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Barth, T. F. (1959). *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans*. London: Athelone Press.

Barth, T. F. (1981). *Features of Person and Society in Swat: Collected Essays on Pathans*. (2 ed.). London: Routledge & K. Paul.

Basso, K., & Feld, S. (1996). *Sense of place.* Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research.

Baumeister, R., & Leary, M. (1995). The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 497-529.

Bertelsen, B. E. (2016). *Violent becomings : state formation, sociality, and power in Mozambique* (4 ed.). New York: Berghahn Books.

Bianco, C. D. (2020). *Pemba: Spontaneous Living Spaces* (1 ed.). London: Routledge Editor.

Boerekamp, E., Louw-Vaudran, L., Els, W., Chelin, R., & Adam, Y. (2022). *Violent extremism in Mozambique: Drivers and links to transnational organised crime* . Maputo: Institute for Security Studies & Judicial Training Institute of Mozambique.

Bortolot, A. I. (2007). *A Language for Change: Creativity and Power in Mozambican Makonde Masked Performance, circa 1900-2004* (PhD Thesis ed.). New York: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Bussotti, L., & Coimbra, E. (2023, January 9). Struggling the Islamic State in Austral Africa: The SADC military intervention in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) and its limits. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 1-8.

Bussotti, L., & Nhaueleque, L. (2022). Processes of Ethnic and Cultural Marginalisation in Post-Colonial Africa.The Case of the Amakhuwa of Mozambique. *Comunicação e sociedade [Online], 41*.

Caelli, K., Ray , L., & Mill, J. (2003). Clear as mud: towards greater clarity in generic qualitative research. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods. vol. 2(2),*, 1-13.

Cahen, M., Rosario, D., & Morier-Genoud, E. (2018). *The War WIthin: new perspectives on the civil war in Mozambique, 1976-1992.* New York: James Currey.

Casey, E. S. (2009). *Getting back into place: toward a renewed undestanfing of the place-world* (2nd ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Clifford, J. (1992). Traveling Culture. In L. Grossberg, C. Nelson , & P. Treichler, *Cultural Studie* (pp. 95-116). London: Routledge.

Conceição, J. (2017). *Costumes ancestrais do povo makhuwa-metto de Montepuez, Moçambique: ensaio de antropologia e etnografia.* Ciedima Lda: 2017.

Creswell, J., & Plano Clark, V. (2011). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research.* Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Darch, C., & Hedges, D. (2021). Liberation and Biographical Narrative in Mozambican Historiography: The Struggle in Cabo Delgado, 1962–1974. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 47*(4), 605–625.

Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (1994). *Handbook of qualitative research*. Califórnia: Sage Publications, Inc.

Devermont, J. (2024, September 04). Is There an Ethnic Insurgency in Northern Mozambique. Maputo: Fraym.

Dias , J., & Dias, M. (1964b). *Os Macondes de Moçambique Vol. II: Cultura Material*. Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Centro de Estudos de Antropologia.

Dias, J. (1964a). *Os Macondes de Moçambique, vol. I: Aspectos Históricos e Económicos*. Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Centro de Estudos de Antropologia.

Dias, J., & Dias, M. (1970). *Os Macondes de Moçambique Vol. III: Vida Social e Ritos*. Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Centro de Estudos de Antropologia Cultural,.

Eriksen, T. H. (2017). *What is Anthropology?* (2 ed.). London: Pluto Press.

Eriksen, T., & Jakoubek, M. (2019). *Ethnic groups, boundaries and Today*. London : Routledge.

Fabian, j. (1983). *Time & the other: how anthropology makes it subject* . New York: Columbia University Press.

Feijó , J., & Balane, N. (2024). *UMA FRAUDE CHAMADA ENSINO PRIMÁRIO PÚBLICO? REPRODUÇÃO DE DIFERENTES NÍVEIS DA CIDADANIA E COMPROMETIMENTO DE UM PROJECTO DE UNIDADE NACIONAL*. Maputo: OMR.

Feijó, J. (2020). *Social Asymmetries Clues to Understand the Spread of Islamist Jihadism in Cabo Delgado*. Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security.

Feijó, J., & Maquenzi , J. (2019). *POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND CONFLICT THE NORTHERN CABO DELGADO*. Maputo: Observador Rural.

Feijó, J., Maquenzi, J., Salite, D., & Kirshner, J. (2022, Agosto). EXPLORING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE IN 2021. *OBSERVADOR RURAL*, pp. 1-40.

Filipe, E., & Norfolk, S. (2017). *Understanding changing land issues for the rural poor in Mozambique*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Funada-Classen, S. (2012). *The Origins of war in Mozambique: a History of Unity and Division* (1 ed.). Hongo Bunkyoku, Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo Co Ltd .

Gammeltoft, T. M. (2018). Belonging: Comprehending Subjectivity in Vietnam and Beyond. *Social Analysis, Volume 62, Issue 1,*, 76-95.

García, M. G. (2025). Food, religion, and gender in medieval and early modern Iberia: A theoretical and conceptual framework. *Food and Foodways: explorations in the History and Culture of Human Nourishment, 33*(2), 150-170.

Geertz, C. (1977). *The Interpretation Of Cultures* . New York: Basic Books.

Geffray, C. (1990). *Ni père, ni mere, Critique de la parenté: le cas makhuwa*. Paris: ÉDITIONS DU SEUIL.

Geffray, C. (1990). *Le cause des armes au Mozambique: anthropologie d'une guerre civile* (1 ed.). Paris, : Karthala, .

Geffray, C., & Pedersen, M. (1988). Nampula en guerre. *Politique africaine, n°29: Mozambique : guerre et nationalismes*, pp. 28-40;.

Gittens, A. J. (2015). *Tales From the Crossroads* (1st ed.). California: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform .

Glazer , N., & Moynihan, D. (1963). *Beyond the melting pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City.* Massachusetts: Massachusetts Inst. Technology Pres.

Glazer , N., & Moynihan, D. (1975). *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience.* US: Harvard University Press.

GOVERNO DE MOÇAMBIQUE. (2021). *Política e Estratégia de Gestão de Deslocados Internos (PEGDI)* . Maputo: IMPRENSA NACIONAL DE MOÇAMBIQUE, E.P. .

Grimes, B., Pittman, R., & Grimes, J. (1988). *Ethnologue : languages of the world.* Dallas, Texas.: Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Gupta, A., & Ferguson, J. (1997). Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference. In *Cultural Anthropology* (pp. 6-23). Clarendon Blvd: American Anthropological Association.

Hall, M., & Young, T. (1997). *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence* (1 ed.). Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Hanlon, J. (2010, March). Mozambique: 'the war ended 17 years ago, but we are still poor'. *Conflict, Security & Development 10:1*, pp. 1-26.

Harris, R. (2023). *Student belonging, mental wellbeing, and help-seeking at Durham University.* Durham : Durham theses, Durham University.

Henriksen, T. H. (1983). *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's war of independece, 1964-1974* (1 ed.). USA: Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data.

Henriksen, T. H. (1983). *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974* (1st ed.). Westport, CT: Praeger - Greenwood Press.

Hess, K., & Miller, L. (Ohio). *Community Policing - Partnerships for Problem Solving*. 2004: Wadsworth, Hardcover.

Hubrich, S., & Wittwer, R. (2014). Household or individual – Advantages and disadvantages of different interview selection strategies. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*(162), 439-448.

Hunt, L., & Trotman, J. (n.d). *Making The Cameo: the dilemmas of voice in an oral history project*. North Carolina: Edith Cowan University.

Huysamen, G. K. (2001). *Methodology for the social and behavioural sciences*. Southern Africa, Cape Town: Oxford University Press .

Ingold, T. (2000). *The perception of the environment: Essays on livelihood, dwelling and skill*. London: Routledge.

IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix. (2024, March 27). *Mozambique*. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from https://dtm.iom.int/mozambique

Israel, P. (2014). *In step with the times: mapiko masquerades of Mozambique*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Israel, P. (2017). Mueda massacre: the musical archive. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 43*(6), 1157-1179.

Israel, P. (2020). The Mueda Massacre Retold: The ‘Matter of Return’ in Portuguese Colonial Intelligence. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 46*(5), 1009–1036.

Israel, P. (2024). The History of the Makonde of Mozambique. Western Cape: Oxford Research Encyclopedias, African History.

Jelínek, M. (2019, August 19). Ethnic groups and boundaries today: a legacy of fifty years. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, pp. 1 - 3.

Jenkins, R. (1997). *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations*. (1 ed.). London: Sage Publications.

Katto, J. (2010). Liberating Taste: Memories of War, Food and Cooking in Northern Mozambique. *Journal of Southern African Studies, 46(5)*, 965–984.

Leary, M., & Cox, C. (2008). Belongingness motivation: A mainspring of social action’. In J. S. Gardner, *Handbook of motivation science* (pp. 27-40). New York : The Guilford Press, .

LeCompte, M., Schensul , ., & Schensul, S. (1999). *Wicke essential ethnographic methods*. London: Altamira Press.

Lincoln, Y., & Denzin, N. (1994). *Handbook of qualitative research*. California: Sage Publications, Inc.

Macaire, P. (1996). *L’héritage Makhuwa au Mozambique* . Montreal: L’Harmattan Inc.

Malinowski, B. (1944). *A scientific theory of culture and other essays.* North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.

Mandamule, U. (2023). *When the elements rage: Displacement and resettlement of populations affected by Cyclone Idai and flooding in Búzi (Mozambique).* France: Aix-Marseille University.

Marcus, G. E. (1995). ETHNOGRAPHY IN/OF THE WORLD SYSTEM: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography . *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.24*, 95-117.

Marte, L. (2012). Dominican Migrant Cooking: Food Struggles, Gendered Labor, and Memory-Work in New York. *Food and Foodways: explorations in the History and Culture of Human Nourishment City, 20*(3-4), 279-306.

Martínez, F. L. (2004). *The Makuan people and their culture: an analysis of culture values in the life-cycle of makua people, Maúa (Mozambique) 1971 - 1985*. Spain: Ediciones Laborum.

Maslow, A. H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. *Psychological Review, 50,* , 370-396.

Medeiros, E. (1997). *História de Cabo Delgado e do Niassa (c. 1836-1929).* Maputo: Central Impressora.

Medeiros, E. d. (1997). *História de Cabo Delgado e do Niassa (c. 1836-1929).* Maputo: Coperação Suíça .

Meneses, M. P. (2009). *FOOD, RECIPES AND COMMODITIES OF EMPIRES: MOZAMBIQUE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN NETWORK.* Lisboa: CES.

Mondlane, E. (1969). *The Struggle For Mozambique* (1 ed.). London: Penguin Book Lda.

Mookerjee, K. (2003). *Re-placing home: Displacement and Resettlement in India's Narmada Valley Dam Project.* London: University of London.

Munasinghe, V. (2018). Ethnicity in Anthropology. *International Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, 1-12.

Narayan, B. (2005). Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity. *THE ORIENTAL ANTHROPOLOGIST; 5(2)*, 269-280.

Ncomo, B. L. (2012). *URIA SIMANGO: Um homem, Uma causa* (1 ed.). Maputo: Ediçoes NovaAfrica.

Newitt, M. (1972). Angoche, the Slave Trade and the Portuguese c. 1844-1910. *The Journal of African History , 13*(4), 659-672.

Newitt, M. (1995). *História de Moçambique.* Publicações Europa - América: Portugal.

Ngunga, A., & Faquir, O. (2012). *Padronização da Ortografia de Línguas Moçambicanas: Relatório do III Seminário.* Maputo: Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA) – UEM.

Osório, C., & Macuacua, E. (2014). *RITES OF INITIATION IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT: ADJUSTMENTS, RUPTURES AND CONFRONTATIONS CONSTRUCTING GENDER IDENTITIES*. Maputo: WLSA MOÇAMBIQUE.

Relph, E. (1976). *Place and Placelessness. London.* London: Pion Limited.

República de Moçambique . (1995). *Resolução N.º 10/95, de 28 de Fevereiro - Aprova a Política Nacional de Terras, 1995.* Maputo: Governo de moçambique.

República de Moçambique . (1997). *Lei n° 19/1997 de 1 de outubro (Lei de Terras).* Maputo: Governo de Moçambique.

República de Moçambique. (2024). *LEI DE TERRAS (PROPOSTA DE ANTE-PROJECTO).* Maputo: Governo de moçambique.

Rita-Ferreira, A. (1973, September). THE ETHNO - HISTORY AND THE ETHNIC GROUPING OF THE PEOPLES OF MOCAMBIQUE. *Africa Insight , 3,*(1), 56 - 76.

Roosens, E. (1994). The primordial nature of origins in migrant ethnicity. In H. Vermeulen, & C. Covers, *The anthropology of ethnicity. Beyond "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries"* (pp. 81 - 104). Amsterdam: HET SPINHUIS Publishers .

Roseiro, A. H. (2013). *SÍMBOLOS E PRÁTICAS CULTURAIS DOS MAKONDE* (Tese de doutoramento ed.). Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra.

Saegusa, K. (2004). *Our Dwelling Place: The Making of a Sense of Place in Semi-rural England.* Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh.

Sefane , A., & Gomes , J. (2021 , jan.-mar.,). SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS: Moçambican ethnicities. *Revista Observatório*, pp. 1-14, .

Sen, A. (2026). Food, place, and memory: Bangladeshi fish stores on Devon Avenue, Chicago. *Food and Foodways: explorations in the History and Culture of Human Nourishment, 24*(1-2), 67-88.

Serfaty-Garzon, P. (1985). Experience and Use of the Dwelling. In I. Altman, & C. Werner , *HOME ENVIRONMENTS HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENT. ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH* (pp. 65-86). New York: Plenum Press.

Simango, U. (1969). *Gloomy Situation in Frelimo (Cyclostyled copy in the author's possession).*

Sousa, S., Gelormini, M., Damasceno, A., Lopes, S., Maló, S., Chongole, C., & Muholove, P. (2019, December). Street food in Maputo, Mozambique: Availability and nutritional value of homemade foods. *Nutrition and Health 25(1)*, pp. 37-46.

Sousa, S., Gelormini, M., Damasceno, A., Lopes, S., Padrão, P., & Moreira, P. (2021, October). Street Food in Maputo, Mozambique: The Coexistence of Minimally Processed and Ultra-Processed Foods in a Country under Nutrition Transition. *Foods 10(11)*.

Stebbins, R. A. (2001). *Exploratory Research in the Social Sciences.* Califórnia: SAGE Publications, Inc.,.

Sturridge, C., Feijó, J., & Tivane, N. (2022). *Coping with the risks of conflict, climate and displacement in northern Mozambique.* London: HPG case study. ODI.

Sulaiman-Hill, C. M., & Thompson , S. (2011). Sampling challenges in a study examining refugee resettlement. *BMC International Health and Human Rights*(11), 1-10.

Tivane, N. (2024a). Being in-between 'to return or to stay': exploring the experiences of urban displaced people in Mozambique's Pemba. *International Journal of Anthropology and Ethnology 8, 7*, 1-15.

Tivane, N. (2024b). Displacement And Legal Response in Mozambique: Mapping Gaps to Explore Existing Beyond Solutions. *International Journal of Research in Sociology and Anthropology*, 1-5.

Tivane, N. (2024c, November). Developing Mozambique's IDP Policy to Better Address Climate Change-Related Displacement. *Climate Mobility Africa Insights*, pp. 1-6.

Tuan, Y.-f. (1977). *Space and Place: the perspective of experience.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

UNICEF. (2022). *Main sociodemographic indicators of Cabo Delgado.* Maputo: UNICEF Mozambique, Maputo.

USA. (2022, March). *U.S. Government Invests in Infrastructure in Cabo Delgado with Bridge and Road Reconstruction Project*. Retrieved from USA Embassy in Mozambique: https://mz.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-invests-in-infrastructure-in-cabo-delgado-with-bridge-and-road-reconstruction-project/

Vermeulen , H., & Covers, C. (1994). Introduction. In H. Vermeulen, & C. Cover, *The anthropology of ethnicity. Beyond "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries"* (pp. 1-10). Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers.

Warsi, S. K. (2015). *Being and Belonging in Delhi: Afghan Individuals and Communities in a Global City.* London (PhD Thesis): SOAS, University of London.

West, H. G. (1977). Creative Destruction and Sorcery of Construction: Power, Hope and Suspicion in Post-WarMozambique. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines, 37*(147), 675-698.

West, H. G. (2004). Villains, Victims, or Makonde in the Making? Reading the Explorer Henry O'Neill and Listening to the Headman Lishehe. *American Society for Ethnohistory., 51*(1), 1-43.

West, H. G. (2005). *Kupilikula: governance and the invisble real in Mozambique.* Chicago: The University of Chicago.

West, H. G. (2019). We Are Who We Eat With: Food, Distinction, and Commensality. In D. Burrows, & A. Cezar, *Politics of Food*.

West, H. G. (2021). Terroir products: a movable heritage feast? *Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies*, 1-27.

West, H. G., & Kloeck-Jenson, S. (1999). Betwixt and between: 'Traditional Authority' and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique. *African Affairs, 98*(393), 455-484.

Whiteley, W. (1954). Modern Local Government among the Makua. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Oct., 1954, Vol. 24, No. 4* , 349-358.

Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Belonging and the politics of belonging. *Patterns of Prejudice, 40*(3), 197–214.

Žikić, B. (2007). Qualitative Field Research in Anthropology: An Overview of Basic Research Methodology. *Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology 2(2)*, 123-135.